Special Issue

Sequence Analysis
in Linguistics and Social Theory

edited by

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Sequence Analysis in Linguistics and Social Theory
Introduction to the Thematic Issue

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1. Introduction

This thematic issue is built around the idea that human social interaction is organized sequentially. In its most basic form, that means that we accomplish interaction in time, step-by-step, one action after the other. The consequences of this 'sequential organization of interaction' go far beyond the concrete everyday encounters themselves. Every time we interact with others, we establish, maintain, and modify social order. Every step is oriented towards the last, and even though our expectations of future steps play a decisive role in this process, we can never escape the directedness of time. We live, act, and interact on an irreversible chain of present moments and so do the people around us. Together, we generate cooperative trajectories that feed into larger structures governing social worlds and societies as a whole. Following this perspective, it is not an exaggeration to say that the sequential organization of human interaction is one of the foundations of all things social.

The contributions to this thematic issue approach this idea from different angles: Some focus on its methodological and empirical consequences (Günthner, Mondada, Franzmann, and Wagener), others on its theoretical foundations (Knoblauch, Meyer, and Loenhoff).

As a theoretical concept, sequentiality is a part of many social and linguistic theories. Among others, it is central to the pragmatist focus on processuality (see e.g. Mead 1938) and to Max Weber's theory of action (see Knoblauch in this issue) – both of which had a considerable impact on social theory and research methodologies over the last 120 years (see e.g. Deppermann/Günthner 2015). The idea of social order as a cooperative, step-by-step accomplishment is also central to Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, which is an important point of reference for many traditions of sequence analysis (see Mondada, Loenhoff, Meyer, and Wagener in this issue). Garfinkel's work was a major inspiration to the founders of modern Conversational Analysis – Harvey Sacks, Gail Jefferson, and Emmanuel Schegloff (see Schegloff 1992), but also for Ralf Bohnsack's Documentary Method and other approaches. Essentially, the concept of sequentiality acknowledges the relevance of time and temporality to human encounters. It is also central to a number of philosophical approaches that have influenced both theories and methodologies in the social sciences. Among the most influential of these are phenomenology and gestalt theory (see Christian Meyer in this issue).

Methodologically, the observation that social interaction is driven by its sequential organization has inspired a number of interpretive research traditions. In this issue, we present papers referring to (Multimodal) Conversation Analysis (discussed by Mondada, Günthner, and Loenhoff in this issue), Objective Hermeneutics (discussed by Franzmann in this issue; see also Wernet 2013), and Documentary Method (discussed by Wagener in this issue). There are many more approaches to sequence analysis in interpretive research, developed mostly in sociology and/or linguistics. Here are some examples from the German speaking countries, where sequence analysis is particularly popular: Genre Analysis (*Gattungsanalyse*; Günthner/Knoblauch 1995), Videography (Knoblauch/Tuma/Schnettler 2014), Hermeneutic Sociology of Knowledge (Soeffner 2007), Narration Analysis (Schütze 1983), and Biographical Case Reconstructions (Rosenthal 1995, 2004). These traditions have different methodological frameworks, follow different research goals, and pursue different strategies in analyzing data, but they all call their endeavour *sequence analysis* or *sequential analysis*.[2]

While the basic idea of sequentiality is central to many theoretical and methodological traditions, the conceptual details and terminology associated with it are quite diverse. As a result, it is almost impossible to describe sequentiality in terms that work for all the traditions represented in this thematic issue, beyond the very basic account we have given above. In this introduction, we are trying to honor the terminological and conceptual specificities of all three approaches, but – inevitably – representatives from every tradition will find sections that sound terminologically dissonant to them.

The origin of this thematic issue is an international conference held on October 29-30, 2020. The conference was organized mainly by the editors of this issue, as part of the research project P02 – 'Media of Praxeology II: History of audio-visual sequence analysis as a methodology'. The project is embedded in the DFG-supported Collaborative Research Center (CRC) *Media of Co-operation*, based at the University of Siegen. In the preparation of this conference, we collaborated with two other projects in the CRC: B06 – 'Un-/desired Observation in Interaction: "Intelligent Personal Assistants" (IPA)', which examines how Intelligent Personal Assistants are integrated in everyday practices, and P01 – 'Media of Praxeology I: The "Discovery Procedures" of Science and Technology Studies', which develops a digital praxeology based on the work of Harold Garfinkel.

As a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, we held the entire conference online. The topic attracted an audience of several dozen colleagues from a number of countries, time zones, and disciplines, who engaged in a lively conversation and developed new ideas and networks.[3] Over the course of two days, we heard seven theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions from various traditions, with long time slots for discussion in between. This arrangement enabled a discussion of major principles and fine details of sequence analysis, complementing abstract terminological debates with detailed empirical examples.

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[2]   There is also a line of quantitative sequence analysis (Abbott 1983, 2001; Raab/Struffolino 2022) which focuses on longitudinal data such as life course directories. Outside the social sciences, sequence analysis (of a very different kind) is also popular in the life sciences. One of the most common contexts is the analysis of human DNA.

[3]   For a more detailed review of the conference, including an overview of the program, see Hrncal/Hector (2022).

Several conference participants expressed their enthusiasm about the exchange between linguistics and sociology. This dialogue was built into our research project from the start, because the history of sequence analysis is a history of interdisciplinary collaboration.[4] The dialogue between sociologists and linguists was particularly lively throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, but over the last 40 years, it has mostly fallen silent. Conversation Analysis is one of the few fields where the exchange between linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, and communication researchers has continued since the 1960s. In this conference, we brought researchers from sociology and linguistics together, to talk about the past, present, and future of their fields. We discovered that many of the participants had a substantial interest in continuing the conversation and engaging in future collaboration.

In this introduction, we will compare the different forms of sequence analysis presented in the thematic issue. The conference and the process of producing this thematic issue helped us to advance our understanding of what holds the field together and why there is so much room for productive discussion among the different traditions. Sharing some of these insights here should provide a useful background for readers of the issue and others who are interested in the various forms of sequence analysis. We will start with a brief sketch of the history of sequence analysis (2) and proceed with the methodological commonalities (3), and differences (4) of the three approaches represented in this issue. At the end, we will give an overview of the contributions (5), and an outlook on possible questions for the future (6).

2. History of Sequence Analysis

Historically, sequence analysis first became possible with the advent of audio and visual recording technology – the phonograph, photography and film – towards the end of the nineteenth century (see e.g. Erikson 2011; McElvenny/Ploder 2021). Several pioneers in the social sciences and humanities recognized the methodological potential of this technology and used it to analyze human action and interaction. A common goal of these analyses was to reconstruct linguistic and cultural dynamics in everyday phenomena, an endeavour that can be placed in an intellectual lineage extending back to such figures as Johann Gottfried von Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt and the notion of *inner linguistic form* (in German: *innere Sprachform*). The work of pioneers in sequence analysis brought forth numerous theoretical and methodological insights and inspired the creation of various artifacts, technologies, and transdisciplinary networks.

Many traditions of sequence analysis in the social sciences (and all of the ones represented in this thematic issue) have their origins in pioneering projects throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. The first of these projects was particularly fruitful and has inspired several traditions of research in multiple disciplines: The *Natural History of an Interview* was an interdisciplinary project initiated in Palo Alto in 1955 that continued until 1968 at the various home institutions of its members. This project was crucial for the development of many traditions of sequence analysis (for

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4   The project members were recruited from both disciplines, both on the PI and Postdoc level. The work packages were designed to have a focus on one of the disciplinary histories, but with many opportunities for exchange and fruitful discussion.

details, see McElvenny/Ploder 2021). Another pioneering project analyzed telephone calls to a suicide prevention centre in Los Angeles in the 1960s and led to the development of Conversation Analysis by Harvey Sacks, Gail Jefferson, and Emanuel Schegloff (Pomerantz/Fehr 2011). It was strongly influenced by the work of Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman. The development of Objective Hermeneutics started in a project on *parents and school* (*Elternhaus und Schule*) in Frankfurt am Main in the late 1960s (for details see Franzmann in this issue). The Documentary Method was developed by Ralf Bohnsack in Erlangen/Nürnberg starting in the 1970s based on the analysis of counseling sessions in youth drug counseling centers (for details see Wagener in this issue). The traditions developed in Germany (like Objective Hermeneutics and Documentary Method, but also Hermeneutic Sociology of Knowledge, Narration Analysis, and Genre Analysis, to name just a few) were all part of a larger network that evolved in the early 1970s (see Ploder 2018). Its members met on a regular basis and had a number of shared theoretical interests. One of the key organizations of this network was the section *Sociology of Language* in the German Sociological Association (GSA), founded in 1977.[5] Today, sequence analysis is a central component of numerous methodological approaches in the social sciences. In the German-speaking countries, it has become so ubiquitous that some researchers use the terms interpretive social research and sequence analysis as synonyms (e.g. Kleemann et al. 2013).

3. What do the traditions have in common?

On a practical and methodological level, the three traditions of sequence analysis presented in this issue have a lot in common.[6] In the following, we will point out some shared characteristics, many of them also apply to other approaches mentioned above:

Sequence analysis looks at details and requires certain types of data.

Because of its analytic focus on micro-dynamics of social life, sequence analysis is always based on very detailed data and works through the details in extensive data sessions. It does not exclude any kind of data in principle, but the analysis will only yield insights into practices that the data is a *document of*. Therefore, sequence analysts often use recordings of interactions between research participants. If they do use interview data, then it is typically because they are interested in a practice documented in the interview itself – for example, the interaction between interviewer and interviewee (Wernet 2009:57f.), or the habitus of the interviewee as it is documented in the interview (see Wagener in this issue). The data is often produced with technical assistance (typically audio or video recordings), because the analysis focuses on details below the threshold of what we can see, hear, and document without technology. Before analysis, the recordings are usually transcribed according to

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[5]   In 2000, the name of the section was changed to *Sociology of Knowledge*. It is currently the section with the highest number of members in the GSA.

[6]   A different selection of commonalities and differences between Conversation Analysis, Narration Analysis, Objective Hermeneutics, and Documentary Method is discussed in Kleemann et al. (2013:198ff).

a strict transcription protocol. In data analysis, some approaches will only use the transcripts while others will use both recordings and transcripts.

Sequence analysis makes strong generalizations.

All three approaches discussed in this issue make comparatively strong generalizations based on the analysis of individual cases. The approaches have developed different strategies to connect the in-depth analysis of individual cases to more general claims about broader social phenomena, which will be discussed in section 4 of the introduction.

Sequence analysis is based on steady procedures.

Compared to other, more flexible qualitative approaches in the social sciences (like Grounded Theory, for example), sequence analyses tend to be based on rather steady procedures. These procedures can be modified with respect to specific research interests or data qualities, which enables a constant development of the approaches. But, as Kleemann et al (2013:202, translation by AP/JMc) put it, "the methods grow around a methodologically stringent core". The technical support of data production, detailed transcription, steady procedures in data analysis, and use of research groups serves the goal of maximizing confirmability and improving the validity of the interpretation. These goals are closely connected to the strong epistemological claims mentioned above.[7]

Sequence analysis is often practiced in groups.

Sequence analysis is typically practiced in a trained and skilled research group, often mixing more junior and more senior researchers. Acquiring proficiency in this type of data analysis requires several years of training, which supports the building of strong research communities – another remarkable feature of many traditions of sequence analysis. One important task of the group is to enhance the pool of perspectives on the data and produce a greater range of ideas on how to interpret it. Another is to question the interpretations of the other members of the group and make sure that only well-founded readings make their way into the research report.[8] Historically, group data sessions were one of the foundational locations in the NHI project, and many other pioneering projects on sequence analysis. In German-

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[7] Michael Lempert (2019) has pointed out that the mechanical recording, fine-grained transcription, and highly standardized protocol, which are typical for most traditions of sequence analysis, can be read as an example of mechanical objectivity, an epistemic aspiration dating back to the mid-nineteenth century (see Daston/Galison 2007:115f.).

[8] In his analysis of data sessions in Conversation Analysis, Objective Hermeneutics, Documentary Method, and Narration Analysis, Berli (2021) shows that one important strategy in group interpretation is the 'call to order'. Calls to order are "observable if one member of the interpretation group addresses another or several members, questioning not primarily the meaning of an interpretive proposition, but its *Gestalt* or the process of its formulation. These interventions more or less explicitly enact the criteria and principles of qualitative research in general or a specific methodology in particular in the interpretation process" (Berli 2021:778). According to Berli, they "help to stay within the boundaries of the conventions of the respective method of analysis, (… help) sharpening each other's arguments (…, and) immunize readings and interpretations against possible critiques" (Berli 2021:780).

speaking interpretive research, interpretating in groups is almost ubiquitous.[9] But while it seems to be a source of inspiration and mutual support in many approaches, it has a more epistemologically vital status within sequence analysis. In Objective Hermeneutics, for example, the *collective* creation and elimination of potential readings (*Lesarten*) is indispensable, because it secures the validity of the analysis (see Franzmann in this issue). Groups working in sequence analysis often have a very clear framework for the organization of data sessions, and new members have to learn the 'tricks of the trade' before becoming a full member of the group. The central role of group interpretation makes sequence analysis a prime example of cooperative research on cooperative processes (Schüttpelz/Gießmann 2015; Ploder 2017). As a result, the history of sequence analysis is also a history of cooperative interpretation practices in the social and cultural sciences.

Sequence analysis is interested in practices.

It is striking that many approaches to sequence analysis use the term 'practice' in one way or another. In Conversation Analysis, the term comes from the strong methodological connection to Garfinkel's praxeology. In Documentary Method we find influences from both Garfinkel and Bourdieu, who developed a different, but no less influential theory of practice (see Bourdieu 1977). Less obviously, we also find the term also in Objective Hermeneutics (see Oevermann 2016; Franzmann in this issue). This shared interest in practices is closely connected to the shared focus on the 'how' instead of the 'what' of social interaction. Focusing on the sequential organization of interaction means focusing on the ways a type of interaction is accomplished, rather than the actual (inter)actions themselves.

Sequence analysists often seek to improve the phenomena they study.

Many sequence analysis projects combine their basic academic goals with the goal to improve the structures they study. In Conversation Analysis, this idea has deep historical roots, both in Garfinkel's *hybrid studies of work* (Garfinkel 2002) and in the pioneering project on recorded phone calls from a suicide prevention center (Pomerantz/Fehr 2011). Up to the present day, Conversation Analysis is frequently used for the improvement of communication structures, in companies or welfare contexts (for a collection of recent examples see Stokoe 2018). Both the Documentary Method and Objective Hermeneutics are used (among many other fields) to improve teaching and social work.

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[9]   For the analysis of group interpretation in different research communities see, e.g., Olzewski et al. (2006); Reichertz (2013); Meier zu Verl/Tuma (2021); and Berli (2021). In his 2013 book on group interpretation, Jo Reichertz compared several research traditions on a practical and methodological level and arrived at several interesting insights. First of all, interpreting in groups is a good opportunity for building and maintaining methodological schools. Recurring data sessions provide an opportunity to train new members of the school, develop a certain local 'style' of analysis, and test the abilities of new members (on the "production of 'good' interpreters" see also Berli 2021:781). Being a member of the same interpretation group also fosters a sense of academic identity (Reichertz 2013:50ff.). Apart from these social factors, interpreting in groups also has important epistemological benefits. It is an opportunity to develop new perspectives on the data and generate ideas that can only grow in a communicative environment. Moreover, interpreting in groups provides the opportunity to strengthen or weaken existing interpretations. Every group member can challenge the interpretation of each of the other members. If the whole group agrees on a certain interpretation, it seems more likely to be valid (Reichertz 2013:53f.).

Sequence analysis follows the step-by-step logic of the data.

All types of sequence analysis honour the temporal succession of events in the data they work with (see also Kleemann et al. 2013:20ff). They are based on the conviction that social interaction is organized sequentially and mimic this dynamic in their research strategy. Just like the protagonists they study, researchers go through their data step-by-step and avoid the anticipation of events documented later in the data. The idea to mimic strategies from the field in social research is supported by a number of methodological foundations of interpretive research. One important source is Alfred Schutz (1953), who introduced the distinction between constructs of the first degree ("constructs of common-sense thought", Schutz 1953:3) and constructs of the second degree, "namely constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene whose behavior the social scientist observes and tries to explain" (Schutz 1953:3). In his widely-read paper on 'common-sense and scientific interpretation of human action', Schutz underlines the differences between common-sense actors and social scientists: Most importantly, they approach the social world with different attitudes and systems of relevances (in German *Relevanzsysteme,* see Schutz 1953:31). Common-sense actors and social researchers also have a lot in common: As human actors, social researchers rely on the same basic strategies of interpretation and construction as the people they study. They also have to follow the principle of adequacy, which requires that "a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that […it] would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life" (Schutz 1953:34). Following Schutz, it is only consistent (or even required) that we mimic field strategies in social research as long as we maintain the specific benefits of the scientific attitude and system of relevances (see also Schutz 1954; Soeffner 2003:40f.; and Ploder 2014:54ff.).[10] But the idea of following field strategies is not only prevalent in social phenomenology. It echoes in Garfinkel's concept of unique adequacy (see, e.g., Garfinkel/Wieder 1992:182ff.), and runs through his complete oeuvre as a recurrent theme. A similar idea is prevalent in many schools of hermeneutics, from Wilhelm Dilthey to Hans Georg Gadamer and beyond: Every attempt at academic hermeneutics (regardless of whether we interpret literature, legal texts, religious texts, or social interaction) must be based on a detailed analysis of hermeneutic procedures in everyday life. This hermeneutic tradition, especially the work of Gadamer, is an important point of reference for social research hermeneutics and many other traditions of sequence analysis in the German-speaking countries.

Sequence analysis shows an interest in reflexive methodology.

In recent years, several approaches to sequence analysis have established a focus in studying their own research practice empirically. Their goals are often twofold: improving the method(ologie)s applied in the project, and making an empirical contribution to the social studies of the social sciences at the same time. Hubert Knoblauch (2021) calls this approach *reflexive methodology*, Ralf Bohnsack calls it *praxeological epistemology* (Bohnsack 2020:63, Wagener in this issue), Christian

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[10] In his discussion of Luckmann's project 'Daten über Daten', Meier zu Verl (2018b) makes a similar argument.

Meier zu Verl calls it *doing social research* (Meier zu Verl 2018a:2).[11] Although this current boom is noteworthy, and can be read as a result of a broader 'reflexive turn' in the social sciences (Kuehner/Ploder/Langer 2016), this idea is not entirely new. We find several examples of *reflexive methodology*[12] in the work of Garfinkel (for an overview see Ploder/Thielmann 2021:216-219) which stimulated similar projects in Science and Technology Studies (see Garfinkel 2022). In the last few decades, a number of research groups in the German speaking countries have recorded and analyzed their own data sessions (for some examples see Berli 2021:785). And there are even earlier historical predecessors in Germany in the 1970s, especially the project 'data on data' (in German: *Daten über Daten*) by a team around Thomas Luckmann at the University of Konstanz (for details see Meier zu Verl 2018b). It almost seems as if there is a reflexive moment built into sequence analysis from the start. In his discussion of the project 'data on data', Meier zu Verl traces it back to Schutz' discussion of constructs of the first and second degree, which we considered above.

4. What sets the traditions apart?

Apart from these shared features, the approaches to sequence analysis presented in this issue also differ from one other in various respects:

Strategies of generalization.

As mentioned above, all three approaches have developed strategies to generate general claims about social phenomena from individual case studies (see, e.g. Sammet/Erhard 2018:45ff.). In Conversation Analysis, generalization is based on the in-depth-analysis and subsequent comparison of different cases, typically fragments of interaction. The cases are taken from a collection composed according to research interest (Schegloff 1996). In Objective Hermeneutics, generalization is based on the idea that concrete cases always document much more than the individual social context they come from (Oevermann 1981, 1991). Every case is special and general at the same time, and the reconstructive procedure of Objective Hermeneutics is supposed to uncover the general structures documented in the individual case (see Wernet 2009:19ff.). Therefore, generalization in Objective Hermeneutics is sometimes based on a single case. The Documentary Method uses types in the tradition of Max Weber to generalize from a medium number of case studies (for details see Bohnsack/Hoffmann/Nentwig-Gesemann 2018).[13]

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[11]   These are examples from the field of sequence analysis. Within the broader reflexive turn in the social sciences, we find much more work in this direction. An interesting example of 'ethnography of ethnography' comes from Stephanie Bethmann and Debora Niermann (2015), who call it 'empirical reflexivity'. For a recent collection of ethnographies of ethnography, see Ploder/Hamann (2021).

[12]   The term is used here in the sense described above. In ethnomethodology, the term 'reflexivity' has an entirely different meaning. For an inventory of meanings and a concise account of ethnomethodological reflexivity, see Lynch (2000).

[13]   Another reference for generalizations in sequence analysis is Kurt Lewin, who is often quoted in publications on narration analysis and biographical case reconstruction. Lewin argued that valuable scientific generalizations are not the result of abstraction and quantification from a large

The number of cases analyzed in each project.

None of the approaches discussed in this issue employs quantitative sampling strategies. The validity of a study is always tied to the strength of the analysis and never to the absolute number of cases. Still, it is noteworthy that the typical case numbers differ widely in the different traditions. While Conversation Analysis tend to work with larger case numbers, sometimes hundreds of cases,[14] Objective Hermeneutics focuses on a small number of cases, sometimes only one or two. The Documentary Method often works with ten or more cases, but still does not come close to the number of cases used in Conversation Analysis.

The use of context in interpretation.

Whether the empirical context of an action or utterance (e.g. the situation it occurs in) should inform its analysis or not is probably one of the most important and most heavily discussed disagreements between sequence analysts of different traditions. Representatives of Conversation Analysis and Bohnsack's Documentary Method will say: yes, of course we need to use context knowledge (see, e.g., Schegloff 1987; Wagener in this issue). In contrast, in Objective Hermeneutics, *refraining* from context is a central methodological rule (see Wernet 2009; Franzmann in this issue).[15] This rule has led to a lot of misunderstandings, because a complete ignorance of context seems to contradict the goals of interpretive analysis. In fact, knowledge accumulated *during the analysis of previous data segments* can always be used in Objective Hermeneutics. Moreover, the exclusion of context knowledge is only temporal. The interpretation *starts* without the use of knowledge about the concrete empirical case, in order to reconstruct the potential meaning of an utterance in a variety of *potential* contexts. But at a later point in the analysis, context knowledge about the case is taken into account (see Wernet 2009:21ff.).

Methodological justification.

The different traditions of sequence analysis are anchored in a surprising variety of methodological foundations, which leads to another point of long lasting and heartfelt disagreement. The most significant divide is between ethnomethodology and hermeneutics. While Conversation Analysis is deeply rooted in ethnomethodology, Objective Hermeneutics rejects ethnomethodology and draws on Critical Theory, Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action and hermeneutics instead. The Documentary Method is based on a number of methodological foundations, such as ethnomethodology, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice and Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge (for details, see Wagener in this issue). Both Conversation Analysis and Objective Hermeneutics refer to linguistic theories. The contributions to this issue give an idea of how broad the area of references is.

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number of cases, but require a detailed and context-sensitive analysis of concrete, individual cases and situations (Lewin 1930/31:455-456; Rosenthal 1995:210; Ploder 2021:65).

[14] Many CA studies are based on smaller case numbers.

[15] According to Berli (2021:778f.) 'ignoring contextual knowledge' is an important 'call to order' in data sessions on Objective Hermeneutics.

Who owns it?

Today, sequence analysts in all camps tend to use the term 'sequence analysis' as a cover term for the particular approach they represent. Although every approach includes more than one step in its methodical workflow, sequence analysis is often presented as the central step, central enough to identify the whole approach with it, *pars pro toto*. Between the groups, there is no agreement on which approach was the first fully developed sequence analytical methodology, although the founders of these approaches have known one another since the 1970s. Apart from being an interesting case of boundary work (from a sociology of science point of view), this controversy makes clear that sequence analysis has a central function in all of these approaches.

5. Contributions to this Thematic Issue

There is a significant overlap between the speakers at this conference and the contributors to this thematic issue (for an overview of the conference program see Hrncal/Hector 2022). Antonia Krummheuer (Aalborg) presented a very interesting paper titled 'The analysis of artificial/hybrid sequences? How analysing human-computer interaction challenged and innovated the field of conversation analysis', which will hopefully be published in another outlet soon. Unfortunately, different timelines prevented it from being included in this thematic issue. The paper by Christian Meyer was not presented at the conference, but added as an original contribution to the thematic issue.

Unlike the sequential order of time in social interaction, the sequential arrangement of the contributions in this issue is not inevitable. The papers approach the topic in very different ways and we decided to arrange them accordingly. The papers by Lorenza Mondada and Susanne Günthner present very strong empirical analyses, which yield a number of interesting insights into the nature of sequentiality. They are prime examples of using fine-grained empirical work to answer highly complex theoretical questions and advance social and linguistic theory on empirical grounds. The papers by Hubert Knoblauch, Christian Meyer, and Jens Loenhoff are mostly theoretical and shed a new light on reception processes, shortcomings, and potentials of the existing body of theories on sequentiality. They do not present or interpret empirical data, but give a number of important impulses for the debate around empirical sequence analysis. While the first five papers of the issue focus on the ethnomethodological and phenomenological tradition of sequence analysis, the last two have a different focus: the papers by Andreas Franzmann (on Objective Hermeneutics) and Benjamin Wagener (on the Documentary Method) introduce two types of sequence analysis that have developed at a similar time but with different theoretical references and methodological procedures than Conversation Analysis. Both papers elaborate on the historical development, methodological foundations, and practical steps of their approach, and give an empirical example at the end. In the following, we will briefly introduce each of the papers of the issue.

Lorenza Mondada opens the thematic issue with a paper on the emergence of sequentiality in public space. What happens *before* interaction can unfold its sequential character? How do people prepare the opening of an interaction, and how do they support, adjust, or refuse the step-by-step-trajectory of interaction? Based on a multimodal Conversation Analysis of video data of emerging encounters, Mondada unpacks the sequential structure of the very beginning of public social interaction: the moments that "precede or merge with the emergent contact between parties who are not yet fully interacting" (Mondada in this issue:36). Her empirical analysis is embedded in a theoretical discussion about the nature of sequentiality, to which the paper makes several important contributions.

Susanne Günthner presents a study of how sequentiality shapes practices of person reference in dialogue. Using corpora of Chinese and German SMS, WhatsApp and WeChat exchanges, Günthner examines how nominal forms of reference to self and other are used in preference to more conventional deictic pronouns in order to convey a sense of togetherness as a family or couple. The sequential aspect of this alternative form of reference arises through the way in which its use creates the expectation that co-participants will partake in the same nominal reference practices in the following turns. In addition, Günthner's analysis illustrates that it is not only communicative actions that depend on sequential order, but also practices of person reference and the associated interactional modalities and stances.

Hubert Knoblauch focuses on the foundations of sequence analysis in social theory. He looks at the work of three theorists (Weber, Luhmann, and Habermas) and compares their approaches to sequentiality. He points out a number of gaps and shortcomings in these theories, which set the agenda for the second part of his paper. In the second part, he shows how communicative constructivism – an approach developed by him and other German sociologists over the last decades (Knoblauch 2020; Keller/Knoblauch/Reichertz 2012) – addresses some of these gaps. Knoblauch's contribution lays the foundation for building a bridge between theoretical reflection and empirical reconstruction of sequentiality. Towards the end of his paper, Knoblauch points out the relevance of *spatiality* and *simultaneity* for communicative action, which also play a role in the papers by Mondada, Meyer, and Wagener. This adds an important dimension to the arguments on temporality and sequentiality which are – so far – dominant in the discussion of sequence analysis.

Christian Meyer investigates the influence of Aron Gurwitsch's Gestalt phenomenology on the work of Harold Garfinkel. Based on a number of unpublished papers from the Harold Garfinkel Archive, Meyer shows that Garfinkel extensively used (and intentionally misread) Gurwitsch's work (see also Garfinkel 2021). Most importantly, he shows that Garfinkel's own ideas on sequentiality and indexicality were heavily inspired by this reading. The paper reconstructs this complex reception process and makes some interesting suggestions regarding its methodological and theoretical consequences for contemporary ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis.

Jens Loenhoff embarks on a provocative theoretical discussion of the role of notions of objective and prior structure in Conversational Analysis. He begins with an exposition of Conversation Analysts' standard critique of attempts to invoke 'transsubjective' and 'transsituational' forms of order in analyses of language and interaction as a way of guaranteeing stability in meaning and group orientation across concrete instances of interaction. Approaches in Conversation Analysis, he points out, range from unbounded contextualism to acknowledging the adaptation and re-use of structural moments and formal precedents that occurred in earlier interactions. This latter position, argues Loenhoff, amounts to an implicit concession to the existence of some kind of structure beyond the immediate interactional situation.

Andreas Franzmann introduces the historical origins, methodological foundations, and steps in the research process of Objective Hermeneutics, a highly influential methodology in the German-speaking countries. He shows that this type of sequence analysis follows a different logic from Conversation Analysis. Here, the term 'sequence' "refers to meaning-bearing elements in a protocol" (Franzmann in this issue:176) and the analysis follows the "requirement of not adding contextual information for interpretation unless this is absolutely necessary" (Franzmann in this issue:178). The paper ends with an empirical example, the interpretation of a letter. At several points throughout the paper, Franzmann compares Objective Hermeneutics to Conversation Analysis and prepares the ground for a dialogue that may prove fruitful for the future of both methodological approaches.

Benjamin Wagener closes the issue with a paper on the Documentary Method and its uses for both text and audiovisual data. He gives an overview of the past and present of the approach, and illustrates it with an empirical example of classroom interaction. In his discussion of the Documentary Method for the analysis of images and video data, Wagener shows that sequentiality has an important complement, namely simultaneity. In analyzing data on interaction, the Documentary Method focuses on sequentiality. In analyzing pictures, it focuses on simultaneity. When it comes to video data, "sequentiality and simultaneity are interwoven" (Wagener in this issue:191; see also Bohnsack 2011). Therefore, the Documentary Method of films and videographs integrates both sequence analysis and simultaneity analysis. Throughout the paper, Wagener compares the specific goals and methodological foundations of sequence analysis in the Documentary Method to sequence analysis in both Objective Hermeneutics and Conversation Analysis, which makes it the perfect conclusion for the issue.

6. Outlook

Both the conference and the thematic issue have highlighted a number of topics for future discussion. At the end of this introduction, we want to point out three of them:

The practice of sequence analysis

One of the goals of the conference was to examine the interdependence of ideas, practices, and infrastructures in the history and current application of sequence analysis in linguistics and sociology. In line with the focus of the CRC on practices, we wanted to highlight the practical sources out of which the different methodological approaches have developed historically, as well as the transformation of methodological practice in each approach over time, as they have been confronted with new phenomena but also with the changing fortunes of different theoretical positions in each academic field. We were also interested in questions of how the practice of sequence analysis differs in the various traditions. We wanted to know: What does it mean to *do* sequence analysis? What *practices* – of documentation, datafication, transcription, sequencing, or analysis – play a role? What data are suited to this task and how are they generated, transformed, and processed through analysis? How is sequence analysis practiced in groups, what rules have become established, and what group dynamics are particularly relevant from an epistemic perspective? What methodological reflection regarding the sequential organisation of interpretative practice do research groups engage in and how does this reflection feed back into research practices? Although the conference as well as the contributions to this issue turned out to focus on other matters, we want to mark these as relevant questions for the future. The abovementioned 'reflexive turn' in sequence analysis goes along with a growing number of projects studying the practices of sequence analysis empirically (e.g. Berli 2021, Meier zu Verl/Tuma 2021). Bringing these efforts into conversation could be the next topic for an interesting interdisciplinary conference.

The relationship of sequentiality and simultaneity

Three of the papers in this issue (Mondada, Knoblauch, and Wagener) point out the relevance of spatiality and simultaneity for social interaction. Not everything that is relevant to interaction happens step-by-step; some things actually happen at the same time. And that goes far beyond the most obvious case, overlaps of verbal utterances in conversation. The relevance of simultaneity becomes particularly obvious in video data, and video analysts have found different ways to deal with it (e.g. Mondada and Wagener in this issue). Is this where we reach the limits of sequence analysis? Not necessarily. Mondada, Knoblauch, and Wagener suggest looking at sequentiality and simultaneity not as competitors for empirical attention, but as two aspects which are deeply connected to each other. Looking at this connection in more detail is another interesting topic for future conversation. There is certainly existing work on simultaneity and sequentiality (e.g. Bohnsack 2011:47f.; for a recent example, see Deppermann/Mondada/Doehler 2021), but there is still more work to do. The contributions to this issue suggest that the topic would benefit from a collaborative investigation across research communities. Comparing the different solutions found in different traditions of sequence analysis could be highly relevant for theoretical, methodological, and empirical work around sequentiality.

The bridge between theoretical foundation and empirical research

Talking about sequence analysis means talking about the nexus of theory, method, methodology, and research practice. This nexus is central to understanding the sequential organization of interaction, but also to understanding the historical development of sequence analysis. Social theory and methodology are a necessary foundation for empirical research that examines the sequential organisation of interaction, conversation, communication, or narrative. Conversely, such research generates empirical and theoretical results that highlight the moment of sequentiality. This thematic issue explores these interactions in various traditions, where they meet and diverge, and what is brought into focus or ignored. The contributions approached the topic from all three angles (empirical, theoretical, and methodological) and showed how fruitful this kind of conversation can be. Strengthening the ties between theory and research in sequence analysis is a task that needs more attention in the future, and it seems to benefit from conversation across disciplines and methodological traditions.

The last word is a word of thanks. As editors, we want to thank all authors for their exciting papers and their patience in the publication process, the reviewers for their time and important remarks, and the editors of the journal *Gesprächsforschung* for their diligence and good communication throughout the publication process. We hope that this thematic issue will spark more interesting conversations and collaboration between sequence analysts in all camps.

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Adjusting step-by-step trajectories in public space: the micro-sequentiality of approaching and refusing to be approached

Lorenza Mondada

Abstract

On the basis of an empirical study of fleeting interactions in a public space between activists seeking for support for an environmental organization and passersby, this paper discusses some fundamental features that make social interaction possible. These fleeting encounters constitute a perspicuous setting for exploring how various forms of interaction emerge out of copresence in public space, from the most minimal to the more focused, and how possible encounters are prepared well before their openings and mutual engagement. This, in turn, enables a reflection on different forms of sequentiality, based on Schegloff's distinction between sequential vs. sequence organization, also including specific forms of micro-sequentiality. In particular, I examine the moments that precede or merge with the emergent contact between parties who are not yet fully interacting – moments in which no opening has been completed, no word has yet been produced, and rather subtle continuous embodied adjustments can be witnessed. These adjustments also characterize more focused engagements of the incipient participants to the interaction, in particular their walking trajectories, revealing spatial convergences/divergences and embodying forms of (dis)alignment. I analyze the methodic fine-tuned micro-sequential organization of spatial embodied attunements between parties in pre-openings and openings, and discuss how the sequentiality characterizing embodied responsiveness and adjustments is intertwined within the sequentiality of turns-at-talk. These issues are particularly observable in asymmetric unilateral disaligned social interactions, such as the subset of cases studied in this paper, in which passersby either refuse to be approached or refuse the reason for the approach.

Keywords: Social interaction – fleeting interaction – copresence – openings – sequentiality – sequence organization – micro-sequential adjustments – embodiment – mobility – sociality in public space.

German Abstract

Basierend auf einer empirischen Untersuchung flüchtiger Interaktionen im öffentlichen Raum zwischen Aktivisten, die um Unterstützung für eine Umweltorganisation werben, und Passanten werden in diesem Beitrag einige grundlegende Merkmale erörtert, die soziale Interaktion möglich machen. Diese flüchtigen Begegnungen stellen ein *perspicuous setting* dar, um zu untersuchen, wie verschiedene Interaktionsformen aus der Kopräsenz im öffentlichen Raum hervorgehen – von den minimalsten bis zu den fokussiertesten – und wie potentielle Begegnungen lange vor ihrer Eröffnung und ihrer gegenseitigen Bereitschaft vorbereitet werden. Dies wiederum ermöglicht eine Reflexion über verschiedene Formen der Sequenzialität, basierend auf Schegloffs Unterscheidung zwischen sequenzieller Organisation (*"sequential organization"*) und Sequenzorganisation (*"sequence organization"*), die auch spezifische Formen der Mikro-Sequenzialität einschließt. Insbesondere untersuche ich die Momente, die dem emergenten Kontakt zwischen Parteien, die

noch nicht vollständig interagieren, vorausgehen oder in diesen übergehen – Momente, in denen noch keine Eröffnung stattfindet, noch kein Wort geäussert wurde, und eher subtile fortlaufende verkörperte Anpassungen zu beobachten sind. Diese Anpassungen charakterisieren auch fokussiertere Handlungen der bevorstehenden Interaktionsteilnehmer, insbesondere ihre Gehbewegungen, die räumliche Konvergenzen/Divergenzen aufzeigen und Formen von (*dis)alignment* verkörpern. Ich analysiere die methodische, fein abgestimmte mikro-sequenzielle Organisation räumlicher, verkörperter Anpassungen zwischen den Parteien in Voreröffnungen und Eröffnungen und erörtere, wie die Sequenzialität, die verkörperte *responsiveness* und Anpassungen charakterisiert, mit der Sequenzialität von Redebeiträgen verflochten ist. Diese Sachverhalte sind besonders in asymmetrischen, einseitigen, *disaligned* sozialen Interaktionen zu beobachten, wie in der in diesem Beitrag untersuchten Untergruppe von Fällen, in denen Passanten sich entweder weigern, angesprochen zu werden, oder den Grund für die Annäherung ablehnen.

Keywords: soziale Interaktion – flüchtige Interaktion – Kopräsenz – Eröffnungen – Sequenzialität – Sequenzorganisation – mikro-sequenzielle Anpassungen – embodiment – Mobilität – Sozialität im öffentlichen Raum.

1. Introduction

This paper emanates from ongoing research on the situated methodic order of minimal interactions, and reflects on the sequential organization of social interaction on the basis of fleeting encounters in public space. Offering a systematic analysis of the way in which some activists intercept passersby, who refuse to stop and to engage with them, the paper discusses how the principle of a sequential order does hold for what can be considered a rather extreme case of interaction – situations in which possible not-yet-participants are approached in asymmetric ways, and respond minimally and in misaligned manners.

The activity studied constitutes a perspicuous setting for investigating some fundamental aspects of the organization of sequentiality, with a special focus on when sequentiality emerges in the openings and their preparation (in pre-openings or pre-beginnings) within fleeting interactions between people who do not know each

other. These emergent interactions include mutual micro-adjustments of the embodied conduct of all parties even before they talk.

While most of the literature has explored encounters in which openings achieve the mutually coordinated entry of all participants into a joint activity, this paper deals with encounters that are not only asymmetric – unilaterally initiated by one party – but also divergent – resisted, refused, or even ignored by the other party. The paper discusses issues in sequential organization in these cases, in which a) most of the turns-at-talk result in either no response or responses that are misaligned in some way, and in which b) major aspects of the interaction are negotiated within embodied adjustments – typically within the methodically interactionally organized trajectories of the walk of individuals who are not-yet-ratified-participants to the encounter.

By so doing, the paper addresses issues that have been most often discussed in distinct spans of the literature: the emergent social life of public spaces, studied in terms of how copresence, unfocused, and focused interactions are dynamically organized (§ 1.1), the openings of social interactions in a diversity of contexts (§ 1.2), and broader issues concerning sequential organization (§ 1.3).

1.1. The sequential organization of fleeting encounters in public space

Public space has been described within the interactional and micro-sociologic tradition as a space of copresence among strangers who might navigate while avoiding collisions with each other, within forms of civil inattention (Goffman 1971), or enter into more focused interactions (Goffman 1963). Simmel (1908) referred to minimal interactions, constituted by the mere exchange of glances, as a basic form of social life, insisting on the importance of gaze in the establishment of human relations. Goffman also referred to gaze when he defined copresence not as the mere colocation of individuals in the same space, but as mutually perceived copresence within an environment which individuals constantly scan. For him, this constitutes *unfocused interaction*, defined in terms of *gatherings,* as occasions in which "one gleans information about another person present by glancing at him, if only momentarily, as he passes into and then out of one's view" (1963:24). By contrast, *focused interaction* is achieved by engaging in a "mutual eye-to-eye activity" (1963: 92), that is, in an *encounter*. Thus, for Simmel and Goffman, gaze is fundamental to achieve social life in public space within various forms of interaction. The influence of these authors on further ethnographies of the city (for example, on Lofland 1973, 1998) has been fundamental for a better understanding of sociality in public spaces.

However, the ways in which people who do not know each other (often called "strangers," although the term can be questioned from a member's perspective since they are most often identified as members of some category, like 'passerby,' 'tourist,' 'street vendor,' or 'beggar'; cf. Goffman's reference to Sacks in this regard, 1971:7 fn 5) do or do not precisely step-by-step engage in social interaction in public places remains understudied.

Ethnographic studies of public spaces have been interested in how encounters emerge out of copresence: Goffman (1963) gave numerous anecdotical descriptions

of such events; Lofland (1973:169ff.) proposed some principles that make them possible – such as desirability, legitimacy, and appropriateness of the approach – while Whyte (1980) spoke of *triangulation* in reference to the "process by which some external stimulus provides a linkage between people and prompts strangers to talk to each other as though they were not [strangers]" (94). The latter recalls the notion of *ticket*, which was introduced by Sacks (1992) as a resource used by people with limited rights that serves "to warrant one having begun to talk" (265), such as, *Excuse me, I'm lost* (553). Sacks' definition of the ticket is constitutively sequential: it is a first utterance, or turn, that makes a response possible and thereby establishes an incipient encounter.

Although possible encounters in public spaces have often been regarded as support for a bright view which celebrates the sociality of urban public life, unsolicited and unwelcome encounters that constitute its dark side have been discussed, too. This is the case of street remarks and other offensive approaches by males to females, discussed by Gardner (1989, 1995; also critical of Goffman 1963:144-145), of troubled public interactions with the homeless, often involving women (Duneier/ Molotch 1999), and of racial violence (Whitehead et al. 2018). More generally, street violence and crime generate practices constituting what Anderson calls "the art of avoidance" (1990:209). Gardner (1995), Duneier and Molotch (1999) and Whitehead et al. (2018) implicitly referred to the dynamics of sequencing in describing the dilemma of either ignoring or responding to a street remark and how the latter can make further escalating and aggravating remarks possible.

The sequentiality of these emergent encounters invites a closer look based on video recordings rather than ethnographic observations and interview data, in order to enable an understanding of the emergent temporality of sequencing and its social consequences.

Video-based interactional studies of fortuitous encounters among unknown people in public space are still very scarce. A few of them refer to asymmetric encounters initiated by one party addressing another party and proposing some kind of business transaction. Some have studied how passersby are targeted and invited to buy something at a market stall (see Clark/Pinch 1995 on the work of street market pitchers; Mondada 2021b on how sellers attempt to stop passersby and transform them into customers). Although in these cases, the institutional party initiating the asymmetric encounter is statically bound within their stand, mobile parties have also been studied, such as street vendors (Llewellyn/Burrow 2008) or tourists asking for directions (Mondada 2009). In both cases, services are offered or requests are made – Gardner (1986) speaks of actions that make the approach legitimate, which she calls "public aid." These fleeting encounters in public space are crucially based on mobility: the approach of pedestrians and passersby relies on moving, cruising, walking, and mutual positioning of converging or diverging body trajectories (Ryave/Schenkein 1974; Watson/Lee 1993).

1.2. Openings of encounters in public space

Whereas Goffman has insisted on copresence as a basic context within which unfocused and focused interactions might happen, conversation analysis has instead focused on encounters that clearly start at some point, emerging within the opening

phase, which enable imminent participants to engage in a joint and coordinated manner leading to a focused interaction (for a review, see Auer 2017; Pillet-Shore 2018). For instance, Schegloff (1968, 1986) demonstrated the systematic organization of a series of sequences which achieve the openings, relying on telephone conversations to reveal the main interactional problems people have to solve: getting the other's attention and availability (the summons), identifying and/or recognizing the other, engaging in greetings, and making the reason for the encounter explicit. Schegloff highlighted how these series of sequences – reflexively adapted to a diversity of settings – enable a joint stepwise progression in the activity. These sequences have been further elaborated on by Kendon and Ferber (1973) for face-to-face encounters in which the co-perception and attention of the other is first achieved with visual resources rather than with vocal and verbal ones, such as through the phone. They show how face-to-face opening is characterized by sighting and seeing the other, walking toward them, catching their eye, producing distant greetings, further approaching and smiling, and engaging in close greetings with/without contact. In a step-by-step manner, the participants have the opportunity to engage but also to withdraw from the interaction at any point. As noted by Sacks (1992), these apparently mundane steps are "the sequential building blocks of conversation" (99).

Casual conversations between unacquainted people in public spaces have been much less investigated. In Sacks' lectures, several notes deal with practices to begin a conversation as well as sequencing rules which account for how responses are provided, further creating new slots to talk. A good example is the question *When does the plane arrive?* asked to another person waiting at the airport (Sacks 1992:103). The question provides for an opportunity and a slot to answer, being recognizably relevant in that setting, projecting some answer that everybody will be able to produce and to recognize as adequate; moreover, when the answer is recognizably finished, this provides for an opportunity to talk again. In this sense, the question initiates a possible conversation. Contrary to summons/answers initiating the opening, the question about the arrival of the plane, similar to a passerby's request for help or a street vendor's offer of a magazine, are not preceded by any proper opening but begin as early as possible with the proposed common business. This shows one specificity of these fortuitous encounters between unacquainted persons (for a contrast with acquainted ones, see De Stefani/Mondada 2018): they are often achieved on the fly and under time pressure in situations in which everyone can freely move away rather than having to stay or walk along and which can immediately be brought to a close by an absence of response, declining the first action (Llewellyn/Burrow 2008:568).

1.3. Issues in sequentiality: sequential vs sequence organization, and micro-sequential adjustments

In this paper, I discuss the practices through which one person approaches another person in public space, thereby proposing to engage in interaction, as a perspicuous context in which to revisit the mode of organization of copresence, pre-openings, and openings and to reflect on their sequential organization. The analytic focus chosen, namely, fleeting interactions in which one mobile party approaches another

mobile party who, in different ways, refuses to engage in the encounter, enables a discussion of the basic conditions that make social interaction possible. Moreover, it enables the study of different forms of emergent sequentiality, from clear-cut and audible verbal actions composing a sequence – like a question/answer adjacency pair – to more continuous and constantly transforming embodied adjustments.

Sequentiality is the crucial principle that grounds the ethnomethodological and conversation analytic understandings of interactional order and motivates their specific approach to social action. As Sacks (1992:99ff.) hinted at when speaking of *sequencing rules*, a simple action like a question, a noticing, or a request can initiate a conversation between unacquainted persons who are standing close-by, by offering an opportunity to talk, which itself could be taken as an occasion to talk again, and so on. This rudimental but powerful insight puts sequentiality at the core of interactional sociality.

Schegloff (2007:2) distinguished between sequential and sequence organization, referring to the former as a general principle permeating all levels of organization of social interaction and to the latter as a specific form of organization between two actions. Thus, in the sequence, one action does not only follow and respond to the other in an adjacent way, but the first also projects and makes conditionally relevant the second, thereby creating a normative expectation about its realization (Schegloff/Sacks 1973). The sequence is a basic form of interactional organization: given a first, the second is expectable, and normatively inspected in this way, generating the possibility of identifying its absence as well as specific rights and obligations among the participants. Forms of (dis)alignment, (dis)agreement, and (dis)affiliation between the first and the second build the ongoing dynamic interactional relations between parties (Pomerantz 1984; Raymond 2003). Constraints on the types of first actions allowed and on the second actions expected, as well as further specifications of rights and obligations to perform these actions, build the informality vs. institutionality of the encounter – and, therefore, can be considered as the building blocks of social order.

Beyond sequence organization, other forms of sequential organization which permeate all levels of social interaction are observable. Some have been commented on in early analyses of turn-taking, showing that as the speaker progresses in the production of their turn, they also constantly project more to come which the co-participant can anticipate and preemptively respond to, reflexively impacting what the first speaker was still telling (see early work on overlaps, Jefferson 1983; on participation in the construction of an utterance, see Goodwin 1979; on what makes early responses possible and their consequences on the progression of turns and embodied conducts, see more recently Deppermann et al. 2021).

Projection, anticipated responsiveness, and reflexive mutual elaboration of the ongoing action not only happen with turns-at-talk but also with embodied conduct, in which one participant can anticipate and preempt what another one is initiating or projecting (Deppermann/Schmidt 2021; Heath/Luff 2021; Mondada 2021a). In different terms, this was very early on alluded to by Garfinkel (1948/2005:184):

> A acts towards B as if the signs that B provides are not haphazardly given. When we say that A understands B we mean only this: that A detects an orderliness in these signs both with regard to sequence and meanings. The orderliness is assigned to B's activities by A. The 'validity' of A's conception of the signs generated by B are given

in accordance with some regulative principle established for A when his return action evokes a counter action that somehow 'fits' A's anticipations.

Despite the semiotic and hermeneutic vocabulary, the dynamics described here concern situated *actions* rather than signs having general meanings attached, in a way that already sketches the reflexive mutual elaboration of each other's conducts.

This vision of sequentiality concerns a much more detailed granularity of actions, practices, and resources than does sequence organization and complements it. In particular, it concerns the emergent moment-by-moment contingent unfolding in time of social interaction in its multiple dimensions. This is particularly relevant for a dynamic conception of multimodality. Multimodally formatted actions are made intelligible by the mobilization of a diversity of resources, linguistic and embodied, such as talk, gestures, gaze, body postures, and movements, which each have their specific temporality (such as the movement of the hand rising to point at an object or the quick movement of a gaze shift) although being globally arranged in a holistic Gestalt (such as when the pointing towards an object is part of a larger movement in which the body leans over and the eyes inspect it) (Deppermann/ Streeck 2018; Goodwin 2017; Keevallik 2018; Mondada 2018). This complex array of multiple temporalities and their own, although interrelated, organization affords many opportunities for micro-sequential adjustments, plastically adaptable to the local circumstances and ongoing contingencies. In this paper, I further discuss this form of sequentiality, referred to here as *micro-sequentiality*, to highlight the fact that it concerns continuous adjustments rather than well-delimited adjacent actions.

The general notion of sequentiality enables us to consider both forms of responsivity: while analyses in terms of sequence organization have favored the latter – in the form of adjacency pairs, in which one action is realized in one turn and responded to in the action of the next turn – analyses of micro-sequentiality and adjustments have focused on the former. The latter insist on detailed responsive movements of different parts of the body with which the participants can engage, subtly adjusting to the conduct of other participants (Deppermann/Schmidt 2021; Mondada 2021b). As we shall see, in the encounters studied in this paper between unacquainted persons in public space, the latter are observable in classic adjacency pairs, such as greetings or questions like *do you have any time for me?*, whereas the former are observable in the adjustments of the stomping, stepping, walking, accelerating, and slowing down trajectories of the pedestrians.

2. Data

The analyses contained in this paper are based on video-recordings, realized with multiple cameras, of a portion of a street in the center of a Swiss-German city in which activists approached pedestrians and invited them to support an environmental organization. During four hours, my team and I recorded several hundreds of encounters with three activists, each of whom wore a cordless microphone. All participants were asked to give their informed consent.

The activists work for an organization active in the defense of the environment, nature, and wildlife. They call themselves 'dialoguers,' and this is the category I have used in this paper. Dialoguers are young professionals with whom the organization contracts to do fundraising in the streets; they are also all personally engaged

in the causes defended, and in most of the cases, also support members of the organization. Their task is to approach passersby and convince them to become new members.

While passersby who accept talking about a possible membership stop and engage for a substantial amount of time with the dialoguers, passersby who decline the approach generally do not stop and only engage in fleeting mobile interactions in which they display their refusal to further participate. This paper is focused on cases in which the dialoguer's approach is rejected by the pedestrians. These interactions are asymmetrically initiated by the dialoguers, who can be silently ignored, obtain a minimal response, or be rejected in more focused engagements by the pedestrians they approached.

The work of the dialoguers establishes a particular form of copresence in public space. They broadly cruise the street around their anchorage point, the stand. Although the stand is often not immediately visible to the pedestrians, the dialoguers move in public space in a way that is noticeable as different from most of the passersby. Whereas ordinary pedestrians walk up or down the street within direct trajectories, the dialoguers move in circles, back and forth across the street. Their movements make them visible to others – a visibility enhanced by the fact that they wear a T-shirt with the logo of the organization. Thus, two types of mobility associated with two types of visible recognizable categories – 'passersby' vs. 'street professionals' – are witnessable at-a-glance (Sudnow 1972) to anyone coming into that portion of the street. This defines a particular mode of copresence in which the dialoguers initiate the approach to pedestrians and are seen doing so. Dialoguers scan the environment searching for pedestrians and initiating converging trajectories with them; pedestrians monitor the environment while navigating, avoiding collisions, and seeing what dialoguers do with others and will eventually do with them. This enables them to anticipate convergent approaches and possibly avoid or counter them. These ways of inhabiting copresence project possible trajectories of action which cannot simply be categorized as unfocused vs. focused interactions and which often largely begin before the opening, if any, of an encounter is achieved. In this context, mutual adjustments are crucial before any other form of sequentially organized actions occurs, such as greetings, questions, or requests.

3. Analysis

The analysis demonstrates the sequential organization of ways in which pedestrians can refuse to be approached and/or refuse the activity that is being proposed by the approaching party. The most radical way of refusing is to ignore the approaching party (§ 3.1). This type of interaction raises interesting analytical challenges: although one party does not engage in interaction, both parties can be shown to adjust to each other. Another way of refusing is to minimally interact with the approaching party (§ 3.2). These cases are in contrast with those in which the approached party refuses what the approaching party proposes by engaging in interaction with them (§ 3.3). Displaying and claiming that you are in a hurry is another way of refusing the approach within an earlier temporality than in the previous cases, with some sequential consequences on the action that is being refused (§ 3.4). These ways of refusing occur at different moments within the emergence of the encounter: early

on, at a distance, within the emergent negotiation between converging/diverging trajectories, vs. during the first words of the encounter, typically the greetings, vs. in response to the reason of the approach. They also engage a diversity of embodied and verbal practices, which range from verbal turns saying "no" in second position within a sequence to progressive embodied disalignments within continuous subtle micro-sequential adjustments.

3.1. Doing ignoring

When approached, a basic option for a passerby is to ignore the initiative of the dialoguer. This produces a specific sequential unfolding characterizing a unilateral approach.

We join the first fragment when a dialoguer (DIA1) has just closed a fleeting encounter with another passerby: she is able to spot the incoming pedestrian, who likewise is able to see her and possibly other dialoguers (DIA2, DIA3) who are engaged in that portion of the street (fig.1). In this situation of copresence, vehicular units scan the environment and see other vehicular units (Goffman 1971:11) as well as the way they engage with each other, making sense of what is occurring. The dialoguers are identifiable in their activity of approaching and trying to stop passersby, while the pedestrians are identifiable in their passing-by trajectories and in their responses avoiding, refusing or accepting their approaches.

As soon as the interaction with the previous pedestrian is finished, the dialoguer (DIA1) turns in the direction of the upcoming trajectory of the pedestrian (PED). Orienting to the dialoguer, the pedestrian slightly changes her trajectory, walking in a more oblique way, beginning to avoid her (1). So even before the proper opening, i.e. before the dialoguer utters a summons in the form of a term of address (2), both of them have already mutually responsively adjusted their trajectories, the dialoguer projecting initiation of the encounter, the pedestrian projecting avoidance.

(1) DIALOG 0-17-21

fig. 1

```
1          #(3) *(0.2) + (0.4)
   dia         *turns laterally to ped->
   ped     >>walks fwd+slightly more obliquely->>
   fig     #fig.1
2  DIA     ma̲da:me#
           mam
   fig            #fig.2
3          (0.7) * (0.4)
   dia         ->*one lateral step->
4  DIA     wie ge- isch* ihre morge# bis jetzt?*
           how a-  is    your morning until now
   dia               ->*one more step, parallel to PED*
   fig                          #fig.3
5          *(0.8)*
   dia     *one step, as PED passes by her*
6  DIA     *wünsch ihne no en schönen# tag* klong*
           I wish you PRT a nice day       ((sound))
   dia     *one more step, leaning fwd----*Lfoot sounds on floor*
   fig                          #fig.4
```


The dialoguer's unilateral approach to the pedestrian is finely calibrated in relation to her upcoming walk. The dialoguer positions herself by stopping her body parallel to the incoming trajectory of the pedestrian (fig.2). The summons (2) is uttered in a louder than normal voice, as the pedestrian is still at some distance. As the pedestrian does not answer (3), the dialoguer does one parallel step to adjust to the approaching trajectory. She does another similar step (fig.3) while addressing her question (self-repaired from *wie ge-* projecting *geht es Ihnen* to a more elaborated and also sarcastic *isch ihre morge bis jetzt* (4), formulating the precise moment of their fleeting encounter). This question is perfectly calibrated in such a way that it reaches completion when the pedestrian walks at the level of the dialoguer and passes her (5). So, a response is projected and made expectable at the precise moment at which both individuals are face-to-face and maximally close to each other.

The pedestrian does not respond at all (5) but keeps walking, impassive. The dialoguer makes a further parallel step, thus maintaining their respective positions at the same level during the absence of response (5). She then does another step, this time leaning her body forward, still bodily aligned with the trajectory of the pedestrian but now partially at her back, while uttering the final closing greeting (6, fig.4). This posture projects stopping and leaving the pedestrian to walk away alone. This step ends with the left foot hitting the street and producing an audible noise (6), manifesting the stance of the dialoguer in closing the unilateral encounter with the pedestrian who ignored her.

In this extract, the dialoguer continuously responsively adjusts to the walk of the pedestrian and to her non-responses. The pedestrian – after her early change of trajectory in the pre-opening – does "doing ignoring" the dialoguer by keeping her walking pace, her straight trajectory, her body posture, and her facial expression unaltered. In this way, she achieves the encounter a s unilateral. The unilateral encounter is sequentially organized step-by-step by the dialoger in a way that is responsive to the walking trajectory of the recipient and its temporality.

3.2. Minimally responding

Unilateral approaches to pedestrians are often not totally ignored but rather receive a minimal response. Minimal responses are observable within the respective walking trajectories – continuing vs. converging – in similar ways to that sketched above.

In the next fragment, the dialoguer is scanning the environment and spots a pedestrian walking up the street. She walks perpendicularly toward him, and addresses the fact that he wears an Eagles cap, possibly playing on the double sense of Eagles as a sports team and eagles as a protected animal:

(2) DIALOG 0-17-41

```
1        (1)    *(0.6)*  (0.8)#(0.7)
   dia   >>scans*pivots*steps twd PED--->
   fig                      #fig.5
```



```
2  DIA   SIND SIE •EAgles fans?#•
         are you an Eagles fan
                 •points at cap•
   fig                      #fig.6
3        • (0.5)* #(0.5) •+ (0.5)
   dia   •,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,•
   dia       ->*walks parallel to PED->
   ped                +looks slightly twd her->
   fig           #fig.7
4  DIA   f+indi g#uet.+
         I find that good
   ped   ->+turns to her+
   fig         #fig.8
```

```
5          + (.)
    ped    +looks straight->>
6   DIA    ±set± meh: >unterstützig ha.#ich wünsch en schöne *tag<*
           should get more support     I wish you a nice day
    ped    ±nods±
    dia                                            ->*turns away*
    fig                          #fig.9
```

It is observable from the dialoguer's sudden change of posture from cruising and scanning the environment to abruptly pivoting that she has noticed the pedestrian. She then begins to step toward him (fig.5). The first turn she addresses to him – referring to the cap and pointing at it, uttering a question, making an answer conditionally relevant – is perfectly calibrated with her steps toward him: at turn completion, she is not only close to him but at the same level (fig.6). She maintains the same relative position as he continues to walk, not responding, and she makes a step in parallel with him while retracting her pointing (fig.7). In absence of a response, she proffers a positive assessment (4): this is responded to by the pedestrian gazing at and turning toward her (fig.8). This gaze shift constitutes a form of minimal engagement within the unilaterally initiated and progressed encounter. As he withdraws his gaze and looks forward (fig.9), still walking at the same pace, she adds a turn-constructional unit (TCU) (6) in which she playfully refers to both the basketball team and the animal as needing to be supported, and closes with a final greeting.

In this case, too, the stepping toward the pedestrian characterizes the initial approach; the calibration of further steps toward and with him before dissolving the interactional space (Mondada, 2009) is not only skillfully coordinated with the continuous walk of the recipient but is also adjusted in such a way that the moment in which a response is made relevant, at turn completion, coincides with the two participants being at the same level – in a face-to-face formation. Thus, the dialoguer's walk and turns are continuously and reflexively responsively adjusted to the unaltered progression of the pedestrian's walk.

3.3. Refusing

When approached by dialoguers, pedestrians can engage in a focused interaction in which they explicitly verbally respond to the dialoguer and refuse the proposed joint activity. Although in this case, the refusal is uttered within a sequence constituted

by a first action initiated by the dialoguer and negatively responded to in second position by the pedestrian, this sequence is embedded in converging/diverging mobile trajectories that manifest the refusal well before it is verbally expressed. In other words, the initial adjustments – and negotiation of the encounter – happen during the incipient (pre-)opening and before the reason for the approach has been announced; foremost, they involve the embodied walking movements of the participants.

The next extract involves a vehicular unit of two pedestrians walking up the street. The dialoguer, stomping and looking around, sees them, stops, and waits for them, adjusting her position to their upcoming trajectory (fig.10):

(3) DIALOG 0-44-50

```
1       (3.2)   * (0.8)#(1.0)  *
  dia  >>stomps*stops and wait*steps twd PEDs->
  fig              #fig.10
```



```
2  DIA   salü zäme:, $£ (.) *ganz kleine* moment #zei:t?* .hh#
         hello together (.) a very short moment of time
                        ->*spreads legs*lateral step*w backwards->
  ped1             $slightly changes trajectory->
  ped2              £slightly changes trajectory->
  fig                              fig.11#      fig.12#
```



```
3  PED1 äh: [nein. $£[danke#
        eh   no       thanks
4  PED2     [(nei)  [xx
              (no)
5  DIA              [sehr #schade.
                     very sad
  ped1         ->$walks obliquely on the R->>
  ped2          ->£walks obliquely on the R->>
  fig               #fig.13
```

```
6   DIA  >ich * wünsch ihne $£n schöne< t[ag$£#
         I wish you a nice day
            ->*pivots and steps aside->>
    ped1                  ->$passes by DIA--$
    ped2                   ->£passes by DIA--£
    fig                                       #fig.14
7   PED2                             [danke, ihne au
                                      thanks same to you

8   DIA  da:nke sehr
         many thanks
```


The dialoguer positions herself quite in advance on the trajectory of the pedestrians (not yet visible on fig.10), stopping and then stepping toward them (1). As they come closer, she greets them (2). The greetings address them explicitly as a *with* (Goffman 1971:19), with the Swiss German expression *salü zäme* literally 'hello together' (2) (see Mondada in press). Just after her greetings, they begin to slightly change their trajectory, projecting avoidance of her on her left. She responsively adjusts to this change by spreading her legs and doing a lateral step to the left (fig.11), as well as walking backward in front of them (fig.12). By so doing, she preserves and actively maintains a common interactional face-to-face space.

Thus, even before the dialoguer's question about the availability of the pedestrians begins to be audible, they manifest an embodied disalignment with the trajectory initiated by the dialoguer, projecting their refusal in the next turn. The refusal (3-4) is produced chorally, as both pedestrians further obliquely turn toward the right (fig.13), circumventing the dialoguer on her left. In this case, the dialoguer produces the closing greeting as they pass by her (6, fig.14) – a final exchange of thank you occurs after they have overcome her (7-8).

In the next excerpt, the dialoguer approaches two pedestrians with a baby stroller in a similar way: she positions herself in front of them, blocking their trajectory, and they circumvent her:

(4) DIALOG 0-12-10

```
1          (3)              * (0.7) *     (3.1)       *
    dia    >>walks around*pivots-*5 big steps perp*
2   DIA    *salü zäme:# (.) ±ei kl*eine +moment+ für uns:.#
           hello together (.) a short moment for us
           *2 smaller steps-------*stops in fr and stands->
    ped1   >>looks PED2-----±looks DIA->
    ped2                               +...+moves stroll around D->>
    fig              #fig.15                        #fig.16
3   PED2   o[h: nei dankschön
           oh no thank you
4   PED1   [nei jetz grad nid.#±
            no now really not
    ped1                   ->±looks straight->>
    fig                     #fig.17
5          (0.3)
```


fig.15A/B   fig.16A/B   fig.17A/B

```
6   DIA    alles *klar.# i wünsch* ihne en schöne tag
           alright        I wish you a nice day
    dia       ->*1 step lateral*torso turns twd PEDs->
    fig              #fig.18
```


18

```
7          und gute [zei:t
           a good time
8   PED2            [dir [au:
                     you too
9   PED1                 [danks±chön*
                          thanks a lot
    ped1                    ->±looks straight->>
    dia                        ->*walks away->>
```

When the dialoguer spots the two pedestrians, she moves decidedly toward them
(1) and stops in the middle of their way. She utters the greetings, which treat them
as being together, that is, as a "with" (*zäme* 2), as she is still walking (fig.15A/B),
and the question about their availability is produced as she stops in front of them
(2, fig.16A/B). Although the pedestrians are engaged in a conversation and do seem
to notice her relatively late, as the greetings have already been initiated (Pedestrian1
shifts her gaze from her partner to the dialoguer only after the greetings, possibly
orienting to the expected response she makes relevant, 2), as soon as they notice
her, they change their trajectory, even before the question is completed. In other
words, the pedestrians begin an avoiding trajectory – which is an embodied re-
sponse – before the reason for the encounter is produced, and this projects early on
their verbal refusal. Next, they produce their refusal in a turn adequately positioned
in response to the question (3-4), during which they look away from the dialoguer
and walk around her (fig.17-18). The dialoguer liberates the pathway with a lateral
step (6) as she produces the closing greetings, which they reciprocate and thank (8-
9).

In these two cases, the negotiation between the initiating dialoguer and the re-
sponding pedestrians is achieved, first and foremost, in an embodied way, by mean
of their trajectory disaligning with her convergent one, in multiple and continuous
micro-sequential adjustments. Only then, the sequences of turns-at-talk make this
refusal explicit.

In the previous cases, the dialoguer engages in the encounter with a pre-sequence
that checks the temporal availability of the passersby, projecting a further action –
and getting a negative response. In the next two cases, the dialoguer uses another
type of pre-sequence which attributes a positive stance toward nature to the pedes-
trian, projecting a positive response. In these cases, the refusal is both embodied
early on in the adjustments of the trajectory, and later on in a verbal response, adopt-
ing a "yes but" format.

We join the next extract as the dialoguer approaches two pedestrians (fig.19).
After the greeting (2), she initiates a pre-sequence with a question about their love
for nature (3), projecting a positive response:

(5) DIALOG 0-47-20

```
1        (1.3)    *(0.9)* (0.7)
   ped1 >>walks same pace than PED2->
   ped2 >>walks same pace than PED1->
   dia  >>cruises*turns*lateral steps twd PED->
2  DIA  #hallo, schöne gute tag zäme.*£$#
        hello a nice good morning together
   dia                             ->*
   ped1                              ->£changes trajectory->
   ped2                               ->$changes trajectory->
   fig  #fig.19                        #fig.20
```



```
3        *>händ sie# a herz* für de naturschutz?<#
         do you have a hearth for nature protection
         *1 step in fr PEDs*one step back-->
   fig            #fig.21                 fig.22#
```



```
4        (0.4)*
   dia   ->*
5  PED1 £$*eh (.) eh hämmer£$ scho* abr mir #händ nu$r mittagspause*
        eh (.) eh we have PRT but we have our lunch break
   ped1 £at DIA's level£cont.walking looking back at DIA->
   ped2 $at DIA's level$cont.walking lking DIA$w and looks fwd->>
   dia  *one step following them*another step following them--*
   fig                              #fig.23
```

```
6        *n (aso)xx
         and so xx
         *stompels->
7  DIA   ah >alles klar< dann wünsch ichf schöne mittag*
         oh alright      then I wish you a good lunch
   dia                                          ->*stops
   ped1                               ->fwalks and looks fwd->>
```

The dialoguer calibrates her walk and talk in such a way that she is positioned in front of the pedestrians at the end of her greetings (fig.20). The pedestrians adjust to her approach by changing their walking trajectories at the completion of the greetings (2), responding in a way that displays their unavailability for what will come next. The dialoguer adjusts her steps in front of them (fig.21), keeping this position until the completion of her question (3, fig.22), which is uttered with a faster pace, adjusting to the progression of the recipients who continue to walk forward. While the dialoguer adjusts her steps (e.g., walking backward) in such a way as to maintain a frontal interactional space, the pedestrians continue their walk in such a way as to dissolve it. The transition relevance place (TRP) (4) and last moment (given their mobile trajectories) in which they are positioned face-to-face constitutes the expected opportunity, limited but timely created, for the pedestrians to respond. Pedestrian1 does so – aligning first with the preferred response projected by the question but then producing an account that negates their availability – as they bypass the dialoguer, who begins to follow them (fig.23) until the end of the response. At that point, the dialoguer aligns with their rejection and slows down, doing some small steps and definitively stopping at the end of her final greetings.

In this case as well, two sequential organizations unfold at the same time: a series of micro-adjustments of the mobile trajectories negotiating the establishment of a common interactional space and a sequence of turns constituted by the greetings and a preliminary question projecting more to come which is then rejected.

In the next fragment, a similar pre-sequence is initiated by the dialoguer. The pedestrian responds in a subtle manner with positive-but-negative multimodal format:

(6) DIALOG 0-49-50

```
1        (4.2)            •(0.5)#%(0.2)%*(0.3)#(0.4)*(1.4)%
   ped   >>walks straight fwd->
   dia   >>walks in circles----------*stops--*one step twd PED->
   dia   >>scans envrnmt•sees PED and cont. to gz at him->
   ped   >>                         %.....%drinks-----------%
   fig                              #fig.24      #fig.25
```


24

25

```
2          %(0.3) * (0.6)*%±(0.4) ± (1.7) #
   ped     %,,,,,,,,,,,,,,%
   ped                      ±lks DIA±looks on his L->
   dia        ->*one st*5 perpend steps to PED->
   fig                                  #fig.26
3  DIA     ja schöne gu±te tag da %he±*rrs%::#
           yes nice good day   the mister
   ped                 ->±lks DIA------±lks down/in front->>
   ped                            %raises LH%
   dia                            ->*stops->
   fig                                     #fig.27
```



```
4          (0.3)
5  DIA     >sie+ haben bestimmt >a herz %für# %natur+°sc[hu#tz%.<+
           you have for sure a heart for nature protection
6  PED                                         [>dankschön.<
                                                thank you
   ped     ->+walks R of DIA--------------------+at D's level-+
   ped                            %.....%refusing gest---%
   fig                            #fig.28         #fig.29
```



```
7          +(0.3) * (0.2)+
   ped     +overtakes DIA+turns twd the street on his R->>
   dia         ->*2 steps following PED->
8  DIA     alles klar i wünsch ihne n schöne dag=
           alright    I wish you    a nice day
9  PED     %=gli#ch%falls
           you too
           %greet gest%
   fig        #fig.30
```

```
                                                    30
10 DIA    da*ng•ge sehr
          thanks a lot
          ->*walks away->>
             ->•looks away->>
```

As in the previous cases, the dialoguer is cruising, scanning the environment. The fact that she identifies an upcoming pedestrian as a target is observable in that she looks in his direction, stops, and then progressively steps toward him (1). Just after the dialoguer spots the pedestrian (fig.24) and as she stops, looking at him, the pedestrian brings a cup of coffee to his mouth and takes a sip (fig.25). Her further approach adjusts to this action that makes him unavailable for talking: she stands for a moment, then makes a first slower step toward him while he finishes drinking and then a second faster step. She accelerates as he has finished drinking, and he looks at her (2) before looking away. She makes five big steps toward him (fig.26) and greets him (3): she stops in front of him as she completes her greeting turn (fig.27). At the end of her first turn, she has created an opportunity to respond and has positioned herself exactly opposite him, blocking his trajectory. This completion of her approach and greeting is skillfully timed with the pace and the trajectory of his walk, timely creating an interactional space for a response.

The pedestrian briefly glances at her during the greeting but then continues to look forward. He orients to the projectable completion point and TRP by raising his hand (which can be seen as a greeting in response but also as an early refusal gesture) and looking away. He also slightly readjusts his trajectory in such a way to pass on her right.

She uses the window of possibility in which she stays in front of him and before he passes her (in total, seven seconds) to initiate another action, projecting the reason to approach him (5). She initiates a pre-sequence by attributing to him a love for nature, in a declarative form, projecting a further action that will address the protection of nature. She accelerates her turn as he comes closer to her and at turn completion, he reaches her. In this way, the moment at which she completes her turn, opening up a slot for him to respond, and the moment at which he passes her are perfectly coordinated (fig.28), as in the previous extracts. This is also the precise moment at which he responds: in overlap with turn pre-completion, he produces a >*dankschön.*< 'thank you' (6) and raises his left hand. This multimodal response orients to the double-barreled dimension (Schegloff 2007) of the dialoguer's conversational action: he verbally responds positively to her turn treated as a compliment, and he gesturally refuses the action understood as a pre-request. The latter is the type of response to which the dialoguer orients, treating it as closing-implicative

with *alles klar* and a final greeting (8). The greeting is reciprocated by the pedestrian, as he has already overtaken her: he does a gesture waving back toward her (9, figs.29-30), which she thanks (10).

While in the first two extracts (§ 3.1-3.2), the pedestrians were mostly ignoring the dialoguer's approach, in the cases examined in this section, they align with the sequential constraints set up by the dialoguer's actions and engage in a focused encounter, although responding in a disaligning way. The refusal is not only expressed by a verbal negative response, but, much earlier on, by the reorientation of the ongoing mobile trajectory, in a way that diverges from the converging one of the dialoguers.

3.4. Displaying and reporting being in a hurry

A distinct case of disalignment and refusal is constituted by pedestrians who exhibit being in a hurry: like the pedestrians examined in the previous section, they orient, address, and respond to the dialoguer; unlike them, they do so by producing a turn accounting for their non-availability much earlier, in overlap with the greetings. In response, the dialoguer does not maintain her frontal position until the completion of her question or request, but steps out quite early, giving the way, and often abandoning her turn.

The next fragment shows two pedestrians in a hurry. The dialoguer spots them coming from another street and walks toward them (Fig.31). In this case, they do not change their trajectory at all and continue straight forward:

(7) DIALOG 0-35-30


```
1       (0.7) *(0.5)* (0.4)#(0.2)
   dia        *turns*walks frontally twd PED1/2->
   ped1 >>walks fast->>
   ped2 >>walks fast->>
   fig                    #fig.31
2  DIA   die zwei he:rre, $guezi* wo[:hl#
         the two misters   hello
```

```
3   PED1                                [mir# hends leid[*er press$ant#
                                         we are unfortunately in a hurry
4   DIA                                               [*darf i-
                                                       can I
    ped1                 $gesticulates---------------------$
    dia                        ->*stops frontally-----*...steps aside>
    fig                                  #fig.32            fig.33#
```



```
5   DIA    AC[H: (0.3) so furcht-
           ACH   (0.3) so terrib-
6   PED1    [es tut uns jo- [eigentlich lei:d. ab]er *mir
            [we are xx-      actually sorry    but we
7   PED2                    [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
    dia                                             *w along w them->>
8   PED1   |chöme no#cher| [gli £z'ruck£
           come later back
9   DIA                    [alles guet
                           [alright
    peds   |-pass by DIA-|
    ped1                        £lks back£
    fig              #fig.34
```

34

The dialoguer addresses the pedestrians at some distance as she is walking toward them, greeting them (2). They continue their walk straight toward her at a fast pace, projecting the continuation of their trajectory. In overlap with the terminal part of the greetings (fig.32), one of them provides for an account (3), which further overlaps her request, which is abandoned (4). At the completion of their account, they are still at some distance from her (fig.33). As she responds (5), she is overlapped again (6) by some apologies and the promise to come back (8), uttered as they pass her (fig.34).

In the following two fragments, there is a very similar overlap, leading to the abandonment of the dialoguer's turn. Contrary to the previous case, the pedestrian changes trajectory very early, on the term of address used by the dialoguer.

(8) DIALOG 0-56-30/1

```
1          (4.2)    *(0.8)* (1.6)
   dia    >>cruises*turns*walks twd PED->
   ped    >>walks down the street->
2  DIA    •.hh •d#ie* jungi +lady, (.) blibt •si#cher schnäu
           .hh the young lady (.) will surely quickly
   dia    •....•open arms-------------------•
   dia            ->*stops frontally->
   ped                  ->+changes trajectory->>
   fig          #fig.35A/B                    #fig.36
```


35a/b

36

```
3          [±bi *mir stoh# dr-
           [stop with me xx-
4   PED    [±sorry ich (bi am) % schaffe,*± s[o#rry
           [sorry I (am at) work, s[orry
5   DIA                                  [alles gu#:e[%(h)et
                                         [alright
6   PED                                         [ähäh .äh
    dia     ->*...pivots laterally-----*walks with PED->
    ped    ±raises LH--------------------±
    ped                     %looks at DIA-----------%lks fwd->>
    fig              #fig.37         fig.38#     #fig.39
```



```
7   DIA    en schöne tag *tschau,
           a nice day      bye
                      ->*stops
```

The dialoguer moves frontally toward the pedestrian walking down the street. She opens her arms (fig.35A/B) and produces a term of address (2), stopping in that position at some distance on her projectable trajectory. The pedestrian begins to change her trajectory on the term of address (2, fig.36), projecting a disalignment avoiding the dialoguer. In overlap with the dialoguer's turn, she produces an account (4), also raising her hand in a refusing gesture. Overlapped, the dialoguer does not finish her turn (3). She also pivots laterally (fig.37) in order to let the pedestrian continue her walk. She walks along with her until the final greetings and then stops (fig.38). Her *alles gu:e(h)et* is not only stretched but produced with an empathic accent and is responded to by the pedestrian looking at her (fig.39).

A very similar occurrence is the following one, with a dialoguer positioning herself frontally on the incoming trajectory of a pedestrian coming from the opposite direction.

(9) DIALOG 0-56-30/2

```
1       (8.1)                   *(0.9)* (0.6)
    dia     >walks up/down the street*turns*stands->
2   DIA    d•ie dame#::•, +grüezi w[o#hl. darf ich sie sch-
           the lady          hallo        can I xx- you
3   PED                                [han temi- han e termi::n
                                       [I have an appointment
    dia     •raises RH-•
    ped               ->+changes traj->>
    fig           #fig.40         #fig.41
```

```
4         %[(tut mir% leid)
          [(I am sorry)
5  DIA    [alles *guet
          [alright
   dia          ->*w w PED->
   ped    %looks DIA%straight->
6         (0.3)
7  DIA    wünsch# ihne schöne tag*
          I wish you a nice day
                           ->*
   fig          #fig.42
```



```
8         (0.2)
9  PED    glichfalls
          you too
```

The dialoguer waits for the pedestrian and, at some distance, utters a term of address (2, fig.40) and a greeting (fig.41). The pedestrian changes trajectory while greeted and produces an account and an apology in overlap with the greeting and the beginning of the request (3-4). As in the previous fragments, the dialoguer does not finish her request (2). Instead, she aligns with the pedestrian, both with an agreeing turn (5) and by walking with the pedestrian along the street (fig.42), until she produces the final greeting (7).

This section demonstrates that one way to refuse to engage in the encounter initiated by the dialoguer is to display being in a hurry in an embodied way and to formulate it with an explicit verbal account. Being in a hurry is displayed in the fast pace of the walk, which can be either straight forward without any deviation (extract 7) or with a relatively early change in its trajectory, that is, already on the address term (extracts 8-9). This temporality contrasts with that of the refusals expressed by a negative turn, in which the change of trajectory tends to happen a bit later, at the end of the greetings (extracts 5-6). Likewise, when the pedestrians proffer an account for being in a hurry, they utter it early on and in overlap with the ongoing initiating turn of the dialoguer, preempting and curtailing their request and occasioning its abandonment. This brings the encounter to a close, with the dialoguer

realigning with the reasons for not stopping (typically with *alles guet*). In this case, the positioning of the dialoguer frontally on the pedestrians' trajectory is quickly readjusted by pivoting laterally and letting the pedestrian pass, dissolving the interactional space of the encounter.

4. Conclusion

The paper has presented a range of methodic ways in which pedestrians refuse an approach and the activity that is being proposed by the approach. It has shown a diversity of formats in which refusals can be implemented, going from minimal interactions – such as ignoring the approaching party (§ 3.1) or minimally exchanging glances with them (§ 3.2) – to more focused engagements which verbally express the refusal within sequences of turns-at-talk – either saying "no" (§ 3.3) or claiming and accounting for being in a hurry (§ 3.4).

These fleeting encounters which end in refusals enable us to reflect upon the sequential organization of extreme forms of social interaction characterized by asymmetry, unilaterality, and disalignments. These cases reveal how copresence in public space can gradually move from civil inattention to a progressive fleeting interaction between divergent parties in which one initiates an approach while the other navigates to avoid it. Before a word is produced, these divergences are implemented in the mobile trajectories of the participants and witnessed, not only by parties implicated but also possibly by third parties at-a-glance. The party initiating the approach skillfully adjusts their walking trajectory to the incoming trajectory of the approached party and calibrates its temporality with the temporality of the address or first turn. These adjustments are oriented to by the approached party, which responsively adjusts to them – typically by changing the trajectory of their walk in a way that does not align with the person convergently stepping toward them but disaligns, divergently avoiding them. Both trajectories are asymmetrically adjusted: while the dialoguer visibly steps toward the pedestrian, stops in front of them, walks laterally and backward to establish and maintain a frontal interactional space, the pedestrians generally operate minimal changes in their trajectories, obliquing toward the right or the left of the dialoguer in an attempt to avoid them but without radically reorienting the direction of their walk. These mutual adjustments constitute a fascinating form of micro-sequentiality in which the parties respond to each other in a continuous way.

These adjustments characterize the pre-opening of the encounter, and continue during the opening and the entire interaction. They confirm the importance of visuality and mobility for the emergence of interactions in public space (Goffman 1971). They contribute to a better understanding and problematization of pre-openings (or pre-beginnings, Schegloff 1979; Mondada 2009; De Stefani/Mondada 2018): preliminary actions and positionings can be achieved by the initiating party which identify a possible future addressee well before the latter notices it; when both notice each other and are able to anticipate their trajectories, they do not yet engage in a reciprocal interaction, which is achieved only later by mutual gaze and mutual engagement. Thus, (micro-)sequential adjustments begin well before the opening of a focused interaction, although they constitute a crucial aspect of what makes this interaction possible.

As an alternative to minimal forms of silent embodied fleeting interactions, focused interactions in which the parties engage in talk are shaped by sequencing dynamics that are well-described by Sacks (1992:99ff.). It is noticeable that verbal openings are compact, with greetings that are generally not reciprocated and are immediately followed by the reason for the approach, often in pre-sequences (*do you have time*', *are you sensitive to nature*') that project some solicitation. Thus, these opening are more similar to institutional ones than to casual informal ones, presenting a "reduced" format (Zimmerman 1992) when compared to the "canonical opening sequence" (Schegloff 1986).

In this case, too, the mobile micro-sequential adjustments between the two walking parties are crucial. In particular, for the dialoguer, the adjustment to the pedestrian's progressive walk enables the creation and maintenance of an interactional space, thereby achieving a form of face-to-face, reciprocal, mutually accessible eye-to-eye contact that characterizes social interaction. These adjustments between walking trajectories are skillfully calibrated and coordinated with the turns-at-talk and their sequence organization: the dialoguers adjust their positions in front of the pedestrians in such a way that at the end of a turn, the interactional space between them secures relations of accessibility, proximity, and reciprocity. This creates a spatiotemporal window corresponding to a TRP in which a response to the turn asking a question or requesting something is possible and is expected. The negatie response is produced as this window progressively closes, given that the pedestrian continues to walk and the dialoguer slows down or stops when the denial becomes clear. The cases in which the pedestrians claim and display that they are in a hurry are interesting in this respect since they curtail the formulation of any further action after the greetings, preempting them with the provision of an account. By contrast, final greetings are often reciprocated in an aligned way, especially when the pedestrian has already overcome the dialoguer – this final alignment is bodily oriented by all parties as inconsequential for any prolongation of the encounter.

The fleeting interactions examined in this paper thus enable us to discuss on the basis of systematic analyses a diversity of forms of sequentiality. The focus on refusals demonstrates how they can be implemented in embodied micro-sequential adjustments as well as in sequences of turns-at-talk. In the former case, they are manifested in divergent mobile trajectories, responded to as such by the recipient adjusting to them; in the latter case, they are uttered within a sequence of verbal or multimodal responses to a first action. Most often, the latter are preceded by and embedded in the former. Embodied adjustments can exhibit very early responses, orienting to the incipient interaction even before its opening. Verbal negative responses, by contrast, tend to follow the turn expressing the first action within a canonical form of sequence organization, the adjacency pair – although (as shown by the cases of pedestrians in a hurry), they can anticipate, preempt, and curtail very early the first pair (cf. Mondada 2021b). While the micro-sequentiality of adjustments is characterized by fine-grained multiple temporalities responsively coordinated together – including forms of simultaneity typical of multimodal resources – sequence organization is characterized by a more linear form of successive temporality. This shows how temporality and sequentiality in their diverse manifestations are central to social life.

5. Transcription conventions

The transcripts use Jefferson's conventions for talk (2004) and Mondada's conventions for embodiment (2018), see
https://www.lorenzamondada.net/multimodal-transcription

6. Acknowledgments

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Aspekte der sequenziellen Organisation von Personenreferenzen in translokaler Chat-Kommunikation: Zur Ko-Produktion "alternativer" Selbst- und Fremdreferenzen in deutschen und chinesischen WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktionen[1]

Susanne Günthner

Abstract

Auf der Grundlage von Chat-Interaktionen wird im vorliegenden Beitrag verdeutlicht, wie Sequenzialität, und damit die zeitlich dynamisch verlaufende Abfolge kommunikativer Handlungen, die dialogische Konstitution von Praktiken der Personenreferenz prägt.

Auch medial vermittelte translokale Chat-Kommunikation zeichnet sich durch sequenzielle Abläufe aus, die die Grundlage für das kollaborative Display von Beziehungsformationen und Zugehörigkeiten bilden: Chinesische wie auch deutsche TeilnehmerInnen setzen immer wieder nominale Referenzformen (jenseits der deiktischen Pronomina) zur Bezugnahme auf SprecherIn und AdressatIn ein und konstituieren so gemeinsame Familien- bzw. Paaridentitäten. Diese "alternativen Praktiken der Personenreferenz" erweisen sich insofern als sequenziell relevant, als sie Erwartungen an die KommunikationspartnerInnen in Richtung einer korrespondierenden Fortsetzung im Folgeturn aufbauen. Darüber hinaus veranschaulicht die Analyse, dass nicht nur kommunikative Handlungen eng mit dem sequenziellen Verlauf der Interaktion verwoben sind, sondern auch Praktiken der Personenreferenz und die damit verwobenen Interaktionsmodalitäten und "stances" sich als sequenziell organisiert erweisen.

Keywords: Personenreferenz – Selbst- und Fremdreferenz – Chat-Kommunikation – Kollaboration – Display – "stance/s" – Interaktionsmodalität(en) – Beziehungszeichen – sequenzielle Erwartung(en).

English Abstract

Based on SMS-, WhatsApp- and WeChat-interactions, this study will illustrate how sequentiality, and thus the temporally dynamic sequence of communicative actions, shapes the dialogical constitution of practices of personal reference.

The analysis demonstrates how translocal media communication is characterized by sequential processes which form the basis for the collaborative display of relationship formations and affiliations: Chinese as well as German participants in these interactions repeatedly employ nominal forms of self- and other-reference (instead of deictic pronouns) to display togetherness as family or couple. These 'alternative' practices of person reference prove to be sequentially relevant insofar as they build up expectations of co-participants reaction in their following turn. Furthermore, the analysis illustrates that not only communicative actions are closely interwoven with the sequential order in which they are carried out, but also practices of person reference and the interwoven interactional modalities and stances prove to be sequentially organized.

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1. Einleitung

Menschen verfügen – so Levinson (2006:44) – über distinktive, universell gültige Fähig- und Fertigkeiten, die unsere zwischenmenschliche Interaktion prägen. Folglich zeichnen sich sprach- und kulturübergreifende Interaktionsprinzipien ab, die auf allgemeinen kognitiven Fertigkeiten und Verhaltensdispositionen als Teil der menschlichen Natur gründen. Zu dieser "human interaction engine" zählen neben dem Prinzip der zwischenmenschlichen Kooperativität, der Reziprozität bzw. der Ausrichtung am Gegenüber auch das Prinzip der Sequenzialität (Levinson 2006:44ff.).

Auf der Grundlage einer Analyse von Praktiken der Personenreferenz in deutschen und chinesischen SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Dialogen werde ich in diesem Beitrag veranschaulichen, wie Sequenzialität – und damit die zeitlich dynamisch verlaufende Abfolge kommunikativer Handlungen – die Konstitution von Beziehungsformationen und Interaktionsmodalitäten bzw. "stances" (Stivers 2008) auch in der medial vermittelten translokalen Kommunikation prägt.

Mit dem Fokus auf Personenreferenzen wende ich mich einer zentralen menschlichen Aktivität in Alltagsinteraktionen zu (Enfield 2007:97), die an der Schnittstelle verortet ist, wo universelle Prinzipien zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation mit kulturellen und sprachspezifischen Ausprägungen zusammentreffen (Levinson 2005:433). Trotz sprachlich-kultureller Differenzen illustrieren die vorliegenden Referenzierungspraktiken auf Ego (und damit auf die/den SprecherIn) und Alter-Ego (das heißt auf die/den RezipientIn), wie sowohl in der chinesischen als auch in der deutschen Chat-Kommunikation die zeitliche Abfolge der einzelnen Dialogzüge aufeinander abgestimmt ist und die sequenzielle Positionierung der Personenreferenzen als Ressource zur Konstruktion interaktiver Bedeutung beiträgt. Ferner veranschaulicht die Analyse, dass Sequenzialität nicht nur den interaktiven Verlauf sozialer Handlungen prägt, sondern diese auch genutzt wird, um gemeinsame

Interaktionsmodalitäten, "stances" und Beziehungsrelationen zu konstituieren, zu bestätigen bzw. zu modifizieren.

2. Sequenzialität in SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktionen[2]

Sequenzialität und damit die dynamisch verlaufende Abfolge kommunikativer Handlungen gilt als zentrales Merkmal zwischenmenschlicher Interaktion, das durch das Zusammentreffen der situierten Platzierung einzelner Handlungselemente, zwischenmenschlicher Kooperativität, Reziprozität bzw. Ausrichtung am Gegenüber den Interagierenden anzeigt, wie intersubjektiv ausgerichtete Handlungen zu interpretieren sind. Soziale Handlungen – und somit auch kommunikative Aktivitäten – orientieren sich (in der Regel) an dem allgemeinen Strukturierungsprinzip der Zug-um-Zug Abfolge, das die einzelnen Schritte der Beteiligten organisiert (Schegloff 2007a:2) und dazu führt, dass die Interpretation von A's Äußerung wiederum die Voraussetzung für B's Folgeäußerung bildet (Garfinkel 1948/ 2005:184):

> A acts towards B as if the signs that B provides are not haphazardly given. When we say that A understands B we mean only this: that A detects an orderliness in these signs both with regard to sequence and meanings. The orderliness is assigned to B's activities by A. The 'validity' of A's conception of the signs generated by B are given in accordance with some regulative principle established for A when his return action evokes a counter action that somehow 'fits' A's anticipations.

Sequenzialität bzw. die zeitliche Dynamik sozialen Handelns erweist sich somit als organisatorisches Merkmal interaktionaler Praktiken und als Grundlage intersubjektiven Verstehens (vgl. Deppermann/Günthner 2015; Knoblauch 2020a):

> As such, time is a constitutive feature of practices, and trust and reciprocity are implicated in its use. The order in which things are said and done – their placement before or after one another – is constitutive of how they mean (Rawls 2005:179).

Doch nicht nur Redezüge in face-to-face Interaktionen werden von Teilnehmenden so verknüpft, dass ein "Nextness" (Stivers 2013) der Abfolge vorliegt, auch medial vermittelte, translokale Chat-Interaktionen sind vom Prinzip der Sequenzialität und damit der dynamischen, interaktiven Abfolge kommunikativer Handlungen geprägt: Die einzelnen Dialogzüge, die in der SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktion zeitlich asynchron bzw. quasi-synchron verlaufen, bilden keineswegs entzeitlichte monologische Entitäten, sondern auch sie weisen eine starke Ausrichtung am Gegenüber sowie am sequenziellen Verlauf der Interaktion auf (Günthner 2011; 2012). Allerdings unterscheidet sich der Interaktionsablauf bei der "keyboard-to-screen"-Kommunikation (Dürscheid/Frick 2014) vom Redezugwechsel in synchron stattfindenden Gesprächen: So findet in der räumlich (und teilweise auch

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[2] Ich verwende den an Berger/Luckmann (1969) bzw. Luckmann (2002) angelehnten Interaktionsbegriff, der Interaktionen als Prozesse wechselseitigen (reziproken) sozialen Handelns betrachtet, die von anderen wahrgenommen, gedeutet und "mit-bestimmt" werden (Luckmann 2002:75). Auch wenn der Prototyp der Alltagsinteraktion die face-to-face-Situation darstellt, können Interaktionen in unterschiedlichen (unter anderem medial vermittelten) Formationen stattfinden. Zu Typen sozialer Interaktion siehe Berger/Luckmann (1969:31ff.).

zeitlich) zerdehnten Chat-Kommunikation keine Synchronisation der Bewusstseinsströme der Interagierenden im Hier und Jetzt und folglich auch keine unmittelbare Rückkoppelung zwischen den Beteiligten statt (Schütz/Luckmann 1984:105; Günthner 2011, 2012). Das heißt die Produktion eines Beitrags wird von der/dem RezipientIn nicht "miterlebt". (Bei WhatsApp-Dialogen kann der 1. Verfasser zwar erkennen, dass seine Rezipientin zur Replik ansetzt, doch die inhaltliche Produktion kann erst dann rezipiert werden, wenn diese auf dem Handy des 1. Verfassers bemerkbar eingetroffen ist.) Da in der Chat-Kommunikation also kein synchron ablaufendes Turn-Taking wie bei der Face-to-Face-Kommunikation bzw. bei medial vermittelter synchroner Kommunikation (wie bei Telefongesprächen) vorliegt, finden sich keine Unterbrechungen, Kämpfe ums Rederecht bzw. zeitlich überlappende Hörersignale in Form von "continuers" etc. Dennoch folgen auch diese kommunikativen Handlungen – trotz ihrer (teilweise sehr geringen) zeitlichen Versetzung – einem sequenziellen Ablaufschema, das sich auf die Handlungsfolge, Erwartbarkeit und interaktionale Bezugnahme auswirkt: Die einzelnen Handlungen orientieren sich auch hier an den vorausgehenden Mitteilungen des Gegenübers und setzen wiederum Erwartungen an die Folgehandlungen (hierzu Günthner 2011, 2012 sowie König 2015).

Im Folgenden werde ich anhand der Analyse von nominalen Personenreferenzen veranschaulichen, dass die sequenziell konstituierte Orientierung nicht nur größere kommunikative Projekte bzw. Handlungen betrifft, sondern auch die interaktive Konstitution referenzieller Praktiken und damit verwoben die kollaborative Konstruktion von Beziehungsformationen, Interaktionsmodalitäten bzw. "stances".

Nimmt man das Prinzip der Temporalität bzw. Sequenzialität und die damit verwobenen Aspekte der zwischenmenschlichen Kooperativität, der Reziprozität und dialogischen Ausrichtung am Gegenüber ernst (Levinson 2006:44f.; Linell 2009), so stellen sich folgende Fragen hinsichtlich der Produktion und Rezeption medial vermittelter, schriftlicher Chat-Dialoge:

- Wie macht sich die zeitliche Dynamik der Dialogzug-Abfolge in den Chats bemerkbar und welche Konsequenzen hat sie für das kommunikative Handeln?

- Wie bauen die Interagierenden in der räumlich und zeitlich distanten Chatkommunikation sequenzielle Erwartungen an Folgereaktionen des virtuellen Gegenübers auf?

- Inwiefern zeichnen sich sequenziell organisierte Kollaborationen und Ko-Produktionen kommunikativer Praktiken über mehrere Dialogzüge hinweg ab?

Diesen Fragen werde ich im Folgenden am Beispiel von "alternativen Personenreferenzen"[3] in chinesischen und deutschen Chat-Dialogen nachgehen und dabei veranschaulichen, wie eng die kollaborative Durchführung dieser Praktiken mit der sequenziellen Organisation verwoben ist.

Die Untersuchung basiert auf folgenden Korpora, die in den letzten zehn Jahren im Rahmen verschiedener Forschungsprojekte in Deutschland und China erhoben wurden, 91% der Interaktionen sind dyadisch ausgerichtet, 9% beinhalten Gruppenchats:

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[3] Der Begriff der "alternativen Personenreferenzen" orientiert sich an Stivers (2007:80) Konzept der "alternative recognitionals".

- *Einem SMS-Korpus mit chinesischen und deutschen SMS-Interaktionen*, das sich aus zwei Subkorpora zusammensetzt: Dieses umfasst (a) 1072 chinesische Interaktionen (circa 9000 SMS-Mitteilungen) von 13- bis 74-jährigen Personen (mit unterschiedlichem Bildungsgrad) aus der zentralchinesischen Stadt Xi'an (und Umgebung) sowie der Inneren Mongolei. (b) 601 deutsche SMS-Interaktionen zwischen 11- bis 70-jährigen Personen (mit unterschiedlichem Bildungsgrad) aus verschiedenen Regionen Deutschlands (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Württemberg und Niedersachsen). Die SMS-Dialoge stammen zu 88% von Studierenden, die untereinander bzw. mit Geschwistern, Eltern, Verwandten interagieren.

- *Einem chinesischen WeChat-Korpus,* das 144-Interaktionen von 13- bis 74-jährigen Personen (mit unterschiedlichem Bildungsgrad) aus den nordchinesischen Provinzen Shaanxi, Innere Mongolei, Shandong und Jilin umfasst. Die überwiegende Mehrzahl (86%) der Interaktionen findet unter Studierenden zwischen 20 und 30 Jahren statt. Bei weiteren 10% handelt es sich um Interaktionen zwischen Studierenden und deren Eltern, Geschwistern und anderen Verwandten sowie zwischen Studierenden und DozentInnen.

- *Einem deutschen WhatsApp-Korpus* mit 78 Interaktionen zwischen 11- bis 70-jährigen Personen (mit unterschiedlichem Bildungsgrad) aus verschiedenen Regionen Deutschlands (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Württemberg und Niedersachsen). Diese Interaktionen enthalten ähnliche Beziehungskonstellationen wie die chinesischen Daten.

Die Daten entstammen unter anderem dem Forschungsprojekt "Kommunikation in den Neuen Medien: Eine kontrastive Untersuchung von chinesischen und deutschen SMS-Botschaften" (2010-2014).[4] Weitere Daten wurden im Rahmen der GIP-Kooperation zwischen dem Germanistischen Institut der WWU und der Germanistik der Xi'an International Studies University erhoben (seit 2017).[5] Zu den SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktionen wurden Metadaten zu Alter, Geschlecht, Beruf, Ausbildungsstand, Herkunft und sozialer Beziehung der VerfasserInnen erfasst. Informationen zum Texteingabemodus und zum Modell des Mobiltelefons etc. liegen nicht vor; gelegentlich fehlen Angaben zum Sendedatum und der Uhrzeit.

3. Die sequenzielle Konstitution kollaborativer Praktiken der Personenreferenz

Nach Sacks/Schegloff (1979) zeichnen sich bei der Referenz auf Personen zwei Präferenzprinzipien ab:

- "Preference for using a form ('a recognitional') under which the referent can be recognized by the recipient".

- "Preference for using a minimal form".

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[4]   http://www.uni-muenster.de/Germanistik/Lehrende/guenthner_s/projekte.html
[5]   https://www.uni-muenster.de/Germanistik/Internationales/Kooperationen/gip/index.html

Schegloff (2006:85) betont ferner, dass sowohl im Englischen als auch in anderen Sprachen das "referring *simpliciter*", das nichts tut, als "simply referring to the person it identifies", die unmarkierte Personenreferenz darstellt – auch im Fall von Selbst- und Adressatenreferenzen (Schegloff 1996:442):

> I/you are the central forms for referring to speaker and recipient, and fuller noun phrases, if used, are substitutes for them, and not the other way round.

Allerdings veranschaulichen die vorliegenden Chat-Dialoge, dass sowohl chinesische als auch deutsche Interagierende bei den am häufigsten auftretenden Referenzformen – nämlich Referenzen auf SprecherIn und AdressatIn (Schegloff 1996:441) – immer wieder von dieser Präferenz des "referring *simpliciter*" durch deiktische Pronomina abweichen und sowohl für die Selbst- als auch Fremdreferenz (jenseits vokativer Adressierungen) nominale Formen (Kose- bzw. Intimnamen, Verwandtschaftsnamen, Berufstitel etc.) einsetzen und somit lateral auf sich und ihr Gegenüber verweisen,[6] wie

- "Und: die Tante (=SPRECHRIN) will einen fotografischen Beweis!"
- 小杜老师太累啦 ("*Lehrerin Kleine Du* (=SPRECHERIN) *ist total müde*").
- "Hat das kleine Muttchen (=ADRESSATIN) morgen Lust auf eine Shopping-Tour?"
- 所以想问问学姐能帮我改一下吗˜ (*"[ich] möchte die ältere Studienschwester* (=ADRESSATIN) *fragen, ob sie mir vielleicht helfen und es korrigieren kann"*).

Obgleich in SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktionen der Teilnehmerbezug (wer kommuniziert mit wem?) medial durch die Angabe von VerfasserIn bzw. RezipientIn gelöst ist, wählen sowohl deutsche als auch chinesische Interagierende immer wieder nominale Formen der Selbst- und Fremdidentifikation (wie Verwandtschafts- und Kose- bzw. Intimnamen sowie honorative Berufstitel). Diese von der "Präferenz für Minimierung" abweichenden "alternativen Referierungspraktiken" tun – so meine These – weitaus mehr als "referring *simpliciter*": Sie fungieren als "social index" (Silverstein 1976:37) und damit als interaktive und multifunktionale Ressource zur Indizierung sozialer Bedeutung (Günthner/Zhu 2017; Günthner 2017, 2018). Darüber hinaus erweisen sich diese lateral eingesetzten Selbst- und Fremdreferenzformen insofern als sequenziell relevant, als sie Erwartungen an die translokalen KommunikationspartnerInnen in Richtung einer korrespondierenden Fortsetzung im Folgeturn aufbauen und zugleich das Gegenüber zur Bestätigung der Beziehungsformation bzw. zur Ko-Konstruktion gemeinsamer Interaktionsmodalitäten bzw. "stances" einladen. Die sprach- und kulturkontrastive Perspektive macht ferner erkenntlich, wie und in welchen Zusammenhängen die

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[6] Siehe Günthner (2000) zur lateralen Bezugnahme auf das Gegenüber sowie Schwitalla (2010) zum "Von sich selbst und dem direkten Adressaten in der 3. Person sprechen". Im Unterschied zu den syntaktisch weglassbaren, im Vor-Vorfeld positionierten vokativen Anreden, bilden diese nominalen Referenzformen in den Satz integrierte NPs, mit denen auf die/den AdressatIn in der 3. Person verwiesen wird. Da im Chinesischen keine Verbflexion existiert und somit anhand des Verbs keine Personenkategorisierung vorgenommen wird, werden vokative Adressierungen primär durch die Satzstellung markiert. Ferner kommt hinzu, dass im Chinesischen "zero pronouns" verbreitet sind, sodass in Einzelfällen die Unterscheidung zwischen nominaler Adressierung und Referenz in der 3. Person verwischt.

kontingent eingesetzten Referenzierungspraktiken "das Situative der Interaktion überschreite[n]" (Knoblauch 2020b:29f.) und kulturspezifische Konventionen evozieren.

Im Folgenden werde ich anhand eines Sets an illustrativen Ausschnitten aus deutschen und chinesischen Chat-Dialogen veranschaulichen, wie Interagierende verschiedene Typen nominaler Personenreferenzen einsetzen, um auf sich selbst bzw. ihr Gegenüber zu verweisen. Besonderes Augenmerk gilt hierbei dem sequenziellen Ablauf und der interaktiven Ausrichtung der Referenzierungspraktiken im Prozess der translokalen Interaktion.

3.1. Nominale Selbstreferenzen und ihre sequenziellen Repliken[7]

3.1.1. Repliken mit Referenzübernahmen durch die/den 2. SprecherIn: von der lateralen Selbst- zur Fremdreferenz

Im folgenden WhatsApp-Chat schickt Florian, der seit kurzem den Führerschein hat, seinem Opa Toni eine WhatsApp-Nachricht, um ihm mitzuteilen, dass er ein Problem mit seinem neuen Auto hat. Das Emoji 😨 mit dem verschreckten Gesicht trägt zur Kontextualisierung seiner Hilflosigkeit in Bezug auf das abgewürgte Auto bei:[8]

"AUTOPROBLEM" (2020)

Hab Problem – sorry! Mein auto fährt nicht mehr an. Abgewürgt? 😨
Was soll ich tun?

WhatsApp #1 (21.10.2020; 16.12)

und jetzt soll **Opi** (= SPRECHER) vorbeikommen und dich retten oder was?

WhatsApp #2 (21.10.2020; 16:14)

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[7] Die vorliegende Darstellung der SMS-, WhatsApp- bzw. WeChat-Dialoge orientiert sich an den Konventionen des Centrums für Sprache und Interaktion (CeSI) der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster (https://centrum.sprache-interaktion.de/): Die einzelnen Dialog-Züge werden in Kolumnen geordnet und chronologisch untereinander versetzt präsentiert. Die Dialoge weisen im 1. Kästchen einen Titel auf (zum Beispiel "AUTOPROBLEM") sowie die Jahreszahl der Aufzeichnung (zum Beispiel "(2020)"). Dann folgen die Originalmitteilung und die Angaben zur Chat-Plattform, zum Dialogzug, Uhrzeit und Datum (soweit vorhanden). Die Anordnung der Mitteilungskästchen wie auch die Grautöne unterscheiden die verschiedenen InteraktionsteilnehmerInnen. Alle Namen sind anonymisiert. Der Begriff "SprecherIn" verweist auf die/den VerfasserIn der betreffenden Nachricht.

[8] In den vorliegenden WhatsApp-Interaktionen werden graphische Mittel wie Emojis immer wieder als Kontextualisierungshinweise (Gumperz 1992) zur Indizierung von Modalitäten beziehungsweise "stances" eingesetzt.

stehe vorm Edeka in A-Dorf und weiß nicht weiter. Vielleicht kann **Opi** (=ADRESSAT) helfen? 😬

WhatsApp #3 (21.10.2020; 16:14)

Bin gleich da. circa 20 minuten.

WhatsApp #4 (21.10.2020; 16:17)

Opi (=ADRESSAT) ist der beste!

WhatsApp #5 (21.10.2020; 16:18)

An diesem Ausschnitt wird bereits die interaktional ausgerichtete Matrix der WhatsApp-Kommunikation deutlich: Statt einer Ansammlung autonomer Mitteilungen einzelner SprecherInnen zeichnet sich die Chat-Kommunikation durch wechselseitig ausgerichtetes soziales Handeln (Schütz/Luckmann 1984:123) aus. Es formiert sich – trotz der zeitlichen Asynchronität – als "continuing state of incipient talk" (Schegloff/Sacks 1973:325; Günthner 2011:15, 2012; König 2015): Einige Minuten nach der Mitteilung von Florian (WhatsApp #1), dass er sein Auto nicht starten kann und auf Hilfe angewiesen ist, antwortet der Großvater mit der ironisch modalisierten Nachfrage "und jetzt soll Opi vorbeikommen und dich retten oder was?" (WhatsApp #2). Hierbei referiert dieser nicht etwa mit der deiktischen Minimalform "ich" auf sich als Sprecher, sondern mit der Familienrollen-bezogenen Form "Opi". Anhand dieser Transposition vom "Zeigfeld" auf das "Symbolfeld" (Bühler 1934/1982:89; Knobloch 2011:327) rekonfiguriert sich der Sprecher in der 3. Person "von außen" in seiner sozialen Rolle des Großvaters.

In seiner Folgereplik (WhatsApp #3) greift Florian die vom vorausgehenden Sprecher initiierte Selbstreferenz "Opi" als Form der Adressatenreferenz auf und bestätigt so in seinem Hilferuf die hypokoristisch modalisierte Beziehungsformation. Durch das nachgestellte, Verlegenheit indizierende Emoji 😬 mitigiert er rückwirkend sein Anliegen. Nachdem der Großvater in WhatsApp #4 mittels "Bin gleich da. circa 20 minuten" seine Bereitschaft, der Bitte nachzukommen, signalisiert, formuliert Florian ein humoristisch modalisiertes Lob an den "Opi", der "der beste" ist (#5).

Dieser Ausschnitt verdeutlicht, wie Toni mit der – von der "preference for using a minimal form" (Sacks/Schegloff 1979:15f.) bzw. vom "referring *simpliciter*" abweichenden – lateralen Selbstreferenz durch die Verwandtschaftsbezeichnung "Opi" seine Identität als Großvater fokussiert und zugleich anhand dieser relational ausgerichteten "membership category" (Sacks 1972) eine Identitätskategorie für sein Gegenüber (als "Enkel") evoziert.

Die medial erzeugte Selbstidentifikation ("Opi"), das emergierende "doing family identity", wie auch die damit verbundene hypokoristische Modalität erweisen

sich als eng mit den aktualisierten Handlungen ("category bound activity") verwoben (Jayyusi 1984): Der Enkel thematisiert sein Problem und kontextualisiert zugleich seine Hilflosigkeit, woraufhin der "Opi" dem Enkel seine "Rettung" anbietet, die wiederum zum Lobgesang auf den "Opi" führt.

Dieser Chat-Dialog verdeutlicht, wie in der translokalen, zerdehnten Kommunikationsform, Sequenzialität genutzt wird, um soziale Beziehungsformationen und damit verwobene "category bound activities" aufzubauen, gemeinsame kommunikative Projekte durchzuführen und Interaktionsmodalitäten zu koordinieren.

3.1.2. Repliken mit komplementären Selbstreferenzen

Statt einer Retournierung der von Seiten der/des 1. SprecherIn verwendeten nominalen Selbstreferenzform zur Fremdreferenz (vgl. das Exzerpt "AUTOPROBLEM") reagieren 2. SprecherInnen – wie der folgende Dialog "DIENSTREISE" exemplifiziert – gelegentlich auch mit einer komplementären Selbstreferenzform.

Im WeChat-Dialog zwischen Qi und ihrem Mann Wang referiert Qi zunächst mittels ihres Intimnamens 猪猪 ("Schwein Schwein" bzw. "Schweinchen") sowie dem Pronomen 我 ("ich") auf sich selbst. Auf diese Weise setzt die Verfasserin gleich zu Beginn ihrer Mitteilung (WeChat #1) ein "Beziehungszeichen" ("tie-sign"; Goffman 1971:194ff.) und damit "evidence about relationships, that is, about ties between persons": Die von Qi durch die laterale Selbstreferenz initiierte Intimmodalität wird in Wangs Replik (WeChat #2) zunächst nicht etwa durch eine Referenzübernahme (wie im Fall von "AUTOPROBLEM") repliziert, sondern er reagiert mit der Indizierung liebevoller Fürsorge 你也早点睡 ("Du sollst auch früh schlafen"). Im Anschluss an Qis Gute-Nacht-Formel 晚安 (WeChat #3) greift Wang den Intim-Talk insofern auf, als er nun mit einer Liebeserklärung reagiert. In dieser Mitteilung verweist er – statt mit dem durchaus zur Verfügung stehenden Pronomen der 1. Person 我 ("ich") – mittels seines Intimnamen 宝宝 ("Schätzchen") auf sich und präsentiert sich so in der 3. Person als Intimpartner.[9]

"DIENSTREISE" (2017)

猪猪我睡觉呀
Schweinchen ich (=SPRECHERIN)
geht jetzt ins Bett

WeChat #1 (03.07.2017; 23:53)

你也早点睡
Du sollst auch früh schlafen

WeChat #2 (03.07.2017; 23:55)

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[9] Siehe Auer (1988) zu Liebeserklärungen sowie Imo (2012) zur Liebeskommunikation in deutschen und chinesischen SMS-Dialogen. Vgl. auch Günthner (i. Dr. a) zur Selbstreferenz mit Kosenamen.

晚安
Gute Nacht

WeChat #3 (03.07.2017; 23:57)

宝宝爱你
Schätzchen（=SPRECHER）*liebt dich*

WeChat #4 (03.07.2017; 23:59)

嗯嗯，好的，猪猪也准备睡呀，嗯。
Ok, gut, Schweinchen （=SPRECHERIN）*ist auch bereit zum Schlafen, haha.*

WeChat #5 (03.07.2017; 24:00)

Hier wird ersichtlich, wie eng die Aktivierung des komplementären selbstreferenziellen Intimnamens (#4) mit der betreffenden sozialen Handlung – der Liebeserklärung – verwoben ist. Im sequenziell folgenden Dialogzug reagiert Qi erneut mit ihrem selbstreferenziell verwendeten Intimnamen "Schweinchen" und führt lachend aus, dass sie Wangs Ratschlag befolgen wird (#5).

Die kommunikativen Handlungen wie auch die Konstitution der Interaktionsmodalitäten werden in den vorliegenden Dialogen durch das dynamisch verlaufende Hin und Her der Dialogzüge und die sequenziell aufeinander abgestimmten Mitteilungen koordiniert. Doch obgleich die von der 1. Sprecherin vorgenommene Initiierung von Intim-Talk durch die Verwendung des Intimnamen bestimmte sequenzielle Erwartungen an das Gegenüber aufbaut, sind Projektionen nicht mit Determination gleichzusetzen (Auer 2005): Zwar werden in den vorliegenden Daten vom zweiten Sprecher ausbleibende Referenzierungsformen mittels Intimnamen von Seiten der ersten Sprecherin nicht eingeklagt, dennoch wird erkenntlich, dass die durch den Intimnamen initiierte kosende Modalität Erwartungen in Richtung "Ko-Kategorisierung der Gesprächspartner als 'Liebende/r'" (Auer 1988:18) setzt und eine korrespondierende Fortsetzung des Intim-Talk abruft.[10] So veranschaulicht der Dialog "DIENSTREISE", wie Interagierende in enger Koordination der sequenziell aufeinander abgestimmten Mitteilungen ein kollaboratives "doing being a couple" konstruieren: Die Intimität-indizierende Selbstreferenz ("Schweinchen") projiziert Erwartungen bezüglich einer Bestätigung des Intimdisplays und die zwei Züge später erfolgende Replik bekräftigt (durch die selbstreferenzielle

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[10] Siehe auch Stivers (2013:206-207) zu unterschiedlichen Typen von sequenzieller Relevanzsetzung und einem "scalar model of response relevance".

Verwendung des Intimnamens "Schätzchen" inklusive der Liebeserklärung) rückwirkend den vorausgehenden Intim-Talk.[11]

3.2. Nominale Fremdreferenzen und ihre sequenziellen Repliken

3.2.1. Repliken mit Referenzübernahmen durch die/den 2. SprecherIn: von der Fremd- zur Selbstreferenz

Nicht nur nominale Selbstreferenzen laden zu reziproken Repliken des Gegenübers ein, sondern auch von 1. SprecherInnen verwendete laterale Referenzen auf die AdressatInnen sowie vokative Anredeformen werden von diesen im Folgezug aufgegriffen und zur Selbstreferenz rekontextualisiert.

Hendrik hat seiner Partnerin Paulin, die in einer anderen Stadt lebt, per WhatsApp das Foto einer Cantaloupe Melone zugeschickt, das an ihr gemeinsames Essen vom letzten Wochenende erinnern soll. Kurz darauf reagiert diese mit folgender Mitteilung:[12]

"VATI" (2010)

Da stand ich gestern auch vor und die hat 3,90€ gekostet

WhatsApp #2 (03.06.2020; 18:56)

Da dachte ich, da wart ich lieber auf **Vati** (=ADRESSAT) 😂

WhatsApp #3 (03.06.2020; 18:56)

Autsch, das wäre **Vati** (=SPRECHER) auch zu viel. Diese gab's für 1,29 € beim Supermarkt meines Vertrauens 😃

WhatsApp #4 (03.06.2020; 18:58)

Nach ihrer Mitteilung, dass sie gestern ebenfalls vor einer solchen Melone stand (WhatsApp #2), referiert Paulin in ihrer Fortsetzung (#3) auf ihren Partner mit dessen Intimnamen "Vati". Mit dieser lateralen Adressierung aktiviert sie eine Transformation der "Ich-Jetzt-Hier-Origo" (Bühler 1934/1965:102): Ihr Gegenüber wird nun als Figur in der betreffenden Situation rekonfiguriert. Obwohl der Verfasserin die Form der deiktischen Bezugnahme "du", die nichts tut als "simply referring to the person it identifies" (Schegloff 1996:442), sehr wohl zur Verfügung steht, weicht Paulin mit der Fremdreferenz "Vati" von dieser Präferenz des "referring

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[11] Hierzu auch Günthner (2011:33; 2012); Imo (2012:36).
[12] Ich danke Paulin für die Bereitstellung dieses Dialogs.

simpliciter" ab. Schegloff (2007b:123) argumentiert, dass Fälle, in denen SprecherInnen die standardisierten Selbst- und Fremdreferenzen durch die deiktischen Pronomen "I" und "you" ignorieren, "invite special attention from participants and analysts for what has prompted their use – '*why that now*'".

Im vorliegenden WhatsApp-Dialog wird deutlich, dass Paulin – mittels der Verwendung des Intimnamens "Vati" (#3) – den bereits von Hendrik durch das Foto der Melone indizierten Beziehungsrahmen (Erinnerung an das gemeinsame Essen am letzten Wochenende) fortsetzt: Der Intimnamen, der den Altersunterschied der beiden parodiert, dient auch hier als "tie-sign", das "für den privaten Konsum" der beiden Teilnehmenden bestimmt ist (Goffman 1971:194f.) und als Bestandteil der interaktiv erzeugten Beziehungsarbeit fungiert. Hendrik greift in seiner Replik (#4) nicht nur den von Paulin thematisierten Sachverhalt des Melonenpreises auf, sondern bezieht sich mit dem zur Selbstreferenz rekontextualisierten Intimnamen auch auf das von Paulin eingesetzte "tie-sign" und ratifiziert somit das Display des "doing being a couple" (Dammel/Niekrenz/Rapp/Wyss 2018:160).

"Tie-signs" bilden – so Goffman (1971) – keine eigenständigen bzw. fokussierten Handlungen, sondern sie begleiten tangential andere Aktivitäten und liefern Indizien bzw. Evidenzen über den Charakter der sozialen Beziehung. Dies trifft auch auf die vorliegende Verwendung von Intimnamen zur Selbst- und Fremdreferenz zu: Diese bilden keine eigenständigen Handlungen, sondern dienen als kommunikative Ressourcen zur Konstruktion der entsprechenden Handlungen und Interaktionsmodalitäten. Doch obgleich die Verwendungsweisen nominaler Referenzen für Ego und Alter-Ego kommunikative Handlungen lediglich begleiten, orientieren sich diese Praktiken dennoch an der sequenziellen Zug-um-Zug Dynamik, die dazu führt, dass die Ausführung und Interpretation der "alternativen Referenzform" der 1. Sprecherin die Voraussetzung für die Folgereferenz des 2. Sprechers bildet. Die vorausgehende Äußerung fungiert also als Grundlage dafür, dass der Rezipient in seiner Äußerung seine Interpretation bzw. sein Verstehen dessen indiziert, was seine Kommunikationspartnerin zuvor relevant gesetzt hat.[13] Auf diese Weise wird die Intimkommunikation affirmierend fortgesetzt und die von der 1. Sprecherin initiierte "verbale Fellpflege"[14] komplementiert (Günthner 2021).

In den chinesischen Daten werden allerdings nicht nur fremdreferenzielle Intim- und Verwandtschaftsnamen im sequenziell folgenden Dialogzug zur Selbstreferenz rezykliert, sondern 2. SprecherInnen reaktivieren auch die zuvor von der/dem 1. SprecherIn (lateral wie auch vokativ) eingesetzten honorativen (Berufs-)Titel zur Selbstreferenz. Auch wird deutlich, dass neben lateralen Fremdreferenzen auch vokative Anreden zur Referenzübernahme durch die 2. Sprecherin können.

Die Dozentin Wu möchte sich für ein Projekt des Social Science Fund bewerben und schickt folgende Anfrage an ihre Prodekanin Li. Dabei adressiert sie ihre Rezipientin mit dem honorativ gebrauchten Berufstitel 老师 ("LehrerIn") in Kombination mit dem Familiennamen "Li" [Familienname + Titel]:[15]

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[13]   Hierzu auch Schegloff (2007a:252).

[14]   Der Begriff der "verbalen Fellpflege" orientiert sich an Linke (2008:88), die von Sprache als "Beziehungspflege" spricht: "Die Ausbildung von Sprache wäre, so betrachtet, als eine Optimierung sozial orientierter Fellpflege zu betrachten." Siehe hierzu auch Günthner/Zhu (2015).

[15]   Im Chinesischen wird bei der Verwendung des honorativen Titels mit Familiennamen der Familienname zuerst genannt [Familienname + LehrerIn]. Hierzu auch Günthner (i. Dr..a; i. Dr. b).

"KOLLEGINNEN" (CHINA 2017)

李老师，要不要参与下西安社科基金课题，咱们的校本课题稍微修改下就可以申请。但是时间比较紧张，需要在8号前提交材料。
Lehrerin Li (=ADRSSATIN)*, wollen [wir] am Programm der Nationalen Sozialwissenschaftsförderung von Xiʹan teilnehmen, [wir] können unser [inklusives Pronomen der 2. P. Pl.] vorheriges Thema an unserer Hochschule ein bisschen korrigieren und damit bewerben. Aber die Zeit ist ein bisschen knapp, [wir] müssen alle Materialien vor dem 8. abgeben.*

WeChat #1 (05.01.2017; 22:02)

Mit der vokativ verwendeten Anrede der Dekanin durch die ehrerbietende Berufsrollenbezeichnung 李老师 (wörtlich: "Li Lehrerin") markiert Wu symbolisch die Wertschätzung und den höheren Status der Rezipientin. Diese reagiert circa 10 Minuten später, indem sie den von Wu eingesetzten Titel nun zur Selbstreferenzform rekontextualisiert:

呵呵，我尽量给咱问。实在不行我们来年再争取，有啥需要李老师帮忙合作尽管说。
Hihi, ich versuche für uns das nachzufragen. Wenn es tatsächlich dieses Mal nicht klappt, versuchen wir es nächstes Jahr. Wenn [du] irgendwas hast, wobei Lehrerin Li (= SPRECHERIN) *helfen kann, melde [dich] einfach.*

WeChat #2 (05.01.2017; 22:12)

Durch das Aufgreifen des ihr zuvor zugewiesenen Anredetitels sowie ihr Angebot zur weiteren Hilfe ("Wenn du irgendwas hast, wobei Lehrerin Li helfen kann, melde [dich] einfach"; (#2)) bestätigt Li den ihr von Wu zugewiesenen Status und untermauert so das Hierarchiegefälle zwischen den Interagierenden. Mit dieser "sekundären Bezugnahme auf sich" (Tugendhat 2006:22f.; Schwitalla 2010) rekonfiguriert sich Li somit quasi "von außen" in ihrer sozialen Rolle als 老师 ("LehrerIn"), aus der heraus sie wiederum der status-niedrigeren Wu Hilfe anbieten kann.

Anhand des vorliegenden WeChat-Dialogs wird sowohl ersichtlich, wie die Teilnehmenden durch sequenziell organisierte Referenzierungspraktiken Beziehungs-

formationen, Statusunterschiede und Respektbekundungen im Prozess der Interaktion ko-konstruieren, als auch, wie sequenzielle Erwartbarkeit mit sozio-kulturellen Konventionen zusammentrifft: Im Unterschied zum Gebrauch von Pronomina der 1. und 2. Person (wie "ich" bzw. "du/Sie" im Deutschen und 我 bzw. 你/您 im Chinesischen) liefern nominale Formen wie 老师 ("LehrerIn") zusätzliche soziale Informationen, die soziale Nähe, Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen und Status- bzw. Hierarchierelationen indizieren. Dieses Mehr an Informationen ist auch ein Grund, weshalb im Chinesischen nominale Referenzierungspraktiken gebräuchlicher und weniger "markiert" sind als im Deutschen: Die Indizierung von Status- und Hierarchierelationen und die damit verwobenen Respekterweisungen gelten als wesentlicher Grundstein der Personenreferenz (Günthner/Zhu 2017; Günthner i. Dr. a; i. Dr. b). Wie auch Levinson (2006:55) betont, ist die Interaktion zugleich der Ort, an dem Kultur – unter anderem durch spezifische Ethnomethoden[16] wie Praktiken der Personenreferenz – zum Tragen kommt, denn: "Interaction is shot through and through with culture. It had better be, because it is the vehicle of culture – without it, there would not be any".[17]

3.2.2. Repliken mit komplementären Fremdreferenzen

Nominale Fremdreferenzen (sowie Adressierungsformen) werden von 2. SprecherInnen auch dadurch repliziert, dass diese mit komplementären Referenzformen zur Bezugnahme auf die/den AdressatIn reagieren.

Eine Form der Personenreferenz, die in den chinesischen WeChat-Daten sowohl zur Selbst- als auch zur Adressatenreferenz (in lateraler wie auch vokativer Verwendung) immer wieder verwendet wird, ist die unter nicht verheirateten jungen Paaren verbreitete Form 老婆 ("Gattin") bzw. 老公 ("Gatte"). Auch hier trägt die sequenzielle Rekonfiguration zur kollaborativen Konstruktion von Zusammengehörigkeit und dem Display des "doing being a couple" bei.

Im folgenden SMS-Dialog adressiert die Studentin Li ihren Freund Wu mit der Anrede 老公 ("Gatte") (#1), woraufhin dieser in seinem Folgezug wiederum Li mit der komplementären Form 老婆 ("Gattin") adressiert und damit das von Li initiierte Intimgeplänkel bestätigt. Im Verlauf der weiteren Interaktion (#5 und #6) setzen beide TeilnehmerInnen dieses "Beziehungszeichen" (Goffman 1971) zur Selbstreferenz ein: [18]

> "LIEFERSERVICE" (CHINA 2010)
>
> 老公，吃饭了吗？
> *Gatte* (=ADRESSAT)*, schon gegessen?*
>
> SMS #1 (2010; 16:23)

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[16] Siehe auch Meyer (2018:316) zu kulturellen Konventionen (bzw. Ethnomethoden).
[17] Zur Beziehung zwischen Praktiken der Personenreferenz und sprach- sowie kulturspezifischen Konventionen siehe auch Stivers/Enfield/Levinson (2007) sowie Günthner (2017, 2018).
[18] Hierzu auch Günthner (2018).

没呢，**老婆**，正在等送饭的人。
*Noch nicht, **Gattin** (=ADRESSATIN), {[ich] warte gerade auf den Mann vom Lieferdienst.*

SMS #2 (2010; 16:26)

哦，饿坏了吧！
Oh, Hunger haben ist schlecht [für dich]!

SMS #3 (2010; 16:28)

没事儿，我找点零食吃。
Kein Problem, ich brauche nur einen kleinen Snack.

SMS #4 (2010; 16:30)

老公今天有没有好好学习啊，**老婆**今天听课状态很好啊.
***Gatte** (=ADRESSAT) [hast du/hat er] heute schon fleißig gelernt, **Gattin** (= SPRECHERIN) war heute im Unterricht sehr gut.*

SMS #5 (2010; 16:31)

哦，加油，好好学，**老公**今天学得很充实. 饭来了，先不聊了哦.
*Mh, gib Gas, lerne fleißig, **Gatte** (=SPRECHER) hat heute sehr fleißig gelernt. Das Essen ist da, [ich] rede erst mal nicht mehr.*

SMS #6 (2010; 16:33)

Mittels ihrer selbstreferenziellen und komplementär ausgerichteten Beziehungs-indizierenden Anredeformen (#5 und #6)[19] ratifizieren die Interagierenden die ihnen vom Gegenüber zugewiesene Rolle und kollaborieren an der gemeinsamen Konstitution von Zugehörigkeit als Paar. In Anlehnung an Schütz (1951/1972:132) lässt sich hier der interaktive Prozess des "wechselseitig sich-aufeinander-Einstimmens" beobachten, wobei "das 'Ich' und das 'Du' von beiden, die an der Beziehung teilhaben, als ein 'Wir' in lebendiger Gegenwart erlebt" und zugleich die Paarbeziehung interaktiv zementiert wird.

3.3. Zur interaktiven Dynamik ko-produzierter multimodaler Referenzierungspraktiken in der translokalen Chat-Kommunikation

Wie die bisherigen Chat-Dialoge verdeutlichten, prägt Sequenzialität nicht nur die face-to-face Kommunikation, sondern sie stellt auch eine zentrale Ressource zur Aushandlung von Bedeutung und zur Konstitution kollaborativer kommunikativer Projekte in der translokalen Chat-Kommunikation dar. Darüber hinaus wird anhand der Daten erkenntlich, wie Interagierende (auch jenseits der ko-präsenten Kommunikation) multimodale Verfahren im Ablauf der Dialogzüge einsetzen, die zur interaktiven Dynamik der Ko-Konstitution von Beziehungsformationen und Affilationen beitragen. Ein solcher Einsatz multimodaler, teilweise jenseits der verbalen Schriftlichkeit liegender, Referenzierungspraktiken und deren sequenzielle Organisation soll nun anhand einer längeren Dialogstruktur betrachtet werden.

Maria initiiert die folgende WhatsApp-Interaktion mit ihrem Mann Paul, der ein paar Stunden nicht erreichbar war, indem sie auf ihn mit seinem Intimnamen "Bär" referiert ("Bär geflüchtet?"):[20]

"BÄR GEFLÜCHTET" (2018)

Bär geflüchtet?

WhatsApp #1 (02.07.2018; 10:26)

Bär am Arsch

WhatsApp #2 (02.07.2018; 12:06)

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[19] Da das Chinesische keine Verbflexion aufweist und keine Personenkategorisierung anhand des Verbs vorgenommen wird, ist im Fall von SMS #5 unklar, ob es sich bei 老公 ("Gatte") um eine vokative Anrede (Gatte hast du heute schon fleißig gelernt") oder eine laterale Referenz in der 3. Person ("Hat der Gatte heute schon fleißig gelernt") handelt. Weder wird nach 老公 ("Gatte") ein Komma gesetzt, das auf eine Anrede hinweisen könnte, noch folgt ein Pronomen der 2. Person, so dass keine klare Zuordnung zu Anrede oder lateralen Referenz vorgenommen werden kann.

[20] Hierzu auch Günthner (i. Dr. a).

😘

WhatsApp #3 (02.07.2018; 12:06)

Ja, der Bär ist total durch. Du brauchst Urlaub ohne ständig E-Mails zu checken und ohne Küchengedöns.

WhatsApp #4 (02.07.2018; 12:47)

Pauls Replik in WhatsApp #2 greift den von Maria verwendeten Intimnamen nun zur Selbstreferenz auf: "Bär am Arsch". Auch hier wird deutlich, dass die Intimnamen, die sich im Prozess der Zweierbeziehung etabliert haben, durch ihre sequenziell organisierte Re-Aktualisierung als Ressource zur Kontextualisierung (Gumperz 1992) einer Paarbeziehung eingesetzt werden. Zugleich erhält der translokale Dialog den Charakter einer "behind-closed-doors"-Kommunikation (Goffman 1971).

Auffällig ist ferner der mediale Switch zwischen den Mitteilungen: Statt verbaler Kommunikation verwendet Paul in Dialogzug #3 ein Emoji, das als Piktogramm eine Handlung (die Zusendung eines Kusses) symbolisiert. In ihrer Folgereaktion (WhatsApp #4) reaktiviert Maria zunächst erneut Pauls Intimnamen im Sinne einer lateralen Bezugnahme in der 3. Person ("Ja, der Bär ist total durch") und setzt damit die bereits in ihrer 1. Mitteilung initiierte und von Paul im Folgezug bestätigte Modalität fort, bevor sie dann mit dem Switch zur deiktischen Anredeform "du" (und damit vom "Symbol- zum Zeigfeld"; Bühler 1934/1982:89) in eine ernste Modalität wechselt. Diese modalitäts- und handlungsbezogene Umfokussierung (vom Intimgeplänkel zum ernsthaften Ratschlag) wird durch den Wechsel der Adressierungsformen mit kontextualisiert.

Anhand dieses Dialogs wird ersichtlich, wie auch in der medial vermittelten, translokalen Chat-Kommunikation die Interpretation einer Mitteilung von A die Voraussetzung für die Folgeäußerung von B bildet und die Handlungen sich am Strukturierungsprinzip der Zug-um-Zug Abfolge, das die einzelnen Schritte der Beteiligten organisiert, ausrichten. Es ist das sequenzielle Arrangement der in der SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktion zeitlich asynchron bzw. quasi-synchron verlaufenden Dialogzüge, in denen Handlungen durchgeführt und die Interpretation von Bedeutung inferiert wird.

Wie der folgende, circa 5 1/2 Monate später stattfindende Dialog zwischen Maria und Paul zeigt, ist die mediale Kommunikationsform von WhatsApp-Interaktionen keineswegs auf verbale Schriftlichkeit reduziert.[21] Interagierende setzen nicht nur sporadisch Emojis zur Kontextualisierung einzelner kommunikativer Handlungen bzw. als Ersatz für einzelne Worte ein, sondern im folgenden Dialog zwischen Paul und Maria bestehen weite Teile der Interaktion aus Emojis.

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[21] Siehe auch Günthner (2012; i. Dr. a) zum medialen Shifting in der SMS-Kommunikation.

Die multimodal gestalteten Mitteilungen repräsentieren die Intimnamen der Teilnehmenden (Paul als Bär, Maria als Hase und die kleine Tochter als Schildkröte) und indizieren darüber hinaus die Handlungen bzw. Affekte:

"WEIHNACHTEN" (2018)

Hallo 🐰

Dein 🐻 ist sehr glücklich – freu mich unendlich auf ein

paar ruhige Tage über Weihnachten mit 🐰 🐢

😍 🥰 ❤️ 🧡 💚 💙 💜 🖤

WhatsApp #1 (19.12.2018; 16:48)

Und der 🐰 liebt den 🥰 😘

WhatsApp #2 (19.12.2018; 16:49)

🥰 🐰 ❤️ 💙

WhatsApp #3 (19.12.2018; 16:52)

Mit den in Form von Emojis aktualisierten Referenzen stimmen sich die Beteiligten im Prozess des multimedial gestalteten Dialogs aufeinander ein (Schütz 1951) und konstruieren eine gemeinsame "soziale Welt" im Kontext habitualisierter Praktiken (Günthner/Zhu 2017:123).

Die mit Emojis bestückte Interaktion verweist nicht nur auf die verfestigte Musterhaftigkeit nominaler Selbstreferenzformen, sondern zeigt, wie ursprünglich sprachliche Mittel des kommunikativen Handelns in Form von Emojis als Piktogramme im Prozess der Interaktion re-figuriert werden: Die ikonisch repräsentierten Selbst- und Fremdreferenzformen werden durch die sequenziell verlaufenden, reziproken Wiederaufnahmen zum Bestandteil der kommunikativen Handlung selbst – der Emotionskundgabe von Liebenden. Anhand dieser multimodal ausgerichteten Interaktion wird ferner deutlich, wie sich in einer Intimbeziehung ein eigener Stil entwickeln und verfestigen kann, der zum geteilten Code des Paares wird.

Die vorliegenden SMS-, WhatsApp- und WeChat-Interaktionen veranschaulichen somit, wie die sequenzielle Organisation der Dialogzüge eine kontingente Aushandlung von Referenzierungspraktiken ermöglicht. Zugleich machen die Dialoge deutlich, dass kollaborativ erzeugte, sequenziell situierte kommunikative Praktiken auch in medial vermittelten Kommunikationsformen möglich sind. Der in der face-to-face-Kommunikation fein-abgestimmte, sequenzielle Rhythmus wird in der

Chat-Kommunikation jedoch in mehrfacher Weise modifiziert: Da die bei der face-to-face-Kommunikation vorhandene "Synchronisation der Bewusstseinsströme im Hier-und-Jetzt" (Schütz/Luckmann 1984:105) und damit verwoben die unmittelbaren Rückkoppelungen zwischen sprachlicher Produktion und Rezeption ebenso wenig möglich sind wie eine körperlich präsente Kalibrierung des Sprecherwechsels, aktivieren die Chat-PartnerInnen andere Ressourcen, die es ihnen ermöglichen, auch in der ent-körperlichten und räumlich distanten Kommunikation Nähe, Intimität und andere soziale Formationen kollaborativ herzustellen.

4. Fazit

Die Tatsache, dass die sequenzielle Organisation von Redezügen für die Produktion und Interpretation kommunikativer Handlungen zentral ist, hat die Konversationsanalyse immer wieder – vor allem anhand von Adjazenzpaaren – verdeutlicht. Dennoch gilt, wie Stivers (2013:208) betont: "there is substantial room for growth in this area".

Die vorliegende Analyse zur Personenreferenz in der translokalen Chat-Kommunikation veranschaulicht zum einen, dass Sequenzialität nicht nur mündliche Interaktionen prägt. Auch die medial vermittelte translokale Chat-Kommunikation setzt sich nicht etwa aus entzeitlichten monologischen Entitäten zusammen, sondern zeichnet sich durch sequenzielle Abläufe aus (Günthner 2011; 2012; König 2015). Diese bilden wiederum die Grundlage für das kollaborative Display von Verstehen: Die TeilnehmerInnen zeigen durch die geordnete Abfolge ihrer Beiträge ihre Interpretationen vorausgehender Mitteilungen, sie bauen Erwartungen an Folgebeiträge auf, stellen Bezüge zu vorausgehenden Dialogzügen her und ko-konstruieren kommunikative Projekte. Doch nicht nur die verbale Schriftlichkeit der Chat-Kommunikation ist vom sequenziellen Ablauf der Dialogzüge geprägt, auch die Organisation und Bedeutungsaushandlung der zur Selbst- und Fremdreferenzierung eingesetzten Emojis erweisen sich als eng mit der interaktiven Dynamik der aufeinander folgenden Züge verwoben.

Zum anderen veranschaulicht die vorliegende Studie, dass nicht nur Handlungen eng mit dem sequenziellen Verlauf der Interaktion verknüpft sind, auch Praktiken der Personenreferenz und die damit verwobenen Interaktionsmodalitäten und "stances" erweisen sich als sequenziell organisiert. Das Prinzip der "Nextness" (Stivers 2013) kommt hierbei insofern zum Tragen, als der Einsatz nominaler Referenzen für Ego und Alter-Ego gewisse Erwartungen an die Folgereaktionen setzt: Obgleich bei den vorliegenden Chat-Dialogen das Problem der Sprecher- und Rezipientenidentifizierung gewissermaßen "vorab" gelöst ist, weichen die Interagierenden immer wieder von der Präferenz für minimierte deiktische Formen ab und greifen auf beziehungsdefinierende Referenzpraktiken zurück. Anhand der sequenziell organisierten Dialogzügen und den damit verbundenen Erwartungen und Anschlussmöglichkeiten haben die DialogpartnerInnen die Möglichkeit, die vom Gegenüber eingesetzten "alternativen Referenzierungsformen" aufzugreifen und so die angebotene Beziehungsdefinition zu bestätigen, zu modifizieren oder zu korrigieren. Die Sequenzorganisation erweist sich somit auch in Bezug auf Interaktionsmodalitäten bzw. "stances" und die kontingente Aushandlung von Beziehungsformationen als relevanter Faktor der kollaborativen Bedeutungsherstellung.

Thus, future work in the area of sequence organization will likely continue to prove to be highly productive of insights into the overall organization of social interaction and will likely prove critical to the development of a richer theory of social action and, more generally, to the underlying organization of human social interaction (Stivers 2013:209).

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Towards a Social Theory of Sequentiality[1]

Hubert Knoblauch

Abstract

In the first part of the paper, I delineate what we mean when we talk about social theory and how it relates to language. I will argue that social theory treats language as something that must be understood without assuming that a language is already constituted. On these grounds, I will then outline the ways in which sequences have been treated in some major "Grand Theories" of sociology: Weber, Habermas, Luhmann. This overview makes it possible to highlight in the next part some of the major aspects of sequentiality: It's being built on actions, their interconnectivity by reciprocity, the role of language and its potential to constitute (social) structures and systems over time. Surprisingly, even more recent social theories hardly relate to sequential analysis of the kind initiated by Sacks and formulated in a first concise manner in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson. As this sequential analysis will be presented in other contributions of this volume, here it serves as a background for the presentation of these social-theoretical approaches only in order to point out their blind spots and shortcomings, such as the role of objectivations other than language, their role for the reciprocation of actions and the patterns and forms of extended social structures. These shortcomings will be addressed in the next part of this text. As a frame to address these shortcomings I will draw on communicative constructivism. This approach allows for a social theory of sequentiality which can solve the problems raised by the social theories mentioned. By integrating sequential analysis as a method to address temporal aspects of communicative actions, it accounts also for the actor's subjective embodied positionality and spatiality.

Keywords: Sequentiality – Communicative Action – Social Theory – Theory of Language – Communicative Constructivism – Sociology – Objectivations.

German Abstract

Im ersten Teil des Beitrags wird erläutert, was wir meinen, wenn wir von Sozialtheorie sprechen und wie sie sich auf Sprache bezieht. Ich werde argumentieren, dass eine Theorie der Sprache die Sozialtheorie voraussetzt. Auf dieser Grundlage werde ich dann die Art und Weise skizzieren, in der (sprachliche) Sequenzen in einigen großen "Grand Theories" der Soziologie behandelt wurden: Weber, Habermas, Luhmann. Dieser Überblick ermöglicht es, im nächsten Teil einige der wichtigsten Aspekte der Sequenzialität hervorzuheben: Ihr Konstitution in Handlungen, ihre Relationalität durch Reziprozität, die Rolle von Objektivierungen und Sprache sowie ihr Potenzial, (soziale) Strukturen, Institutionen und Systeme über die Zeit zu konstituieren.

Überraschenderweise beziehen sich auch neuere Sozialtheorien kaum auf die Sequenzanalyse, wie sie von Sacks initiiert und in Sacks, Schegloff und Jefferson erstmals prägnant formuliert wurde. Da diese sequentielle Analyse in anderen Bei-

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trägen dieses Bandes vorgestellt wird, dient sie nur als Hintergrund für die Darstellung dieser sozialtheoretischen Ansätze, um auf ihre blinden Flecken und Unzulänglichkeiten hinzuweisen, wie etwa die Rolle anderer Objektivationen als der Sprache, ihre Rolle für die Reziprozität von Handlungen und die Muster und Formen erweiterter sozialer Strukturen.

Als Rahmen für die Behebung dieser Mängel werde ich mich auf den kommunikativen Konstruktivismus stützen. Dieser ermöglicht eine soziale Theorie der Sequenzialität, die die von den genannten sozialen Theorien aufgeworfenen Probleme lösen kann, indem sie die sequenzielle Analyse als eine Methode integriert, die zeitliche Aspekte kommunikativer Handlungen unter Berücksichtigung der subjektiven verkörperten Positionalität und Räumlichkeit des Akteurs berücksichtigt.

Keywords: Sequenzialität – Kommunikatives Handelns – Sozialtheorie – Soziologie – Sprachtheorie – Kommunikativer Konstruktivismus – Objektivationen.

1. Introduction

In the last years, we have witnessed an enormous rise of studies on conversations that are conducted in real life. This line of research has mainly been initiated by researchers in the field of conversation analysis, such as Sack, Schegloff, and Jefferson who have also laid the groundwork for what has come to be called "sequential analysis" in the study of verbal interaction. There are, in addition, many important predecessors and other forms of sequence analysis which cannot be tackled in this context. This kind of sequence analysis has extended to many fields of sociological analysis, such as religious conversations, or shoptalk in scientific laboratories, and, of course, various forms of conversation in everyday life. In German speaking countries, a subfield of linguistics has been developing called "Gesprächsforschung". Internationally, sequential analysis seems to be centered on conversational analysis, which has become an interdisciplinary field with regular international meetings. It has also been established as part of the growing field of qualitative methodology.

Despite the breadth, richness and relevance of empirical studies regarding the analysis of the "structures of social action" (Atkinson/Heritage 1984), sequence analysis is only marginal to sociology. In fact, sociology uses the notion for various different methods, which often have been introduced after the notion had been coined by conversation analysis. Thus, since the 1980s Abbot (1983) and others have started to use "sequence analysis" as a method for analyzing the order of events in historical sociology.[2] In Germany, sequence analysis also became the notion for

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[2] In quantitatively oriented sociology, sequence analysis has become a well-established method which, however, differs methodologically from interpretive sequence analysis we are discussing here (Abbott 1983). As opposed to their definition of the units of sequences by the researchers,

a method of analyzing texts and other documents that are a crucial part of various forms of sociological hermeneutics which have become popular in qualitative social research (Soeffner 1997). In addition, despite the recent revival of ethnomethodology, social theory has so far only taken little notice of the kind of sequence analysis and, even less of the myriad of empirical studies on the sequential organization of conversations and interactions. The gap between social theory and sequential analysis may also be due to the strong empiricist, naturalistic and, with respect to Sacks (Lynch/Boden 1994), the "positivist" orientation of the tradition of sequential analysis. However, as we shall see, social theory also seems to have been ignorant of the theoretical impact and relevance of sequential analysis. One of the reasons for the lacking reflection of sequential analysis has been its strong emphasis on the verbal, para-linguistic and other signs, which are mainly seen in relation to language. It is on these grounds that much of conversation analysis is carried out in linguistics and in research fields that are rather interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary. Although this hybrid character contributes to its spread, it makes it more difficult to relate its methodology and its general findings to the kind of abstract discourse that came to be labelled "social theory".

Despite the often unspecific use of "social theory", here it refers to a crucial part of the discourse which is related to an institutional setting in the social sciences labelled sociological theory. Social theory pursues a series of questions and treats a range of problems that constitute it as a discourse basic to the questions posed by the social sciences in general and sociology in particular. Therefore, in the first part of this paper I shall delineate what I mean when I talk about social theory and how it relates to language. I will argue that social theory, although itself using language, needs to start from the assumption that, on the level of the subject matter it refers to, language is constituted by sociality than the other way around. On these grounds, I will then outline the ways in which sequences have been treated by some major sociological theories, such as by Weber, but particularly by Habermas and Luhmann. The overview allows to highlight in the next part some of the major aspects of sequentiality: It is dependent on actions, the actor's reciprocal interrelations, the role of language, and its potential to constitute (social) structures and systems over time. Surprisingly, even more recent social theories hardly relate to sequential analysis of the kind initiated by Sacks and formulated in a concise manner in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1978; Ten Have 1999; Schegloff 2007). As the methods of sequential analysis will be presented in other papers to this special volume and as we have ourselves contributed to extending the method of sequential analysis to audiovisual recordings of communicative actions (Knoblauch 2006; Knoblauch et als. 2014), in this paper these methods will provide only the background for the presentation of these social-theoretical approaches. On this background, we can discern their blind spots and shortcomings, such as the role of objectivations other than language, their role for the reciprocation of actions, and the patterns and forms of extended social structures. These shortcomings will be addressed in the next part of this text. As a frame to address these shortcomings I will draw on communicative constructivism. This allows for a social theory of sequentiality which can solve the problems raised by the social theories mentioned by integrating sequential analysis

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interpretive analysis is oriented to the first order constructs, i.e. they ways how actors construct (and construe of) sequences of actions – and devote much analytical work to demonstrate the "adequacy" of their concepts.

as a method to address temporal aspects of communicative actions. In this way it opens a systematic link to an aspect of action often overlooked – the spatiality of action which will be addressed before the conclusion.

2. Social Theory and Language[3]

As previously mentioned, the kind of action sequences which are subject to empirical studies in conversational sequential analysis have, on the one hand, seldom been theorized. On the other hand, social theory has paid little attention to the concepts of sequential analysis and its empirical results. Before we turn to the ways in which sequences are treated in some prominent social theories, we should probably first clarify what is meant by "social theory" (as it is also in the very center of this issue).

Sociality has been, of course, an issue of discussion in social philosophy. Yet social philosophy only cropped up after sociology had already been labeled a scientific discipline by Comte (Simmel 1894). It was due to Comte's positivism that the scientific discourse on sociality remained divided as the classic sociology of Durkheim, Weber or Simmel or the Chicago School created their own social theory. One must note that their use of the category "social" has also been subject to a long debate within academia by which it was analytically distinguished from pro-social intellectual movements. Thus, in the early history of German, French or American Sociology and Social Sciences it became very clear that it is not collectivity which is at the subject matter of sociology (Gamper 2007), and that sociality is not reduced to social welfare, social care or, to use a more general term, solidarity. This way, social science could also address issues such as fights, war or anything that in everyday language would be called "asocial" or "antisocial". The distinction from everyday language is an attempt to avoid morality while opening up an area for empirical research in the fields of sociology, anthropology, history, linguistics etc. It is probably this orientation towards empirical research which created a boundary to social philosophy, yet philosophical discourses and discussions of "sociality" lingered on in the social sciences and have been maintained in at least some fields of sociology, its methodology and "philosophy of science".[4] These issues have been institutionalized under the title of "sociological theory".[5]

The extension of the term social theory may, therefore, be due to the fact that since the 1970s the legitimacy of sociology and sociological theory was waning. One of the reasons had been the declining plausibility of a nation-bound notion of society in the face of globalization. While sociology certainly preferred the study

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[3]   This chapter is concerned neither with the theory of language (cf. Luckmann 1972) nor with the recent developments in theorizing language (Williams 2020), but rather with the systematic role of language in use (as studied in much of conversation analysis) to the theoretical reflections on sociality as a basic category of social theory.

[4]   The Frankfurt school certainly plays an important role in countering the distinction by maintaining a strong link between sociology and philosophy.

[5]   This is the title of the introductory chapter of a book edited by Merton et al. "under the auspices of the American Sociological Society" by Talcott Parsons (1959) which figured as one of two contributions under the heading "Sociological Theory and Methodology" (including Lazarsfeld on "Problems in Methodology").

of societies, this category had become problematic due to its presupposed closedness and the methodological nationalism often implied which became particularly evident in the course of transnationalization since the 20th century. Another reason may have been the neoliberal critique of sociology, most radically formulated e.g., by Margret Thatcher's declaration that "there is no such thing as society". It may therefore not come as a surprise that the notion of social theory gained prominence in the British context in the early 1980s, through the writings of Anthony Giddens who preferred to talk about "social theory" instead of sociological theory (Giddens 1987).[6]

The notion of sociality is one of the conventional basic categories (such as "society") by which we designate an area of research for sociology as well as for the family of disciplines which came to be institutionalized as "social sciences" in a large number of academic faculties worldwide.[7] Whether the social sciences are identical with the faculties named accordingly or if they should include "humanities" is one of the matters dependent on paradigms within the social sciences (and outside), yet there is little doubt that their subject matter is sociality, and, for institutional and historical reasons, primarily human sociality (as biology or ethology are typically located in the natural sciences). Therefore, sociality and consequently social theory became a notion more frequently used, particularly since the second part of the 20th century, in part because it allowed to transcend the boundaries of sociology in general.

How diverse the institutional location of social theory may be and how variegated the paradigms in social theory and in contemporary "multi-paradigmatic" sociological theories (Seidman 2004) may be, their focus seems to differ from theories on language and, consequently, from linguistics in one decisive point. This point was already made clear by Mead who stressed that the social sciences should not "approach language as the philologist does, from the standpoint of the symbol that is used" (Mead 1964:128). Although social theory is mostly expressed in language, it does not define its subject matter, sociality, as something which presupposes language, signs or symbols. Rather social theory assumes that the constitution of signs, symbols and language is a result of social processes. In fact, this assumption is shared by basic linguistic theories, such as Bühler (2011), yet social theory must also address issues not only related to language and signs. The difference between linguistic and social theory becomes clear even in sequence analysis: linguistic research focuses rather on the ways how language (e.g., grammar, prosody etc.) is used in interaction while sociology assumes that interactions follow their own rules exhibiting "structures of social interaction". It results from their "Erkenntnisinteresse", their epistemological interest, that researchers trained in linguistics rather focus on the logic of signs (including non-verbal signs), while researchers in the social and cultural sciences rather tend to look rather through the signs at the "meanings" they refer to.

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[6] "The backdrop to this book is to be found in a series of significant developments which have taken place in the social sciences over the past decade and a half. These have been concentrated in substantial part in social theory, and bear especially upon that most maligned and most provocative of the social sciences, sociology" (Giddens 1984, XIII).

[7] Thus, in introductions to "Social Theory", it is common to find authors such as Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan or Zizek (cf. Elliott 2009).

The difference between the respective epistemological interest has certainly not been categorical, so that we find many overlaps between them, e.g., in the theories of Bühler (in linguistics), of Luckmann (in sociology) and fusions thereof, as in sociolinguistics (e.g., Gumperz 1981). Yet, it is probably one consequence of the decline of sociolinguistics and the demise of the once booming sociology of language, that even in the interdisciplinary field of Conversation Analysis with many researchers sharing the same methods and empirical issues we can discern quite strong divergences particularly between sociology and linguistics.

My claims about the overlapping, yet different epistemology of linguistics is of course quite impressionistic,[8] yet they may be seen as one reason for the divergence between sequential analysis, sociology and social theory. In fact, leaving aside the role of language acknowledged to social theory by Schutz, Winch, Berger, Luckmann or Habermas, language, the use of language, and the sequentiality of turn taking in conversation features even less in recent social theory.[9]

3. Sequentiality in Social Theory

In the following part I want to sketch how prominent sociological theorists conceive of sequentiality: Weber, Habermas and Luhmann. It is telling that even such an author like Habermas who was quite aware of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis did not refer to these studies in this context, and none of these authors even use sequence terminologically. There is no doubt that other authors, such as Garfinkel (1967), Collins (2004) or the late Luckmann (2013), have acknowledged the crucial role of sequences for social theory. While these authors are more or less known to the methodologies of the kind of empirical sequence analyses referred to here, the three authors below have hardly been considered in this context, although they take the sequentiality of action to be basic for their sociological theory and meso and macro aspects of society in general.

The relevance of the sequentiality of actions is already hinted at by *Weber*, who defines social action as the elementary object of sociology. Although he does not use sequentiality as a term, the temporal relation between actions is quite basic to his theory. In his basic categories of sociology, he defines "social relation" by the "chance" that a social action is followed by a subsequent action (Weber 1978). This "chance" is that aspect of social action which goes beyond mere meaningful orientation towards the behavior of others and establishes the meaningful connection between actions. To Weber, the chance that social actions of certain kinds recur is the basic feature of social relations (a definition which quite easily shows how "relational theories" can build on action theory). Doing so, Weber draws attention to the subjective aspect of any sequence, which is often overlooked by both structural and practice theories: Even if sequences are habitualized as "traditional actions" or regulated by norms, they consist of what is called "turn" or "move".

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[8]   The relation between sociology, social theory, linguistics, and linguistic theory should certainly be subject to an empirical study of science which also takes into account the institutional developments of sociolinguistics and the sociology of language after the 1990s (cf. Murray 1998).

[9]   One should mention that discourse analysis, after having substituted the role of linguistic knowledge, recently establishes new bridges between both disciplines, be it with respect to the analysis of large corpora of verbal data, or with respect to membership categorization devices.

This subjective aspect of sequences is implied in the constitutions of new sequences (which is empirically rarely accessible). As Weber considers social relations based only in the "chance" that certain next acts by the other actor can occur (like obeying a command), it becomes relevant when sequences fail. While Weber did not address linguistic action in particular, the role of failures of adequate responses to prior actions by others has been analyzed as "felicity condition" by speech act theory and translated into interaction analysis by Goffman (1983). Goffman underlines the role of knowledge implied in action and presupposed by actors.[10] It was particularly Alfred Schutz (1964) who had stressed the role of meaning and subjective knowledge in social action. Moreover, in his critique of Weber he was one of the first to emphasize and analyze the temporal structure of social action and, consequently, of sequences of action as experiences projected into the future (Fu/Franz 2014). As much as this theory of action as projected into to the future still resonates as a concept in contemporary empirical analysis of sequences (Mondada 2016:239), it was also Schutz who revealed the shortcomings of this kind of action theory which are characteristic not only of Weber, but also of a range of recent theories, e.g., of rational action: by focusing exclusively on the subject, it failed to address the basic problem of social theory, which, in this context, is called the problem of intersubjectivity (Crossley 1996). As we shall see below, Schutz made a very useful suggestion to solve this problem by his concept of reciprocity.

Weber's theory of action has also been the starting point for *Habermas* and his "Theory of Communicative Action". In this context, he also develops a notion of sequentiality which lies at the very heart of his model of communicative action. To Habermas, social action is, in principle, either instrumental (or "teleological") or "communicative". Communicative action means a form of action which is best exemplified by his interpretation of speech act theory.

By using language, speech acts exhibit three principles (locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary) which Habermas extends to three "validity claims" on statements about three worlds (social, subjective, objective). What is relevant here is that speech acts, validity claims, and worlds are accessible to speaker and hearer by actions and, thence, that they (a) coordinate the course of action and (b) synchronize the meanings of the consecutive actions, i.e. the sequences.

Habermas' concept of sequence includes a beginning with an utterance by speaker S1; then speaker S2 responds to this utterance. The response takes ideally two forms: speaker 2 accepts or contradicts to S1.

S1: utterance

S2: Yes / No

If speaker 2 contradicts, S1 needs to justify, support or legitimate her utterance in a way Habermas calls "discourse". Therefore, it is no longer a pair sequence (question and answer) but turns into a sequence that has at least three moves before it is considered finished. It is telling for the comparison to sequence analysis that a similar

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[10] The relevance of knowledge has quite serious consequences to sequential analysis for it demands that every turn needs to be "interpreted" not only by the actor but also by the analyst. Sequential analysis therefore is a hermeneutic method and demands a hermeneutic methodology. We have tried to elaborate the role of hermeneutics in Knoblauch/Schnettler (2012).

basic sequence has been identified by Jacobs and Jacobs (1981). In their conversational analysis of natural conversations, they describe the basic sequence of argumentation as follows:

S1: Utterance

S2: Contradiction

S1: Expansion

Jacobs and Jackson stressed the structural role of this sequence for the coordination of action: the contradiction by S1 makes something in the prior utterance relevant; it is this relevance which needs to be accounted for in a third utterance which addresses this problem. (The three turns may constitute a sequence embedded in a course of talk, yet they may also be extended into a longer argument sequence).

The three turns thus constitute a basic sequential pattern for coordinating the actions of S1 and S2 in time. This way, this minimal pattern allows them to produce an order which shows them when to do what. To Habermas, the coordination of their actions in time is linked to and dependent on their synchronization.
With their speech act, they not only perform a turn. By using language, they pursue an intention expressed in the speech act.[11]

> With his 'yes' the speaker accepts a speech-act offer and grounds an agreement; this agreement concerns the content of the utterance, on the one hand and, on the other hand, certain guarantees immanent to the speech acts and certain obligations relevant to the sequel of interaction (Habermas 1984:296, original emphasis)

The contradiction by the speaker means that S2 takes a position on this speech act by saying "yes" or "no". While "yes" would be less consequential, "no" makes not only a new turn relevant, but also a claim made by S1 in her utterance.[12] It is because of the "contradiction" that S1 ("ideally") needs to provide arguments in support of the claim, and it is these arguments which turn the sequences into a discourse.[13]

S: Utterance (claim)

R: Yes / No

S: Justification of claim

"Ideally" means that this discourse only unfolds in a situation in which neither power nor economic differences affect the conversation. Even if Habermas concedes that these restrictions apply empirically in most cases, the sequence unfolds a logic of its own which he calls "communicative rationality". This logic is directly linked to language. To be more exact, it is the use of language in action, i.e. speech

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[11] Sequentiality is essential to the performance of speech acts. In fact, the examples Austin (1962) provides for speech acts (such as menacing) are typically pair sequences.

[12] Even in his latest text Habermas emphatically stresses the role of contraction for discourses in general and for political deliberation in particular, as "only by the right, even the encouragement to reciprocal negation ("Neinsagen") the potential of contested opinions in discourse unfolds" (Habermas 2021:478, my translation).

[13] According to Habermas himself, this justification again takes on a fixed, rational and sequential form in everyday language, which he developed through Toulmin's (1958) theory of argumentation. In an empirical study of informal argumentations I have tried to show that negation results in a much more agonistic logic if not regulated by institutions, such as moderators, judges etc. (cf. Knoblauch 2009).

acts, which allows the speakers to distinguish different validity claims. By the different forms of speech acts, "expressive", "normative-regulating" or "propositional", actors make reference to different "worlds" (subjective, social, objective) and addresses with their claim in the sequence (or its denial) different "validity claims". As any participant in this communication can tell these differences in principle, language-in-use serves to synchronize their action across the sequences: they know what is at stake because of language.

Habermas thus shows how meaning and motives of actors are guided by the "pragmatic semantics" of language in use, so that what actors mean, how they take up the meaning and come to a common understanding is guided by language.

However, Habermas addresses the temporal aspects of communicative action only in bypassing. Therefore one better turns to *Schutz'* analysis of intersubjectivity who is one of the references of Habermas. In fact, Schutz very clearly demonstrates how subjective motives and linguistic exchange produce in his famous analysis of questions and answers (Schutz 1964a:14):

> I ask you a question. The in-order-to motive of my act is not only the expectation that you will understand my question, but also to get your answer; or more precisely, I reckon that you will answer, leaving undecided what the content of your answer may be. (....) The question, so we can say, is the because-motive of the answer, as the answer is the in-order-to motive of the question. (...) I myself had felt on innumerable occasions induced to react to another's act, which I had interpreted as a question addressed to me, with a kind of behavior of which the in-order-to motive was my expectation that the Other, the questioner, might interpret my behavior as an answer.

Although Schutz presupposes the use of language, the particular motives in this sequence are not dependent on their linguistic form. Rather, Schutz stresses the temporal position, and, even more, the temporal orientation of the acting subject: It is the orientation toward the other's next action which defines the in-order-to motive, and it is the orientation to the other's prior action, which defines the "because-motive". Both motives depend on the fact that speakers have different subjective positions in the sequence, but they also depend on the sequence itself. The sequence provides the motives almost independently of whatever they want to say, ask or answer in a way which reverses their temporal orientation: S1 future orientation becomes the (past) reason for S2.

It is quite easy to imagine that the same concatenation of motives also applies to Habermas's discourse, as S1 justifies her claim because S2 negates (or "questions") it. However, in Schutz, the reciprocity of motives expressed in this example is not dependent on certain aspects of language (as its position may suffice for any utterance to be treated like a question independent of their linguistic format). As much as language may add to communicative action, it does not allow to understand and explain the principles of synchronization and coordination of actions to sequences in general.

Before we turn to this general question, we need to consider *Luhmann* and his theory of social systems which contributes indirectly to the analysis of sequences. Although he does not use the notion of sequentiality, it figures quite prominently in his theory of communication which he considers at the basis of "social systems". While conceiving of communication as a selection of a certain meaning, sequenti-

ality comes about in what he calls "follow-up communication". While communication is, to Luhmann, the basic process constituting social systems, it is the "continuation of communication" which maintains it in time. To say it in other words: if there would be no follow up to a communication, there would be no social system. The follow up of communication is the basic process of which social systems are constructed and exist (thence: "autopoeietically") in time.


Diagram: Continuation of Communication according to Luhmann

As in Habermas model, "one communication" (C) is followed by another one which either is "yes" or "no". As opposed to Habermas, however, "no" here does not refer to the dissenting actor but to the discontinuation of communication. In this sense, a dissent in terms of Habermas could mean "yes" in this diagram insofar as it takes up what the communication   means the discontinuation of communication. It is the consenting "yes" which does not only mean the acceptance by a subject, but the continuation of the same kind of communication. As opposed to Habermas whose sequence is designed on the pattern of dialogue between two subjects, Luhmann only underlines the fact that a certain kind of communication is continued. As social systems consist of communication, they depend on the continuation of such sequences. The continuation of specific forms of communication are tantamount to (the construction of) specific "systems" of communication. Thus, functional subsystems, such as "economy" or "science" are dependent on the continuation of the specific binary "codes" of communication which are constitutive for them (such as "to pay"/ "not to pay" or "true"/ "false").

Although to Luhmann, actors' motives do not play a decisive role in communication, the model at least indicates how one can link the microsocial concept of sequences with sociological meso structures (such as scientific institutes in which some communication may be bureaucratic, or otherwise scientific) and to the macro-sociological theory of differentiation of functional systems, e.g. scientific, economic, legal etc.[14] Yet, as much as this idea of concatenation opens the sociological perspective to larger structures that are often overlooked in the sequential analysis of interaction, Luhmann's notion of continuation is very reductive in that it assumes that it is only a certain kind of meaning which interlinks communication.

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[14] A similar idea can be seen in Collins' (2004) Ritual Interaction Chains, which have been taken up by Giddens (1984).

The bodies play just as little a role in coordinating communication as the materiality of media transmitting information and their infrastructures.[15]

4. Pointing and the communicative construction of sequences

The role of materiality and the body for sequentiality in interactions has been highlighted particularly in studies which have extended sequential analysis beyond the scope of (verbal) conversations and dialogues (e.g., Goffman 1981; Heath 1986; Goodwin 1994). As much as this extension has been opposed by rather 'orthodox' representants of Conversation Analysis, it is now widely accepted and elaborated in standard method books in the social sciences and linguistics (especially in the context of gesture studies and the analysis of multimodal interaction). Also, aspects such as the one-sidedness of action, the bias towards language, and the disembodied concept of sequences of meaning, which are criticized above in the aforementioned social theories, obviously play a decisive role in the empirical analysis of sequences. However, these aspects have neither been formulated theoretically nor have the various suggestions by the various theoreticians been integrated into a social theory. In the following part, I shall therefore briefly outline how these various aspects (highlighted in italics) can be integrated into a consistent and coherent theory that allows us to grasp what we mean by sequences and how these considerations can inform the methodology of sequence analysis.

Admittedly, in this context the sketch must be coarse. In order to facilitate understanding, it will draw on what I consider to be a paradigmatic example, finger-pointing.[16] This means that we can illustrate the role of all aspects mentioned, with an example which is not only intuitive for theorizing; moreover, we have studied it empirically in quite some detail (Knoblauch 2013); and finally, one can make a strong claim as to the relevance of this gesture for many (but not all) basic aspects of human communication.

The meaning of pointing with a finger has already been recognized in various theories of communication from Wundt to Mead. In recent research it was particularly Tomasello (2008) who emphasizes the basic role of finger-pointing to human culture. Pointing with the finger contains a clear message: it is oriented to others and directed at something. It is of particular importance for the theory of communicative action because, first, it has a referential significance, and, second, it can be acquired both ontogenetically and phylogenetically before and without language acquisition. Because children can already point before they can speak, even Habermas (2009:45), who lays so much stress on language, conceded the role of the pointing finger.

Based on the freeing of the hand (Leroi-Gourhan 1964), pointing "is one of the critical transition points in the evolution of human communication, already embodying most of the uniquely human forms of social cognition and motivation required for the later creation of conventional languages" (Tomasello 2008:2).[17] But pointing

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[15]   The relevance of the materiality of media of communication has been underlined by the Toronto School, e.g., Innis (2007).

[16]   A more elaborate version of the theory of sequences can be found in Knoblauch (2020: Chapter IV A).

[17]   It is hardly possible to prove its phylogenetic relevance that finger-pointing distinguishes humans from other mammals, following a logic that Haraway (2008) calls "human exceptionalism": if

is also a decisive step in the development of human early childhood which has been called the "nine-month revolution". Finger-pointing is one of several new phenomena in this eventful age phase, because during the same period the ability to understand emotional expressions is formed. Whether parents show fear or joy can, after this period, be understood as a motive to do something or also to stop doing something.[18] At this turning point in the individual genesis of humans, children also seem to develop a notion of their own self (Stern 1985). This is particularly evident by the discovery of their mirror image. This discovery has long been regarded as a phase of ego development.[19] However, it now seems to be clear that understanding the mirror image as ego must be understood on the basis of the communicative unfolding of relations to others. This sociality is quite evident since "without using any words, infants can now communicate something" (Stern 1985:9). Finger-pointing is one of the most vivid, clearest, and easily comprehensible communicative actions even for adults. It characterizes this nine-month revolution.

The stress on the basic character of finger pointing allows us to assume that it does not necessarily presuppose the use of language, so that it provides an example for non-linguistic forms of *sequentiality*. In fact, sequential pointing can assume a similar order as analyzed by Schutz in the case of question and answer. Take, as an example, the case of two subjects, interacting by pointing: S1 stretches the finger to show S2 something, S2 looks at the finger moving and, following the movement, turns in the direction shown by the extended arm. The movements can easily be routinized and become a practice, so that S2 does not need to follow the movement of the hand but immediately turns to the direction indicated from the beginning.

It is important to note that such a routinization means that S2 "knows" the gesture already. The role of *knowledge* is one of the reasons why we will later need to turn to the role of the subject. The same holds for the second implication of routinization, the role of *simultaneity*: routinization implies that several movements are coordinated simultaneously, so that the changing gaze direction caused by the pointing of S1 may already trigger S2 to move towards the direction of view when the finger or the arm starts to point.[20]

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chimpanzees and even dogs can learn to point or to understand pointing, then we are talking less about a *differentia specifica*, but rather about a feature of human communication in which other species can also participate. Therefore, finger-pointing should not be understood within the framework of an exclusive anthropology that reveals the limits of the human. Rather, it suggests the elementary forms of communication in human societies in which non-human actors can also participate.

[18] Stern (1985:132) calls these forms of feelings "interaffectivity".

[19] This is the case for Lacan, who regards the mirror image as an alienation and assumes that intersubjective development only develops at the level of language (see Lacan 1953).

[20] Much empirical research in conversational analysis has been adopting the idea of sequences being "practices" (Schegloff 2007:231ff.). Although most sequences are empirically "recurrent forms" and "structures" habitualized by the actors performing them, the task of social theory lies certainly not in the description of empirical phenomena but in the provision of the analytical instruments by which they can be analyzed, constituted, and explained (including the concept, conceptual relations, and their theoretical contexts). With respect to sequential practices this means that we need to ask how and by what these sequences are constituted. In social theory, the constitution of practices and structures has been a topic of Giddens (1984) famous "structuration theory" which was well informed by ethnomethodology. As to the relation of Giddens' notion of action to communicative action cf. Knoblauch (2020:171ff.).

We shall return to the simultaneity of action later, because we should first account for the role of the *body*. When talking about movements we should emphasize more precisely that we talk about bodily movements, e.g., gaze directions, arm movements, stretching of fingers. These movements obviously need not be signs or emblematic gestures, as Ekman/Friesen (1969) would call them. They are, however, obviously communicative in a way which is covered by the notion of *performance* as suggested by Goffman (1959). Performance indicates that actions are not just meaning but something which is linked to bodies in time.

In the case of finger pointing, one part of the body is certainly focused (first), which is the finger. Often the pointed finger may be a gesture but is not necessarily combined with the stretched extension of the hand; given the anthropological arguments, it may also be constitutive of a gesture. For this reason, I propose to use a more general term for the pointing finger borrowed from Berger and Luckmann (1966), which is *objectivation*. Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended (Berger/Luckmann 1966:49). On the basis of Berger and Luckmann, it is even possible to distinguish between the kind of temporal objectivation like the finger pointing which results from the focus on an embodied performance, and its materialization independent of the body, i.e. objectifications, such as a material sign (e.g. shaped like an arrow) or a technology (a laser pointer). While objectivation thus introduces a very general concept for understanding pointing as a form of communicative action, we should stress its difference to non-relational, subjectivist theories of action. In his classical theory, Bühler (2011) assumes that pointing is defined by "haecceitas", i.e. by the standpoint of the subject he called "origo". For him, "origo" is also the reference point of deixis in general.

This subjectivist model has already been criticized by Hanks (1996) who has developed a relational concept of pointing. He emphasizes that finger-pointing cannot be considered as a solitary act for the simple reason that it only makes sense if a person points to someone else. In so doing, the act is by no means guided solely by the subjective point of view from which the finger points. Rather, the 'art' of pointing consists in the characteristic that it is spatially oriented to someone else: in pointing, we align our body in such a way so that the other can see our finger, and we design our finger and body orientation in such a way that both (i.e., our orientation to the reference as well as the others' bodily standpoint) are taken into account. The one who points anticipates the position of the other and makes their own position visible to the other. The position of the subject is thus a point of reference, but not the only one. In its orientation toward a third, namely the finger and its reference, pointing has in fact two reference points.

Pointing thus exemplifies the *relational character* of communicative action already implied in performance.[21] It is not just performed by a subject, but it is performed in the "face" of another subject. As opposed to current relationist theories

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[21] The notions of performance and objectivation seem to be implied in what Garfinkel calls "accountability": "When I speak of accountable my interests are directed to such matters as the following. I mean observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to members as situated practices of

(White 2008) this does not assume that the relation between subjects is the basic unit of analysis but rather includes the objectivation (be it performative of materialized). This *triadic extension* of relationality can build on Meads' theory of symbolic interaction, which takes the constitution of meaning to be basically sequential. It "arises and lies within the field of the relation between the gesture of a given organism and the subsequent behaviour of this organism as indicated to another human organism by that gesture. If that gesture does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or resultant) behaviour of the given organism, then it has meaning" (Mead 1964:163). Thus, the sequence described by Mead has a temporal order in which a threefold relation takes place: "[T]he gesture of one organism to the adjustive response of another organism (also implicated in the given act) and to the completion of the given act" (Mead 1964:164). The "gesture-dialogue" consists of a gesture, the following response and the completion of the act which began with the first move. This sequence represents for Mead the core of communication, because it makes actors reciprocal and thus social beings through the exchange of "indications".[22]

As Schutz has argued, the gesture dialogue implies what he calls *reciprocity*. In fact, it is particularly the analysis of finger-pointing which demonstrates the relevance of a kind of reciprocity specific to (human) communicative action. Thus, in his comparisons of chimpanzees and human infants older than nine months, Tomasello has argued for two different kinds of coordination. Whereas in the former case two actors pursue their egoistic goals when acting together, in the second case they establish what he calls "shared intentionality"; we see "humans' cooperative motives for communicating turn into mutual assumptions and even norms of cooperation" (Tomasello 2008:355). This "shared intentionality" is the prerequisite for understanding finger-pointing as a reference to something else and not as generating attention to one's own finger or person. Only humans from the age of about nine months can produce and understand this reference: They do not see a finger, but a reference to what it points to. "Thus, whereas ape attention-getters rest on the natural tendency of recipients to attend to the source of noises or touches, human pointing rests on the natural tendency of recipients to follow the gaze direction, and so the pointing direction, of others to external targets" (Tomasello 2008:62).[23]

A similar distinction between two types of reciprocity in the sequentiality of interaction has been suggested by neuroscientific research. Thus Creem-Regeh and others (2013) distinguish between an "egocentric frame when it comes to spatial

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looking-and telling" (Garfinkel 1967:1). "Accountable" obviously implies something that is observable in a very sensual way, as it is accessible through seeing and reporting. This interpretation is supported by Garfinkel's use of the word with respect to his analysis of "transsexuality". Here he makes it clear that "accounts" can also take place in bodily behavior ("conduct"), that is, "by making observable that and how normal sexuality is accomplished through witnessable displays of talk and conduct" (Garfinkel 1967:180).

22 The relevance of Mead and symbolic interactionism should not cover the difference to communicative constructivism which is basically (and this way following the idea of Berger and Luckmann) materialist: objectivations must not only be "symbolic", "signifying" or just about "meaning", as the quote by Mead suggests; they can be material (i.e. " objectifications"), have a material and technological effect on humans (i.e. sensual), and also affect other objectifications.

23 The distinction between these two types of action has been formulated most clearly already by Habermas (1984). To sociology, this distinction is quite consequential as it demonstrates the reductionism of most economic, rational choice, and play theories of action which only allow for the former type.

perspective taking and an allocentric frame. In the former frame, an observer determines what another can or cannot see from their standpoint". In the latter, however, "the mere presence of another person may prompt humans to share (implicitly or explicitly) spatial and proprioceptive information with one another" (Creem-Regeh et al. 2013:8). With respect to space, this sharing takes a quite spectacular form, as it allows to identify "where in space a target object is located relative to a viewpoint that is different from the observer's current viewpoint" (ibid.: 5), or to say it in other words, where in space a target object is located relative to a viewpoint that is different from the observers' viewpoint.[24]

For Schutz, reciprocity is also what establishes *intersubjectivity* as the sociality that arises between subjects. To establish this fundamental reciprocity, a number of mechanisms have been identified that we see as being anchored in communicative action. For example, the "looking glass"-effect observed long before neurology by the sociologist Cooley (1902): that we do not perceive our own physical movements visually for the most part, but only through the reaction of the others in which they are reflected. While the assumption of empathic introspection or simple mimetic interpretation turned out to be too metaphorical or too simplistic, the concept of "taking over the role" proposed by Mead (1964) has proven its worth. The core of it is that we anticipate the action of the other individual that he or she will perform in response to our action – and that we design our action already in the anticipation phase in such a way that we receive a corresponding and expected reaction.

The specific *spatial kind of reciprocity* implied in pointing has probably been most clearly identified by Schutz. In analysing the constitution of intersubjectivity as basis for the sociality of the life-world, he suggested, next to the reciprocity of motives, what he calls the "interchangeability of standpoints": "that I and my fellow man would have typically the same experiences of the common world if we changed places, thus transforming my Here into his, and his – now to me a There – into mine" (Schutz 1962:316). Interchangeability of standpoints explicitly refers to the spatial aspects implied in the sequential process of finger-pointing. Pointing is not only spatial in that it refers to something in space, i.e. a spatial deixis. In addition, it implies the ability of human actors not only to point to something in space but also to point in such a relational way which allows to anticipates temporally and spatially the local position of the other subject(s) as if they were able to make perceptions from another person's perspective without changing their position in space. There are many open questions as to how we dispose of the miraculous feature. Nevertheless, it presupposes that subjects are able to integrate the perspective of the other's spatial position. As much as this interchangeability demonstrates that the subject is not the "origo" of pointing, this does not at all mean that subjectivity is irrelevant. In fact, as important as the other's position may be when pointing, pointing does not direct the other from their very position but rather takes an intermediate direction which also accounts for the bodily "standpoint" of the person pointing. This way the reciprocity implied in the interchangeability of standpoints underlines the relationality of this type of communicative action; it also indicates that, at least in terms of the spatiality of pointing, the position of the subject and

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[24] Even if neurology suggests mirror neurons as an explanation for the various forms of reciprocity (Fu/Franz 2014), their empirical description and systematic analysis is still a desideratum – even in the social sciences.

thus *subjectivity* is indispensable, i.e. its positionality. [25] Positionality as the subjective sense of one's location with respect to someone else and something is not only an essential feature of communicative action but also a crucial aspect of sequentiality. If sequentiality consists in the temporal sequence of actions related to one another, the subjective position and thus subjectivity appears to be the crucial feature which distinguishes it from seriality, i.e. the mere temporal sequence of actions (or any items related to one another). [26] We need not conceive of subjectivity as predetermined by mirror neurons[27] in order to see how the (subjectively sensed) standpoint of one's body (in relation to another and something else) serves as a pivot around which the sequentiality revolves. While the mechanism of this pivot can be described by reciprocity, there is another reason why we need subjectivity in order to understand sequentiality: Sequences may not be continued by someone else, e.g. if the listener does not take the turn, the speaker goes on and talk turns turn into speech, a move into a walk, the pointing gesture into a dance not only "ascribed" to an actor but performed by her.

While subjectivity is constitutive of sequences of action, the example already takes up the idea of concatenation as suggested by Luhmann. If sequences are continued, they constitute larger contexts of interaction or, to be more exact, communication. Again, we should emphasize that it is useful to rather talk about communicative actions, as others may not respond or re-act and continue the "interaction chain" (Collins 2004), and single actors may continue their actions and constitute extended forms, such as speeches, walks, action chains. In any case, sequences can constitute larger forms. However, it is quite reductive to assume, as Luhmann does, that only the continuation of meaning (e.g., as "code") would allow to constitute larger forms; rather, the very performance of communicative actions can take a temporal form, such as a conversation, a dance, or an event. Answering the question as to how sequential patterns contribute to the construction of "meso-sociological" institutions (ranging from gossip to the powerpoint presentation in organizations) and macrosociological orders (such as religion or science) has been one major goal of social theory and has triggered and inspired much empirical research, as e.g., on "communicative genres" (Luckmann 1985; Günthner/Knoblauch 1995).

As important as this topic may be to the empirical study of social structures, the sketch of a social theory of sequentiality also demonstrates that we cannot reduce sociality to sequentiality. In this vein, Mondada (2016: 346) is right in stating that "sequentiality is a less linear phenomenon that it appears just on the basis of talk". It is, as Mondada stresses, certainly also characterized by multimodality if one considers the different sensual channels by which we perceive action. Body involvement would also require the acknowledgement of the body's affordances and the

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[25] The fact that macaques and chimpanzees dispose of mirror neurons, as Fu argues, does rather contradict to the claim that mirror neurons explain reciprocity, as far as it is Tomasello (2008) who proves that chimpanzees and thus monkeys in general are obviously not capable of this kind of reciprocity.

[26] One may argue that similarity is another feature designating seriality, but this argument can be tautological as the question what is similar only comes about by the temporal order of things: it may be apples after apples, but also a pear, a pineapple, a plant or anything may constitute a series.

[27] Of course, the body plays an important role which can only be indicated here: The subjective position is related to body ("Leib"), which is (visually) "mirrored" by the other's body performance in different sensual modalities which make it a "subjective body" (*Leib*).

different material media by which action is mediated. While we have taken account of the role of the body in the sketch above, the focus on sequentiality as the temporal unfolding of communicative actions ex negative already indicated that we need to consider (theoretically) the major aspect complementing its sequentiality: *simultaneity*. Be it the body standing next to me or the face on the screen which represents a body from the other side of the globe (or a virtual actor) – sequentiality is always embedded in and defined by a spatial dimension. Also, when considering the temporal coordination of bodies in pointing, we would ignore their simultaneity if we only looked at the temporal process. Particularly with respect to pointing, it becomes clear what simultaneity means, as pointing is not only about the spatial arrangement of the bodies and their spatial movement of the parts and the objectivations they relate (Löw 2008). In fact, as much as finger pointing may be an interactive sequence of bodily moves and possibly turns at speech, it is spatial in that it demands the interchangeability of spatially located standpoints. In being deictic, also its' very focus is spatial: it points to something by pointing somewhere in space.

We should stress simultaneity as the spatial aspect of communicative action not only because it is neglected theoretically as well as empirically. If we consider media as spatial mediations of communicative action, we can also see how the concept of simultaneity helps to understand the current transformation of communicative action, institutions, and society through digital media. Media are the very material forms in which communicative action is "mediated" in space, and therefore changes on media directly affect the spatiality of communication action. Furthermore, the decrease of spatial co-presence, bodily physical interaction and spatial "co-presence" is substituted by a simultaneity of technologically mediatized actions finger-pointing which, like many other gestures, does not work as intuitively when transmitted e.g. in the context of a video conference.

While spatiality is an aspect of sociality as constituted by communicative action which is exemplified by the example of finger-pointing, we should, however, not allow the theoretical issues to be dominated by specific examples or cases. Even if finger-pointing is of quite some relevance to social theory, its specificity lies in being a "proto-sign", as Luckmann (1972) calls it. By indicating something in space, it produces a basic spatial meaning of deixis; yet for that very reason it is not only distant from whatever it indicated, it also does not affect it materially. Focusing on this example should not obscure the fact that any objectivation is material or, as objectivation, materialized, and thus affects human bodies as well as other things sensually. We can only hint at the crucial relevance of the materiality of communicative action for communicative constructivism and its consequences to a social theory of sequentiality extended to transactions.[28] The starting point for an understanding of a materialized sequence of actions as an exchange of things has been provided by Mauss (1966): One subject gives something to another who takes it. As an act, it is the coordinated transmittance of a thing that figures as a third element yet may otherwise be an insignificant objectification – ranging from acts, such as

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[28] It is one of the major arguments of communicative constructivism that communicative actions are not only linked with embodied or "significant" objectivations (such as fingers pointing or letters) but also materialized objectifications and technologies (Pfadenhauer 2015). As to the sequences of objectifications cf. Knoblauch (2020: Chapter IV.a.1).

services, to signs and things. In his analysis Mauss shows that gifts include a reciprocal relation, namely the mutual obligation to reciprocate a gift as well. Bourdieu (2000) has shown how this analysis of a basic sequence can be used for an understanding of social and symbolic capital not only of transactions but of social order in general.

5. Conclusion

As important as the consequences of the social theory of sequences may be for an understanding of contemporary society or of material exchanges, the goal of this paper is not a sociological theory of exchange or a theory of contemporary communication society. Much more modest, I tried to show how sequences are treated in social theories. On the background of sequential analysis as carried out in empirical studies on interaction, I have addressed some aspects which have been exposed by these theories and also identified some shortcomings of these theories. With reference to the example of finger-pointing, I have tried to integrate both series of aspects into a coherent theory of sequence. With respects to the empirical restrictions of the example, I have indicated that sequences must be set in the larger theoretical frame we call communicative constructivism.

Without being able to elaborate this frame in this context, the importance of language for and its relationship to sequences is one of the subjects we should return to in the end. In this respect, the argument is that linguistic conversations are not the paradigm for an understanding of sequences. However, the emphasis on non-linguistic sequences and communicative action does not mean to neglect language in any way. Language is certainly one of the most important resources for the conventionalization of meaning. As important as language is, we should not succumb to the temptation to understand or measure every interaction or action according to the pattern of linguistic or even symbolic action. Social theory in particular must take into account that sociality is the source of language rather than language the source of the social.

Insofar as conversations are primarily of linguistic nature, they are certainly also synchronized by language, its semantics and grammar. But as much as language is a storehouse for meaning, also conversation is driven by a social mechanism that we have described here as sequentiality. Sequentiality refers to the sequence of communicative actions that are physically objectified and can thus be mediated and mediatized in various ways. By its specific form of reciprocity, the sequentiality of communicative action unfolds a kind of social logic which allows to synchronize actors in time and space, and due to the use of objectivations, it allows to coordinate their embodied, mediated or materialized action.

Temporality is a basic dimension of the sequentiality of communicative actions (and thus of society). Admittedly, also consciousness exhibits a temporal structure, as analyzed by Schutz (1964). However, just as we avoid grasping sociality only on the basis of communicative action, we cannot reduce the temporality of action to the accomplishments of subjective consciousness or deduce it form objective time (Luckmann 1984). Rather, we tend to understand the constitution of consciousness, the formation of a meaningful "inner time" and the order in the "stream of consciousness" as well as resulting from communicative actions with others, the concurrent establishment of social relations and institutions. Also "objective" measures

of time are obviously a communicative construct which could not have come into being without highly presuppositional communication (and technical) construction processes. As societies are realized in communicative actions, sequences provide a basic temporal order to their processual performance in situations, to the subjective orientation of actors in these situations and to the workings of institutions and social structures.

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The Phenomenological Foundations of Ethnomethodology's Conceptions of Sequentiality and Indexicality.
Harold Garfinkel's References to Aron Gurwitsch's "Field of Consciousness"[1]

Christian Meyer

Abstract
Some of the opaquest and cloudiest passages and formulations in Garfinkel's writings directly refer to Aron Gurwitsch's gestaltist phenomenology. In this text I will clarify the borrowings and intentional misreadings of Gurwitsch's philosophy by Garfinkel drawing on the topic of sequentiality and endogenously unfolding indexicality. These borrowings and intentional misreadings have been overlooked for a long time, but materials from the Garfinkel Archive now allow us to reconstruct them in more detail.

In doing so, this text at the same time provides an introduction to the many references in the work of Garfinkel to Gurwitsch. The paper offers a treatment of Gestalt contexture and its details, theme, and thematic field, discusses how time and temporality matter, and explains how Garfinkel has been using and taking inspiration from the work of Gurwitsch. It does so also by reference to some unpublished materials in the Garfinkel archive. Furthermore, the text refers to some other sources of inspiration for Garfinkel, like Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Finally, it offers reflections on the theoretical foundations on which empirical strands of ethnomethodology such as Conversation Analysis and Membership Categorization Analysis are based as well as methodological considerations of video-based interaction research.

Keywords: Ethnomethodology – Garfinkel – Gestalt theory – Gurwitsch – indexicality – phenomenology – sequentiality.

German Abstract
Einige der undurchsichtigsten Formulierungen in Garfinkels Schriften beziehen sich direkt auf die Gestalt-Phänomenologie von Aron Gurwitsch. In diesem Text werde ich die Anleihen und absichtlichen Fehlinterpretationen (*intentional misreadings*) von Gurwitschs Philosophie durch Garfinkel anhand der Themen Sequentialität und der endogen sich entfaltenden Indexikalität klären. Diese Anleihen und absichtlichen Fehlinterpretationen wurden lange Zeit übersehen, aber Materialien aus dem Garfinkel-Archiv erlauben uns nun, sie genauer zu rekonstruieren.

Mit diesem Ziel führt der Text zugleich in die vielen Bezüge im Werk Garfinkels zu Gurwitsch ein. Der Beitrag behandelt Gestaltgebilde (*gestalt contextures*) und ihre Details, Themen und Themenfelder, diskutiert die Bedeutung von Zeit und Zeitlichkeit und erklärt, wie Garfinkel die Arbeit von Gurwitsch verwendete und sich von ihr inspirieren ließ. Dies geschieht auch durch Verweis auf einige unveröffentlichte Materialien im Garfinkel-Archiv. Der Text verweist zudem auf einige

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weitere Inspirationsquellen für Garfinkel, wie Hubert Dreyfus und Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Nicht zuletzt bietet er Reflexionen über die theoretischen Grundlagen, auf der empirische Ansätze der Ethnomethodologie wie Konversationsanalyse und Kategorisierungsanalyse basieren, sowie methodologische Erwägungen zur videographischen Interaktionsforschung.

Keywords: Ethnomethodologie – Garfinkel – Gestalttheorie – Gurwitsch – Indexikalität – Phänomenologie – Sequentialität.

1. Introduction

Some of the opaquest formulations in Harold Garfinkel's writings directly refer to Aron Gurwitsch's gestalt phenomenology. An example is:

> Haecceities make up a new descriptive vocabulary of object production. The vocabulary is being worked out by ethnomethodologists. To replace organizational Things produced in their details. Its purpose is to describe Durkheimian Things by addressing their neglected (figural) (contextural) (configurational) characteristics. Not only is this their central and identifying property. It is also strikingly ignored and neglected. Durkheim's Things are (deep gestalten) (patterns). Accountable analytic units composed endogenously, in-and-as-of-their-lived-temporal-in-course sequentiality, in-vivo, local historicities. "Strings" of coherent contextural constituents of lived orderlinesses in practices of ordinary society (Garfinkel 2007a:42).

The quote is an excerpt from a manuscript that Harold Garfinkel intended to develop into the second volume of his book project on "Durkheim's aphorism", the first volume of which had appeared in 2002 (Garfinkel 2002). The manuscript was first presented orally at the Schutz Memorial Lecture in October 2004 to which Garfinkel had been invited. It was read, however, by Ken Liberman and Larry Wieder, due to a car accident that Garfinkel had suffered shortly before. The part that Liberman had read was then published as Garfinkel (2007a), and the second volume on "Durkheim's aphorism", dedicated to ethnomethodological studies of work and sciences and the Lebenswelt origins of the sciences, was never completed.

In one way, the manuscript, including the quoted passage, is representative of Garfinkel's later phase of work as published, where he writes in a condensed and bold, if not radical, way in style and wording. However, as we will see, most of the theoretical concepts and thoughts referred to in these later texts were already present in their essential features in Garfinkel's works of the first half of the 1960s

when he developed ethnomethodology in its proper sense and emancipated himself from Parsons (see Garfinkel 2021:23).

In this text I will try to clarify some of these condensed, bold, and sometimes seemingly radical formulations and concepts by relating them to, and re-reading them with, thoughts developed in Gurwitsch's philosophy. In doing so, I will focus particularly on the topics of sequentiality and endogenously emerging indexicality. Garfinkel's many references to Gurwitsch have – with few exceptions (Wieder 1974; Lynch 1993:chapter 4; Maynard 2005; Fele 2008; Eisenmann/Lynch 2021) – not received the attention they deserve, but especially recently published as well as still unpublished materials preserved in the Garfinkel Archive, Newburyport, now allow us to reconstruct them in greater detail. This text thus also provides an introduction to the many references to Gurwitsch that Garfinkel makes in his work. The text offers a treatment of Gestalt contexture and its details, theme, and thematic field, discusses how time and temporality matter, and explains how Garfinkel has been using and taking inspiration from the work of Gurwitsch. It does so also by reference to some unpublished materials by Garfinkel that can be found in the Garfinkel archive in Newburyport. Furthermore, the text refers to some other sources of inspiration for Garfinkel, like Hubert Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, while leaving out others, like Wittgenstein, Parsons, or Heidegger. Finally, the text offers reflexions on the theoretical foundations on which empirical strands of ethnomethodology such as Conversation Analysis and Membership Categorization Analysis are based.

2. Garfinkel and Gurwitsch

Garfinkel had come into contact with phenomenology as a student of sociology at the University of North Carolina (1939-1942), including with a text of Gurwitsch through an early English collection of Farber (1940), and he cultivated this interest further during his time in the army (1942-1946) (see Rawls 2002). In the fall of 1946 when he moved to Harvard to study with Talcott Parsons, he came to personally know Gurwitsch, who had emigrated from Germany to France in 1933 and to the US in 1940, where – after some initial years at Johns Hopkins – he first taught physics at Harvard until 1947 and then mathematics and philosophy at Brandeis University until 1959.[2] While at Harvard (1946-1951), Garfinkel met regularly with Gurwitsch in his house in Cambridge to discuss "subjects in phenomenology and sociology" (Garfinkel 2002:84), particularly Gurwitsch's at the time still unpublished manuscript *The Field of Consciousness* (2010 [1964]) that he wrote in English, relying on earlier outlines in German and French, between 1943 and 1947. When completed in 1951, Gurwitsch offered the manuscript to Harvard University

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[2] Gurwitsch, a Russian-Lithuanian Jew, was refused his habilitation (second thesis) in Germany after the National Socialists came to power. When he discussed his manuscript (later published as "Human Encounters in the Social World", 1979) with Husserl in 1932 in Freiburg, Husserl established contact with Alfred Schütz with whom Gurwitsch shared a life-long friendship since their first personal encounter in Paris in 1937. While in Paris (1933-1940), Gurwitsch (who had grown up speaking French) lectured philosophy at the Sorbonne where Maurice Merleau-Ponty attended his lectures and was heavily influenced by Gurwitsch's phenomenological re-interpretation of gestalt psychology and experimental neurology (cf. Embree 1972; Moran 2019; Pintos 2005).

Press for publication, but, even after revisions, it was rejected in 1953, partly because of Gurwitsch's refusal to accept profound changes (Grathoff 1989:134-170), partly because of the "professorial German syntax of the Weimar years" (Alexandre Métraux, personal communication) that transpired from Gurwitsch's English manuscript. After all, in the 1950s, phenomenology, in the context of US-American philosophy, was still "exotic", as Cairns (1950:363) puts it. Eventually, Gurwitsch's book was first published in 1957 with Desclée de Brouwer in Bruges and Paris in a French translation of the English manuscript that Gurwitsch was dissatisfied with (Grathoff 1989:216-225; Métraux, personal communication). The revised English original was published in 1964 with Duquesne University Press in Pittsburgh, and a German translation, approved by Gurwitsch, as late as 1975 with de Gruyter in Berlin and New York.

Garfinkel apparently did not come into possession of the original English manuscript and did not know about Gurwitsch's dissatisfaction with the French translation, and the relationship between the two after 1951 remains enigmatic. But Garfinkel kept an interest in Gurwitsch's philosophy even after he had moved to California. In 1957, when he was teaching at UCLA, he hired a graduate student in sociology to (re-)translate Gurwitsch's book *The Field of Consciousness* into English when it was first published in French. As Garfinkel says, he thus gained "textual access in English to Gurwitsch's argument on the functional significations and their coherence of figural contexture in its empirical perceptual details" (Garfinkel 2002:84) – functional signification, coherence of figural contexture, empirical perceptual details being among the formulations that he subsequently used generously and that he himself attributes to Gurwitsch's influence.

Garfinkel states in retrospect that Gurwitsch's philosophy "has been a foundational point of departure in all my teaching. It has lasted a long time. It has also been missed as Ethnomethodology's key resource in identifying Ethnomethodology's concerns to specify 'the problem of meaning' with a program of certain positive empirical researches and instruction in sociology's identifying 'problem of social order'" (Garfinkel 2002:84). In what follows, I will contribute to remedy this negligence.

3. The Autochthony of Phenomena

In the manuscript that Gurwitsch discussed with Garfinkel and that was later published as *The Field of Consciousness* (2010 [1964]), Gurwitsch argues against the psychological "constancy hypothesis" of the early 20th century which assumes an ego who – in perception – synthesizes unconnected sense-data that in themselves possess a stable meaning. But he also called out the concurrent gestalt theoretical critique of the constancy hypothesis for not being radical enough and still presuming extrinsic, particularly spatial, principles that guarantee holistic perception. I will not go into details of the specific argumentation of the two approaches here. For us, it is important that, in his critique, Gurwitsch advocated an argument that he had already developed much earlier as his "non-egological conception of consciousness" (1941).[3]

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[3]   Gurwitsch shares this non-egological conception with Merleau-Ponty and (partly) Sartre in contrast to Husserl and Schütz who are proponents of the egological "spotlight" conception. In

In phenomenological diction, intentionality, among other things, implies that *something* (e.g., a collectivity of forms and colors such as an ensemble of branches, leaves, limbs, and a trunk) appears to us *as something*, i.e. in a certain sense, a certain shape, structure or regulation (e.g., as a tree). The fact that something appears *as* something also means that it appears *not otherwise*, that is, that in and through perception, certain possibilities of experience are singled out and others are excluded.

Gurwitsch's point is that the experience of this appearance *as* something – perception – is not organized like a voluntary spotlight-kind singling out of elements in the world guided by the interested and attentional ego. Instead, as he puts it, the individual elements (branches, leaves, a trunk, limbs) of totalities we perceive (a tree) to some degree *self-organize*. As he puts it, "saliency of a group of data so that this group emerges and segregates itself from the stream is a feature not introduced into the stream, but yielded by the stream itself" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:29; original emphasis omitted). Thus, the recognition of a coherence of elements of perception as being parts of an interrelated whole is not actively and consciously directed by the ego, but by the phenomenon that appears to us. "Organization must be considered as an autochthonous feature of the stream of experience and of the experiential field in its original form" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:52). Gurwitsch illustrates this thought with well-known reversible figures such as the Necker Cube.

Fig. 1: Necker Cube (own depiction)

What Gurwitsch states in regard to these figures (other well-known reversible figures are Rubin's vase or the rabbit-duck illusion) is that they are somehow reluctant and recalcitrant to our voluntary focus of attention and mental singling-out. If, in Necker's Cube, we actively try to see, say, the bottom left corner as being in the back or alternatively in the front we are often disappointed because we are unable

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Schütz, relevance results from interests as outcomes of personal, e.g., biographical reasons. The ego actively performs controls and choices and plays a decisive role in the performance of intentional acts. According to its knowledge and motivations, the ego selects from the mass of objects in the world of everyday life those which are relevant for them. This occurs in either an intrinsic manner or in an imposed way, and the ego also interprets the actions of others in regard to possible motives attributed to them. In Gurwitsch, in contrast, relevance results from perceptual routines that have a cultural, not an individual basis (cf. Waldenfels 1983; Embree 2015; Vincini/Gallagher 2017). This debate also relates to the question of the reflectiveness of self-awareness. Henrich (1982) and Frank (2019), for example, hold in a similar stance that self-consciousness is pre-reflective, consciousness thus being more foundational than any self, or I. In their argumentation, they draw on German Idealist philosopher Fichte's claim that it is not the I which gives rise to consciousness but consciousness which gives rise to the I.

to entirely control our perception. We might sometimes be able to actively do so, but only by tricking ourselves through the manipulation of our eye direction (Einhäuser et al. 2004). Only rarely, these figures appear as an active achievement of our voluntary mental perceptual action. Much more frequently they change their configuration without our intention and will. Therefore, Gurwitsch calls their organization *autochthonous*: Perceptions are self-organizing. Gurwitsch emphasizes the autonomy and self-regulation of meaning structures and meaning processes as they appear to consciousness. He thus repudiates a monadic ego from which intentionality transpires and that focuses on the world and its objects. For Gurwitsch, the "saliency", or relevance, of a "group of data" (2010 [1964]:29) emerges from the field itself in ever recombining and shifting manners.[4] Moreover, the Necker cube, the rabbit and duck, or the vase and the faces are not perceived in a specific way according to the biographic background of the perceiver but according the perceiver being a member of a culture (of perception).

Garfinkel emphasizes this point in a lecture given in 1993 and recently published: "Gurwitsch's achievement was to provide for the appearance of the [phenomenon] as an endogenous – what he called an 'autochthonous' – achievement" (Garfinkel 2021:21). Thus, Garfinkel reconceptualizes the property of perceptual qualities as independent from the perceiving ego and calls their relevancies that Gurwitsch has called autochthonous, "endogenous" (Garfinkel 2002:176). He elaborates as follows:

> Gurwitsch's "idea was that the coherence of the object was endogenous to what he called its details, its functional significations, its perceptual units. It was found as the salience of the group of data; i.e., the coherence arose and was given in and as the stream of perception and was not needed in an exterior provision. It didn't then enter the stream of perceiving in order to provide for what the coherence was, but the coherence was already given as the kind of thing the stream consisted of" (Garfinkel 2021:21).

The expressions that Garfinkel uses here – details, functional significations, perceptual units – will become clearer in the next subsections. Garfinkel (2002:281) thus adopts Gurwitsch's perspective, agreeing that salience consists in "the endogenous coherence of a figure of organized gestalt contexture." Instead of "field of consciousness", however, he uses Merleau-Ponty's expression of "phenomenal field" (1962:52ff.) to speak of "organizational objects specified as the produced coherence of objects in phenomenal details" (Garfinkel 2021:33).

4. Against the Constancy Hypothesis

A second argument that Gurwitsch advocates in his *Field of Consciousness* is directed against the idea, included in the constancy hypothesis, of a constant mental effect and stable significance of individual perceptual units that our consciousness encounters. He illustrates his point with figures 2 and 3 below, presenting a small 'perceptual miracle' that lays the groundwork for Garfinkel's "miracle of ordinary society" as discussed below in this text. The example consists in a triple of dots in

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[4]   Gurwitsch draws on Ernst Mach's and the gestaltist concept of field where a field is characterized prominently by endogenous forces that constitute it.

the middle plus one dot to the left, positioned in a bit of a distance to the triple, and another dot to the right, equally positioned in distance to the central triple.


Fig. 2: Sequence of dots (own depiction after Gurwitsch)

Now if we take this figure and remove the two dots C and E (figure 3 below), the whole gestalt of the figure re-organizes and we again see a triple of dots which is not identical with the one of figure 2, but which, again, configures itself as such. Having no possibility of directly comparing the two figures, the differing distance between the dots of each triple becomes irrelevant.

Fig. 3: Sequence of dots re-organized (own depiction after Gurwitsch)

From this surprising small example of figural re-organization that reveals perception as situational "work", or "achievement", Gurwitsch concludes that the individual perceptual units, the parts of the whole, do not possess an intrinsic significance, but only a relational meaning that is relative to the whole.

In a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association of 1965, Garfinkel used Gurwitsch's model to criticize semiotic models of signs that assume a core signification (or proto-typical semantic meaning) of individual perceptual units (Garfinkel 1965:7-8). In his paper, Garfinkel also re-named what Gurwitsch called "perceptual units" "indexical particulars". We will explain why in the next sections.

Gurwitsch's criticism against sign-based models of communication are based on several basic thoughts. For one, constituent elements of a whole do not each possess, or carry, a meaning. A musical note, for example, "contributes towards constituting the melody as a whole, but it cannot in any sense mean the melody. When the melody is heard, there is no carrier of meaning at all" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:256). Secondly, he says, we do not need any supplementary information to see configurations as, e.g., triples or pairs. This is rather an effect of the gestalt configuration itself.

> If I hear a melody (or even an interval of two notes), if I perceive geometrical figures, compare the lengths of two lines or brightnesses of two colors – the impression of the melody, musical interval, the figure, the differences of lengths or brightnesses, all constitute an enrichment of perception which has no additional stimulus corresponding to it (Gurwitsch 2010 [1936]:10).

These arguments were levelled against contemporary gestalt theorists, but can equally be applied against Bateson's concepts of frame and meta-communication (Ruesch/Bateson 1951) that assume necessary supplementary information that produce situational frames and were a constant point of dispute between Garfinkel, who rejected them, and Goffman (1974), who used them. Let us consider Gurwitsch's argument in more detail.

5. Gestalt Contextures in Space

The configurational coherence of perceptual wholes that we have seen in figures 2 and 3 above was the reason why Gurwitsch spoke of "gestalt contextures". The concept denotes the internally composed and yet integrated character of the wholes. Gurwitsch explains the perception of collectivities such as "pairs" or "triples" drawing on Husserl's notion of "figural moments" (Husserl 1891:288ff.; Farber 1943: 46ff.):

> In speaking of the perception of a 'row of trees', a 'column of soldiers', a 'swarm of birds', etc., we render by the terms 'row,' 'column,' and 'swarm' a certain aspect, a certain characteristic property or organizational form with which the group in question presents itself in our very sense experience. Geometrical configurations, all kinds of arrangements of points and lines belong here, as well as the characteristic aspect of the chessboard pattern, the specific nature of a rhythm, a melody, etc. '*Figurale Momente' denote characters, properties, aspects of groups, and are no more and no less a matter of mere sense experience than the groups themselves and the 'elements' of which the groups consist.* Among such group aspects there must also be reckoned – deserving special attention in the present context – the perceptual feature of qualitative homogeneity. We see at a glance 'a heap of apples' or 'a heap of nuts' (Gurwitsch 2010 [1949]:406; original emphasis).

Gurwitsch's theory of contextural gestalt perception encompasses three parts, metaphorized by a circle:

> The theme with which we are dealing occupies the center of this circle, it stands in the thematic-field, which – to abide by the metaphor – forms the area of the circle; and around the thematic-field, at the periphery as it were, the objects of marginal consciousness are arranged (2010 [1929]:296).

The *theme* is organized by the "saliency of a group of data" (2010 [1964]:29), producing an internal *gestalt coherence*, where each component is interdependent with all other components and possesses a "functional significance" for the whole.

Here is a typical figure that Gurwitsch used to illustrate his ideas about gestalt perception: A pair of dots which are in a mutual relationship of left or right, above or below, far or near.

Fig. 4: Three pairs of dots (own depiction after Gurwitsch)

We see three pairs of dots which are positioned in different distances to one another. Closest is the pair on the upper right, the farthest away from one another is the pair on the upper left. As Gurwitsch says, "the terms 'neighborhood', 'relative proximity', 'moderate proximity', 'immediate surroundings', 'wider surroundings', 'close by',

'next to' and others designate phenomenological qualities and not distances in a merely quantitative sense" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1955]:218-219). However, even the apparent great distance between two dots of a pair does yield to the perception of proximity, if the distance to the other pairs of the whole is taken into consideration.

Fig. 5: Gestalt contexture and "details" of one of three pairs of dots
(own depiction after Gurwitsch)

Each of the pairs has a left and a right member. But the left member is only left within the constellation of the pair itself, not in absolute terms. Equally, the right member is only right to the left pair member, not in regard to, e.g., the other pair top right of the figure. If we would add one dot to the pair top left, e.g., to the left of the pair, the dot that is currently left would become a middle dot of a triple, and the whole gestalt would re-configure. Thus, what we have here, says Gurwitsch, is an indexing structure, in which the individual dots do not possess an intrinsic but a context-dependent, functional significance, a positional index, which only holds for the internal gestalt structure of the pair. It is an indexical structure "from within". It is the internal *constellation*, the gestalt contexture, that produces meaning, not the aggregation of individual intrinsically meaningful elements. Each dot, we might say, "incarnates" and at the same time "reflects" its role within the gestalt (here: the pair).

This finding by Gurwitsch was an inspiration for Garfinkel's thoughts about indexicality as we know from several published and unpublished texts and papers from the early 1960s. Again, like in the Necker cube, these relations are not subjectively imposed on primarily unordered data, but inherent in the perceptual field as it constitutes itself in the observer (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:26).

We said that the individual dots do not possess an intrinsic but a context-dependent, functional significance. However, the context upon which the functional significance of each individual dot depends – the pair – is not external to the individual dots, but produced by these dots themselves (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:331). Details, totality, and context mutually constitute one another. This is what Gurwitsch calls the thematic field. The *thematic field* is the context that acquires unity by its *relevancy* for the theme.

According to Gurwitsch, each element possesses a "positional index" which establishes and appresents a specific thematic field as its context that makes it understandable.[5] In his lecture on Gurwitsch of 1993, Garfinkel calls Gurwitsch' "functional significance" "organizational" or "figurative details" (Garfinkel 2021:25). Consistent with Gurwitsch, these details, as Garfinkel put it (e.g., 1967a:40), mutually point to, and elaborate, one another, thus establishing the "essential indexicality" (e.g., 2007:43ff.) of, in his case, social phenomena.

E.g., pair top left = thematic field

E.g. left pair
member
= theme

Fig. 6: Thematic field (own depiction after Gurwitsch)

We have had three pairs in our figure 4, which constitute three thematic fields if we focus on one of the dot pair members as a theme. The pair is then the thematic field, or context, from which we consider the dots as right and left pair members which constitute together their own context as a pair. Alternatively, we can focus on the three pairs in the figure as themes and their configuration as thematic field. Then, the indexical structure goes between the pairs: We have one pair in the upper left, one in the uper right and one in the bottom center of the figure. We can say, for example, that the pair in the upper right is the one with the smallest distance between its dots. This is equally a relational statement which is true only for the internal structure of the figure. If we attempt at replacing the relational linguistic expressions for the internal structure of the figure with objective expressions, we "lose the phenomenon", as Garfinkel (2007a:31) says. Thus, Garfinkel shares Gurwitsch's judgment that the index of a theme as it is often expressed in "occasional expressions" is irreducible to "objective expressions" that – at first sight – might be able to replace them. The reason for this is that they would destroy the inextricable here-and-now-ness of the situation of perception of a specific configuration that might change at any moment and create a new one of which they are part.

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5   Gurwitsch refers to Husserl's concept of index that he uses to make clear that in phenomenological reduction "that which is parenthesized is not erased from the phenomenological blackboard but only parenthesized, and thereby provided with an index" (Husserl 1983 [1913]:171).

E.g., pair top left = theme

(Top left only in relation to pairs
top right and bottom center)

Functional significance / Positional Index
(Indexicality)

(Greater distance between dots)

(Smaller distance between dots

Fig. 7: Theme-thematic field relation of different scales
(own depiction after Gurwitsch)

Finally, the three pairs of dot figures can also become our theme, for example, if we consider its limits on this page. We could compare several figures with different configurations of dot pairs or other details on it.

Gurwitsch at this point has distinguished a third dimension of perception which he calls the "margin" and which is the unthematic background of perception and experience. It encompasses not currently relevant dimensions such as background noises, time, or our bodies as media of perception.

Side edges of figure = thematic field

E.g. three pairs of dots
= theme (group of data)

Margin

Fig. 8: Theme, thematic field, and margin
(own depiction after Gurwitsch)

For Gurwitsch, the thematic field is not a clear-cut dimension, but a field in which its theme can be contextualized with different possible references. Through indexical references it spreads "indefinitely" into domains of "ever fading clarity" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:369-371).

Fig. 9: Thematic field of ever fading clarity
(own depiction after Gurwitsch)

However, the picture – and with it all the examples above – is misleading because it does not take into consideration the temporal dimension of ever-changing contextures. Garfinkel (2021:26-27) criticized this type of examples for presupposing a "transcendental perceiver" who is in the position of observing from the outside a stable, non-temporal world of objects. Gurwitsch was aware of this problem and situated his examples also in time, drawing on the example of music.

6. Gestalt Contextures in Time

Gurwitsch never intended to develop his theory of "gestalt contexture" only on the example of visual gestalts, but also situated it in time. Both visual perceptions in space and auditory perceptions in time, he says,

> are but specifications of one and the same fundamental structure, namely, the equilibrated coexistence of mutually dependent constituents. Each of these constituents exists in the very qualifications by which it is defined and made to be that which it is in a given case, only in conjunction with, and as determined by, co-constituents (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:135).

Defining a gestalt contexture as consisting of "a plurality of constituents, each one of which is qualified and made to be what it is by its relation to, and significance for, the other constituents", he applies the definition to melodic gestalts in the same way as he did with visual gestalts:

> Each of its notes has a certain musical function and significance within the melodic contexture; it has its functional significance with regard to the other notes of the melody. When, objectively speaking, an identical note appears in different melodies, it can obviously not have the same functional significance in all of them. The note, because of its being qualified by its functional significance, can by no means preserve its functional identity when it is made to belong to different melodic contextures (Gurwitsch 2009 [1965]:403; cf. Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:114).

This implies that "no constituent of a Gestalt-contexture is determined by properties which it has in its own right, which belong to it per se, regardless of the contexture into which it is inserted, i.e., of the other constituents of that very contexture" (Gurwitsch 2009 [1965]:403). The relation between the constituents is mutual:

> As each note of the melody has its functional significance with regard to the other notes, and may in this sense be said to derive it from them, so it confers, in turn, their functional significances on the other notes. It is this strict reciprocity between the constituents, in their mutually determining and qualifying each other, that is denoted by the term Gestalt-coherence as descriptive of that specific kind of structural organization (Gurwitsch 2009 [1965]:403).

The consequence is that, also temporally, "every part actualizes the whole, whose part it is, at its place and in the manner which corresponds to its functional significance" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1959]:386).

Fig. 10: Excerpt from Chopin's Waltz in A minor (B 150) (own depiction)

In the example above, we see a small portion of a chord, or melody, which, in contrast to the pairs of dots above, is not organized spatially but sequentially. Each tone has a tone that precedes it and that we have already experienced, and one that we can expect to succeeding it, an expectable next.[6] Each tone indexes the chord, or melody, as a whole as its thematic field. The immediate thematic field consists of three tones: the actual (experienced in the mode of "presentation"), the precedent ("retention"), and the one that is expected to follow ("protention"), while the wider thematic field includes the melody played so far as a whole, which we remember, and the rest of the play that we can anticipate based on our membership in a culture, or when we already know the particular melody. The melody thus appears as a succession of notes, each one of which is respectively qualified by all of its predecessors with ever fading clarity (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:251). If a significant part of the melody has already been played, so that its general "trend" is established, a "condition is imposed upon its continuation" (Gurwitsch 2009 [1965]:403). The continuation of the melody is not determined in an unequivocal manner, but must be in conformity with the trend established so far. Otherwise, the melody appears as marred and its soundness is violated (Gurwitsch 2009 [1965]:403-404).

However, in contrast to visual images in space, in the case of music we witness "mutual penetration, an interconnection and organization of elements," says Gurwitsch. Since they are ordered sequentially, the elements receive a certain "coloration", a reverberation, from their "surrounding milieu" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]: 137). In the process, each individual tone is "absorbed and qualified by the musical contexture" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:114). This is what functional significance and

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6   I leave out here the undertones which, for a complete picture, should be included as well.

gestalt-coherence mean in the case of music (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]: 137). In other words, preceding notes "intervene" in the present note in that the present note is essentially characterized by references to preceding notes. Even more, the note exists as that which is experienced only by virtue of those references. From Gurwitsch's point of view, therefore, the present note would not be what it is, had it been preceded by different notes (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:138-139). For example, a note following another from which it is indistinguishable, appears as a repetition of the first note. In this case, we are confronted with a "level-experience" since "with the second note we remain on the same tonal level as with the first" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:121). When, instead, a higher note is presented after a lower one from which it can be distinguished, there is another experience of an elementary musical contexture: The experience is one of an ascending movement (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:122). And thus, the melody as a gestalt contexture moves through time. Each preceding tone, or preceding chord, constitutes the context (thematic field) for each next tone.

Fig. 11: Theme and thematic field in time I (own depiction after Gurwitsch)

Fig. 12: Theme and thematic field in time II (own depiction after Gurwitsch)

Thus, for Gurwitsch, the unity of the melody as a whole is grounded in relationships of mutual foundation between the elements (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:80). Gestalt perception depends upon the sequentiality of the melody.

At this point, the gestalt laws of closure and of good continuation are of particular importance. The effectiveness of good continuation "appears most clearly in

cases of incompleted Gestalt-contextures when, for example, a sentence or a melody is broken off before it is finished" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:146). Incompleteness is, Gurwitsch says, "a phenomenal feature of experience. The fragment of the sentence or of the melody appears as incomplete; it is experienced as demanding conformable continuation" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:146). When a wrong note is played or when a correct note is unduly prolonged, in turn, we experience "marredness":

> Marredness (…) is the experience of the present auditory datum as not fitting into the trend of the melody, as the melody has thus far developed. To account for marredness, one must allow for the part of the melody which precedes the critical note demanding to be continued in a specific manner at the place in question and for the fact that the actually resounding note does not satisfy those demands. Marredness thus is an experience of unfulfillment of the demands which, incidentally, grow more specific the closer the melody is to completion. We are thus again referred to the law of good continuation, continuation in conformity with the trend of the process thus far established (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:252-253).

Gurwitsch analyses the constituent components, the details, of a melody even further than on the level of tones. Among the determining components are "figural subfactors": one temporal subfactor pertaining to rhythm and two tonal subfactors referring to pitches and to intensity (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:74). These subfactors, for Gurwitsch, depend upon the properties of the notes and their mutual relations and can thus only be perceived relationally.

Thus, in music, we are dealing with a dynamic, ever-changing gestalt contexture that constitutes itself anew in each moment of our experience. As is the case with the dot examples, individual sense-data do not possess stable core meanings, but interact with their immediate context that they themselves produce. This context is sequential, and notes, or tones, are parts of melodies, or chords, which are wholes. If the context changes, the meaning of the individual sense-data changes as well.

In his early dissertation projects, on "the Jew as social object" Garfinkel (1948:2) planned to elucidate on the basis of Gurwitsch's philosophy "how a common world of objects of action becomes constituted, maintained, and changed." In some of his proposals, Garfinkel even uses Gurwitsch's musical metaphor itself to explain the design of his study. He intended to provide for "experimental conditions under which the same 'note' would be played in a different 'chord'" (Turowetz/Rawls 2021:10) so that "Jews" were constituted and experienced differently as objects of treatment.

Differences in the chords and notes played in Garfinkel's project are a result of different forms of treatment of the social object "Jew" in American society. These different forms of treatment are dependent upon whether the co-participants are Jewish themselves or not, i.e., whether they are members of a particular "culture of treatment" that is constitutive of their understanding of the situation. Here, an experience of marredness might occur as well: when the co-interactants play different notes and chords than expected and treat the social objects relevant for the situation in a different manner.

In conversational interaction, which has become the focus of ethnomethodological conversation analysis, the notes and chords played consist in verbal utterances and sequences. While some of the words used in these utterances might indeed carry some intrinsic core meaning, they are in this respect not unlike notes that possess

only relational meaning; the meanings of words, too, are dependent upon their immediate contexts, unfold incrementally in the course of a conversation, and constantly produce expectations as well as anticipations of expectations in regard to possible "nexts". Moreover, conversation analysis has particularly dealt (and still deals) with procedural dimensions of conversational interaction such as turn construction and transition as well as with the relational and highly indexical verbal material such as the *wells, ohs* and *sos* or the *uhms* and *mhms* of conversational interaction that are highly context-dependent and yet essential for the creation of a joint situational reality.

7. Methodological Consequences for Video-Based Interaction Research

Gurwitsch (2010 [1964]:251; original emphasis) emphasizes that, concerning its temporal configuration, it would be wrong to assume that a melody was "*being,* at every moment, *at a certain note"*. This would be as wrong as a description of motion in which the moving body is assumed "*to be,* at every moment, *at a certain position"* and, "on account of the dispositions left by the perceptions of its previous positions, to exhibit, at the position in question, a certain specific property, namely, velocity" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:251-252; original emphasis). Instead, a moving body, for example, must be considered "as *passing through* its various positions", Gurwitsch says, and correspondingly, a melody has to be characterized "as *passing through* the notes of which it consists" (Gurwitsch 2010 [1964]:252, original emphases).

For the same theoretical reasons, Merleau-Ponty, in his text *Eye and Mind* (1964 [1961]) criticizes Jules-Etienne Marey's chronophotography as methodological tool to investigate movement (cf. Alloa 2013 for the discussion of Merleau-Ponty in this section). Merleau-Ponty says that when snapshots dissect living movements into individual positions,

> the instantaneous glimpses, the unstable attitudes, petrify the movement, as is shown by so many photographs in which an athlete-in-motion is forever frozen. We could not thaw him out by multiplying the glimpses. Marey's photographs, the cubists' analyses, Duchamp's *La Mariée* do not move; they give a Zenonian reverie on movement. We see a rigid body as if it were a piece of armor going through its motions; it is here and it is there, magically, but it does not *go* from here to there (Merleau-Ponty 1964 [1961]:185).

Marey's dissection of movement into individual stills suggests that the moving, living being takes up one discrete position after the other. What occurs in reality is that the gaze of the observer and the motion of the moving being merge in co-movement:

> The something in transit which we have recognized as necessary to the constitution of a change is to be defined only in terms of the particular manner of its 'passing'. For example, the bird which flies across my garden is, during the time that it is moving, merely a greyish power of flight and, generally speaking, we shall see that things are defined primarily in terms of their 'behaviour' and not in terms of their static 'properties'. It is not I who recognize, in each of the points and instants passed through, the same bird defined by explicit characteristics, it is the bird in flight which constitutes the unity of its movement, which changes its place, it is this flurry of

plumage still here, which is already there in a kind of ubiquity, like the comet with its tail (Merleau-Ponty 1962:275).

Thus, Merleau-Ponty criticizes conceptualizations of temporally organized, sequential events as frozen instant-like data and not as a process that continuously "keeps going". Furthermore, movements are bodily accomplishment that possess vectorial qualities: "The passage of one present to the next is not a thing which I conceive, nor do I see it as an onlooker, I effect it; I am already at the impending present as my gesture is already at its goal, I am myself time, a time which 'abides' and does not 'flow' or 'change'" (Merleau-Ponty 1962:421).

For Merleau-Ponty, a better representation of lived movement than photography is provided by painting or sculpture, where not a dissection of movement into individual positions occurs but, ideally, the compression of longer moments of movement into one condensed vectorial gestalt, of the temporal ubiquity of the moving body, is achieved (Merleau-Ponty 1964 [1961]:184). In his text, Merleau-Ponty mentions Rodin's sculptures as well as Giacometti's "walking man", as examples:

> The only successful instantaneous glimpses of movement are those which approach this paradoxical arrangement – when, for example, a walking man is taken at the moment when both his feet are touching the ground; for then we almost have the temporal ubiquity of the body which brings it about that the man *bestrides* space (Merleau-Ponty 1964 [1961]:185).

Thus, with Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, the adequate analysis of the inescapable progressivity of movement and of the sequentiality of interaction would be one which preserves the fleetingness of the (subjective or objective) experience of movement, in particular, the impending trend of the movement invested in its presence. Current video-based ethnomethodological and ethnomethodologically inspired studies of social interaction deal with this theoretical problem in different ways and to different degrees: Some of them, at least in printed publications, dissect movements in individual stills, thus valuing the advantage of recreating the public visibility of the social higher than the disadvantage of neglecting the experiential, subjective dimension of its co-participants. For Merleau-Ponty's individualistic account of kinesthesia (movement experience) precisely misses the micro-responsiveness and artful coordination of movements in interaction that stills are able to render visible. Other studies meet the requirement of a methodical orientation at the fleetingness of the movement experience at the expense of a fine-grained reconstruction of the public properties of incremental co-responsive interactional sequences.

Garfinkel's own notion of "the unavoidable temporal in-courseness of a doing" (2021:30) is consistent with Gurwitsch's and Merleau-Ponty's position in regard to the situation of the co-participants who find themselves involved in an inescapable pressure for action and confronted with the permanent "practical question *par excellence*: 'What to do next?'" (Garfinkel 1967a:12). However, Garfinkel was equally interested in the publicly observable dimension of social objects as interactionally produced and co-emergent, practical accomplishments of co-participants in a setting. Thus, from an ethnomethodological perspective, methodological solutions for dealing with the fleetingness of movements can vary situationally according to the researcher's goals and the specifications of the object of interest. In this respect, Garfinkel also introduces the notion of "probativeness of a group of data" as "endogenous smooth, uninterrupted, accountable sequence from beginning to end,

pointing to its terminal availability, and terminally available finally as an instructably observable sequence" (2021:31). In the quote cited initially, Garfinkel characterizes social objects – Durkheimian Things – as "accountable analytic units composed endogenously, in-and-as-of-their-lived-temporal-in-course sequentiality, in-vivo, local historicities" and as "'strings' of coherent contextural constituents of lived orderlinesses in practices of ordinary society" (Garfinkel 2007a:42). All these ever changing, endogenously composed analytic units are precisely not decomposable into individual frozen moments, since their "lived-temporal-in-course sequentiality" is one of their essential features.

8. What did Garfinkel do with Gurwitsch's theory?

Garfinkel and Livingston (2003:26) stress that in social life, "Gurwitschian contexturally coherent Things are massively prevalent, recurrent, each in coherent witnessed details that are seen but unnoticed, an elephant in the kitchen." Garfinkel also emphasizes that in the realm of the social, these contexturally coherent Things are way more complex than in the gestalt experiments that Gurwitsch drew on. In the realm of social objects, what phenomenology calls "intentionality" (Gurwitsch 1940), i.e. "the work of looking, searching, scanning" is not only an "attainment" achieved by non-egological consciousness (Garfinkel 1966b:23). Instead, the "produced coherence of organizational objects" (2021:30) is *interactionally* and *practically* "achieved". In his "Field of Consciousness", Gurwitsch talked about perceptual objects in the world, either stable visual objects or sequential auditory objects. Both forms are present in the external world, in relation to which the perceiving person acts as disengaged observer "from nowhere". Garfinkel, in contrast to Gurwitsch, was interested in social objects. The objects of sociology are constituted by ever changing "actions and practices" (2021:21). The most important characteristic of social objects is therefore that they are not only perceived, but also, and often simultaneously, produced, and, even more so, produced for being perceived. They are produced for being perceived not in a Goffmanian sense of self-presentation, impression management, and facework but in an ethnomethodological sense, which assumes the identity between practices of organizing everyday affairs and procedures that make these practices understandable and accountable (Garfinkel 1967a:1; also see below). Social objects are produced in interaction right from the start to be witnessable, observable-reportable, through practices and in an embodied, "incarnate" and "reflexive" manner (1967a:1). In their quality as being achieved or "produced" in interaction, phenomenal fields feature an "in-courseness" (Garfinkel 2021:30): Different from Gurwitsch's examples, "gestalt contextures" in the realm of the social, are necessarily dynamic, temporal, and unfolding, and therefore ever-evanescent, they can never be returned to (Garfinkel 2021:26-27). In other words: In contrast to the philosopher, the sociologist cannot act as "transcendental perceiver" of stable objects, even though some might act as if (Garfinkel 2021:27, 29).

8.1. Durkheim's Aphorism

Being concerned with social objects, Garfinkel re-interprets Durkheim's famous dictum that, as sociologists, "our fundamental principle [is] the objective reality of social facts" (Durkheim 1938:lvii). It is the production and "producedness" or "achievedness "of social objects as social facts that Garfinkel is interested in and that he intends to clarify, drawing on Gurwitsch.

As sociologists, in contrast to Gurwitsch, however, he says, "what we needed to have is not only the detail in the generality of the phenomenon found in actual lived service lines and traffic jams as well as in pictured figures. What we needed to have as sociologists and anthropologists and social analysts, who needed to be concerned with every imaginable sort of orderliness in and as of accountably produced social facts of familiar society, were the gestalt properties of social facts" (Garfinkel 2007b:18). So, ethnomethodology is particularly concerned with the "gestalt properties of social facts" which are ongoingly and procedurally achieved by members in time. Instead of stable perceptual objects, ethnomethodology, says Garfinkel (2007b:28), studies how members of any collectivity "competently organize their daily work activities in real time and in detail" (Burns 2000:10, quoted in Garfinkel 2007b:28). It investigates how they are "progressively and developingly coming upon the phenomenon via the work in, as, and of the unmediated, immediately and directly observed phenomenal field details of producing it" (Garfinkel 1996:10 n.11, quoted in Burns 2000:10, quoted in Garfinkel 2007b:28). This, says Garfinkel, is "the successful ethnomethodological leap from the coherence of line drawings to the coherence of social facts" (Garfinkel 2007b:28).

On this basis, Garfinkel takes up Durkheim's dictum, which he calls an "aphorism": "The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle" (Garfinkel 2002:65). For Garfinkel, it is clear that this is not (only) a methodological principle, but actually the object of research of sociology, its fundamental phenomenon. Thus, he re-formulates: "The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental *phenomenon*" (Garfinkel 2002:66; original emphasis). The enigma of the social consists in the hidden machinery (or transformative miracle) of ordinary society that social objects that – as we have seen – are actually *produced* by the parties in a setting are *experienced* by them as external, objective reality. This machinery (or miracle) can be explained by Gurwitsch's non-egological conception of consciousness along with Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" and Merleau-Ponty's "préjugé du monde" that Garfinkel equally refers to in his work (e.g., 1967a:182; Garfinkel 1966a, 1966b). For the machinery (miracle) to work, there must be "steps whereby the society hides from its members its activities of organization and thus leads them to see its features as determinate and independent objects" (Garfinkel 1967a:182), and ethnomethodology is precisely interested in those. In fact, any "practical accomplishment consists in the work whereby a setting, in the same ways that it consists of a recognized and familiar organization of activities, masks from members' relevant notice members' practical ordering practices, and thereby leads the members to see a setting's features, which include a setting's accounts, 'as determinate and independent objects'" (Garfinkel 1967a: 288).

8.2. Mutual Constitution of Details and Context

The machinery (miracle) of ordinary society that social objects are produced "from within", but experienced as external by members is rooted in the mutual constitution between the details of a social object and their context. With Gurwitsch, context is viewed by Garfinkel as a "locally occasioned, instructably achieved, repeatedly and collaboratively achieved and achievable local phenomenon" (2002:129). Actions and utterances give sense to the context and obtain sense from it, in exactly the same way that a part of a gestalt (e.g., the left-hand member of a pair of dots) obtains its sense (as a left-hand member) by its perceived relationship to the other members of the figure (e.g., right-hand member) while giving those other members their sense through their relation to them as thematic field and context. Garfinkel again transfers this perspective to the constitutive properties of social actions, practices, and events. As he says, "particulars in procedures (…) furnish to members perspicuous exhibits of vaguely known 'settings'" (Garfinkel/Sacks 1970:360). The concept of "setting", they say (1970:360, n. 29), is borrowed from remarks made by Hubert Dreyfus in 1968. At this time, Dreyfus worked on his book *What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence* (1972), where he affirmatively quotes Katz and Fodor's post-Chomskyan theory of semantics (1972:128-130), in which the concept of "setting" is defined congenially to ethnomethodology: "The setting of an occurrence of a sentence is (..) the written or spoken discourse of which the occurrence is a part" (Katz/Fodor 1964:490).

This mutually constitutive relationship between details (utterances, themes) and context (setting, thematic field) is also the reason why Garfinkel formulates in his "identity theorem" that, in regard to social objects, "phenomena of order are identical with procedures for their endogenous production and accountability" (Garfinkel 2002:72). Or, in an earlier version that uses the concept of accountability that we will come to in a moment, "organized everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making those settings 'account-able'" (Garfinkel 1967a:1).

Garfinkel's "identity theorem" reformulates, and elaborates, Gurwitsch's theme-thematic field relation. Gurwitsch views "the object as the correlate of a group of acts corresponding to it" and considers "that group of acts as the equivalent of consciousness of the object" (Gurwitsch 2009 [1937]:309-10). Garfinkel locates this principle of equivalence not between object and acts of consciousness but between social order and everyday social actions.

8.3. Indexical Particulars of Gestalt Contextures

The mutual relationship between social action and social order is *indexical*, similar to the relationship of functional significance between the "indexical particulars" (Garfinkel 1965) of a gestalt contexture. In the realm of the social, constituents of action and practice as themes index possible contexts as their thematic fields, and these latter index actions and practices as their typical details. Furthermore, since gestalt contextures operate in time, they index possible, expectable nexts. What happens in this process of indexicality, says Garfinkel (1966a:13-14; 1967a:182), can be understood drawing on the concept of appresentation established in phenomenological philosophy. By appresentation, present elements of gestalt contextures make absent elements co-present:

> For example, when I perceive an object, such as a house from the front, the back is involved in this perception not merely as a possible perception which I judge could be produced if I walked around the house, nor as a necessary implication of the concept 'house.' Instead, the back is experienced as actually co-present – concealed but suggested by the appearance of the front. Philosophers of ordinary language such as Gilbert Ryle have made a similar point by noting that under ordinary conditions we do not say that we see the front of a house but say that we see a house from the front. Both Merleau-Ponty and the Oxford philosophers would go on from such considerations to suggest there is something wrong with the traditional view that we experience 'sense data' – isolated units of experience, which must then be organized by the mind (Dreyfus/Dreyfus 1964:xi).

Thus, themes appresent thematic fields as their contexts, thematic fields appresent themes as their typical details. And, since gestalt contextures operate in time, they appresent possible, expectable nexts.

It is in this theoretical context that Garfinkel reinterprets what Mannheim has called the "documentary method of interpretation" with Gurwitsch as a members' practice by which social order (resp. structures) and social action are mutually constituted and mutually indexical in a theme-thematic-field relation:

> The [documentary] method consists of treating an actual appearance as 'the document of,' as 'pointing to,' as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other (Garfinkel 1967a:78).

Ethnomethodological research has by now analyzed a great number of possible appresentational and indexical gestalt contextures in social life. Not only have indexicalities obtaining between gestalt details and gestalt contextures been investigated; the sequential relations between pair members in regard to expectable nexts resulting from firsts was also studied. A powerful example for research on appresented and functionally indexed nexts, or next pair members, within the gestalt contexture of a social object is the "adjacency pair" of Conversation Analysis.

In his characterization of the adjacency pair, Schegloff (2007:13) says, that "the components of an adjacency pair are pair-type related; that is, not every second pair part can properly follow any first pair part." Only when both pair members adopt a "functional significance" in relation to one another the pair is actually established as pair – and only then a felicitous gestalt contexture for good continuation is realized. Adjacency pair organization, as Schegloff (2007:16; original emphasis) says, is a "powerful *prospective* operation": A first pair part "projects a prospective relevance", making relevant "a limited set of possible second pair parts, and thereby sets some of the terms by which a next turn will be understood" (Schegloff 2007:16).

The components of adjacency pairs, says Schegloff (2007:13-14), are typologized into first and second pair parts (what Gurwitsch calls "themes" and Garfinkel calls "details" or "indexical particulars") that relate to the pair types which they compose (what Gurwitsch calls "thematic field" and Garfinkel calls "context"). Examples for adjacency pairs provided by Schegloff (2007:14) are: "greeting–greeting ("Hello," "Hi"), question–answer ("Do you know what time it is?", "Four o'clock"),

offer–accept/decline ("Would you like a cup of coffee?", "No, thanks," if it is declined)." "Nextness" (Schegloff 2007:14) along with "conditional relevance" (Schegloff 1968:1085) is produced by the expectability of an adequate second pair part after a first pair part was provided. When a first pair part has been provided and a second pair part is being withheld, however, it becomes "noticeably absent" (Sacks 1992:293-94). The lack of "good continuation" entails considerable social consequences such as possible conflicts and reconfigurations of social relations. Furthermore, the "relationship of adjacency or 'nextness' between turns is central to the ways in which talk-in-interaction is organized and understood. Next turns are understood by co-participants to display their speaker's understanding of the just-prior turn and to embody an action responsive to the just-prior turn so understood (unless the turn has been marked as addressing something other than just-prior turn)" (Schegloff 2007:15). Thus, the procedural organization of intersubjectivity here becomes dependent upon the practical, sequential organization of gestalt contextures by parties in a setting.

The similarities of the conversation analytic adjacency pair theorem with Gurwitsch's gestalt phenomenology and Garfinkel's elaboration of the same are obvious.

A second example of the ethnomethodological application of the idea of a gestalt contexture of social objects is Membership Categorization Analysis. Harvey Sacks (1972) has developed this approach on the example of a child's utterance saying "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up." The fact that we commonly understand this utterance as "the baby cried, *therefore its* mommy picked it up" is based upon an "apparatus" (or a machinery, or the miracle of ordinary society, see above and below) that secures "that any activities, which members do in such a way as to be recognizable as such to members, are done, and done recognizably" (1972:332). One element of this apparatus is the "membership categorization device" that refers to the finding that membership categories belong to collections that provide rules for how to apply and hear them. Baby and mommy are items of a collection that can be characterized as "core family" or "parent-child". Now, individual roles within this collection are relational, adopting, as Gurwitsch would say, a "functional significance" towards one another. If we think of "baby", the way to "mommy" or "daddy" is short, the first pair member "baby" evoking the second pair member "mommy" or "daddy" (within a thematic field of "core family"). This is what Sacks calls a "standardized relational pair". In particular, an absence becomes relevant in these terms, contradicting the "gestalt closure": When the "baby" cries and no one picks it up, then where are its "mommy" and "daddy"?

Therefore, not only "standardized relational pairs" are relevant for our understanding of the utterance, but also typical activities that we relate to the relevant categories. These are called "category bound activities" by Sacks. "Crying" and "picking up" are typical activities of the membership categories "baby" and "mommy" respectively. In Gurwitsch's terms, we can see how social roles and categories imply (or appresent) activities as their thematic fields, and activities imply (appresent) social roles and categories as theirs, so that the categories themselves need not always be actually used. In other words, one pair member makes the other relevant, because they possess a "positional index" and a "functional significance" in relation to one another. Interestingly, the appresentation does not need to be related to actor categories as its themes, it can also refer to actions or practices. Thus,

Gurwitsch's pairs of dots (or notes in melodies) can, when transferred to the realm of the social, be applied to the whole spectrum of social objects possible: utterances, practices, actions, roles, persons, and others.

In fact, Garfinkel himself, in his *Studies in Ethnomethodology* and elsewhere, has also explored a broad range of studies and examples of how themes (details) appresent other themes (details) sequentially or appresent possible thematic fields (contexts) of ever fading clarity that make them understandable inferentially. For example, he showed how professional activities in the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center and the Center itself as a social organization mutually elaborated one another as a theme-thematic field contexture (1967a:chapter 1; 1967b). He demonstrated that, and how, the work of jurors and the imaginations these jurors had of what it meant to be, and act in the "fashion" of, a good juror mutually co-constitute one another (1967a:chapter 4). Garfinkel also revealed how the implicitly assumed binary gender structure makes occurrences of doings and sayings explainable, and how these doings and sayings can be manipulated in order to suggest a particular gender structure (1967a: chapter 5). He explored how practices of coding by sociology students presuppose common sense knowledge of social structure, while social structure is then, as a result, presented as having been "discovered" by these very procedures (1967a:chapter 7). As early as in the 1950s, Garfinkel became interested in "commonsense knowledge of social structure" as an example for the mutual relationship between, and the mechanisms of co-constitution of, social action and social order (Garfinkel 1959; Garfinkel 1967a:chapter 3). Traditionally, Garfinkel used the example of queuing to demonstrate how queuing activities produce the phenomenon that they assume to be part of (2002:chapter 8; Garfinkel/Livingston 2003). This list could easily be extended. Garfinkel's general interest was how members of gestalt contextures produce these contextures as collectivities (e.g., society), while the latter endow the former with meaning in the here-and-now of the temporally situated gestalt contexture.

What is common to all these topics is that a social object is constituted by appresenting through the visible an invisible phenomenon, possibly in fading clarity, that makes it reportable, supplements, complements or contextualizes it, or that consists in an expectable next, thus, again, working out "the practical question *par excellence:* 'What to do next?'" (Garfinkel 1967a:12). Garfinkel (1965) was thus interested in "organized activities as methods for making an invisible world observable", being aware that, "in the conduct of his everyday affairs in order for the person to treat rationally the [visible] one-tenth of this situation that, like an iceberg appears above the water, he must be able to treat the [invisible] nine-tenths that lies below as an unquestioned and, perhaps even more interestingly, as an unquestionable background of matters that are demonstrably relevant to his calculation, but which appear without even being noticed" (Garfinkel 1967a:173).

8.4. "From Within" and "From Without"

The fact that gestalt contextures and their details configure themselves constantly anew through processes of good continuation and closure implies methodologically, as Garfinkel (2002:279) says, that the coherence of figural contextures escapes any attempt of formal description 'from without'. The organizational details

of phenomenal fields inescapably include indexical particularities and even expressions that achieve their sense only within a specific here-and-now. Following a suggestion of Gurwitsch (Garfinkel in Hill/Crittenden 1968:206-207), Garfinkel therefore suggests to make use of the "naturally accountable orderliness" and the "mundane character of accounts" that are constitutive parts of the indexicality of actions, as members render their production of social facts witnessable and instructably observable to each other (Garfinkel/Livingston 2003). Therefore, persons in the management of their ordinary affairs, first, treat accounts as being of the same order of activity as the order of properties that the account reports, and, secondly, make use of the reflexive features of accounts to accomplish or to recognize the features of those affairs as organized matters. Since they are public from the start, accounts embedded in activities can be ethnographically observed and described, representing the perspective 'from within'.

Accounts, just as glosses or descriptions, are genuine parts of a setting. In Gurwitsch's terms: Part of the themes that range within thematic fields are verbalizations, reports, or stories about the themes and thematic fields. They are not produced from the outside but are, as verbal activities, intrinsic and constituent practices to accomplish the settings they gloss, describe, and account. Therefore, ethnomethodology is interested in all kinds of "this-worldly settings wherein order productive parties so collaborate as to exhibit 'just what a social fact is that makes it accountably just that' – the exhibited order of service in supermarkets, the concerted freeway slowing together", etc. (Garfinkel 2002:250).

However, accounts do not necessarily have to be realized verbally. Rather, as intrinsic components of each setting as a gestalt contexture, they are carried along in each situation as a potential. The reason for this is that these situations as endogenously achieved situations appear as external, objective, natural situations that could, if necessary, easily be reported, talked about, analyzed, and represented (cf. Garfinkel 1967a:33, 34). This is why Garfinkel (2002:175-177) calls their type of accountability "natural accountability" as opposed to "classical accountability", which is effective in, e.g., professional activities that have to prove their professionalism or methodological rigor towards an institution or public.

Naturally accountable, say Garfinkel and Livingston, means "*made ethnomethodologically recognizable in Aron Gurwitsch's (1964) autochthonous gestalt organization details*" (2003:27; original emphasis); it relates to the gestalt contexture of social objects as endogenously achieved through details. These details – in and as of social, Durkheimian things – can alternatively be called: "phenomenal field properties"; "oriented objects" [objects that are in concert embodiedly "oriented to"]; "social facts displayed in proper temporal orders of details" and else (Garfinkel/Livingston 2003:27).

The important point is thus that verbal activities including accounts, glosses, or descriptions are intrinsic and constituent parts of the social objects that they describe, gloss, and account (for). They do not originate "from without", as by an external observer from nowhere, but "from within" the setting they describe, gloss, and account (for). Each detail of a gestalt contexture simultaneously "embodies" (or "incarnates") and "reflects" the gestalt contexture as a whole. Garfinkel thus also speaks of the "'reflexive', or 'incarnate' character of accounting practices and accounts" (1967a:1). "Reflexivity", as a central ethnomethodological theorem, denotes this fact that accounts and accounting practices are always part of what they

account – verbally or practically. They are themselves "events in and whereby they also make those events, say, recognizable, rationally accountable" (Garfinkel 1966b:24). Therefore, the "reflexivity of descriptions is a collecting gloss for the innumerable ways in which descriptions can be part of what they describe: the reflexivity of questions is a collecting gloss for the innumerable ways in which questions can be part of what they question. And so on for stories, quantities, lists, instructions, maps, photographs and the rest" (Garfinkel cited in Czyzewski 1994: 163). Accounts constitute the settings that they are part of, thus reflecting them as familiar sceneries.

Garfinkel's notion of accountability possibly draws on an insight based on research on brain injuries by Kurt Goldstein that Gurwitsch (who had worked with him in the 1920s) was reflecting upon during the time they regularly met in Cambridge (see Gurwitsch 2010 [1949]). The insight was that in the autochthonous constitution of objects in non-egological consciousness of healthy persons, practice, knowledge, and speech are intrinsically interrelated, while the ability to verbalize, communicate, or typify perceptions is lost after some kinds of brain injuries (what is called "aphasia", "agnosia", and "apraxia"). Goldstein understood these symptoms as a loss of the ability to adopt an "abstract" or "categorial" attitude and as a limitation of the patients' abilities to an exclusively "concrete" attitude. In healthy persons both attitudes are principally united. Like brain-injured patients, healthy persons

> perceive actual data and facts, but in addition to their actuality these data and facts are conceived as *potential examples or exemplars* of a broader context, as potentially referring to a nonperceptual order and to possibilities beyond the actual experience – in short, *as varieties of an invariant* (Schütz 1950:383; original emphases).

Therefore, any theoretically or methodologically established separation of the two attitudes, as it is sometimes required for the "scientific" (or "sociological") attitude (which Garfinkel addressed in-depth in his dissertation), would be artificial. In regard to the perception of the above-mentioned Necker cube, Rubin's vase, or rabbit-duck picture, for example, the thought of a principal unity of both attitudes entails that, as healthy persons, we are able to not only perceive, but also verbalize, typify, and communicate their sense, shape, and details such as, e.g., the sides, edges and corners of the cube being in front or in the back resp. up or down, or the picture depicting a rabbit or a duck of such and such type, or the shape of the noses and chins of the two faces facing each other or of the foot of the vase and so on. When transferred to social objects, as done by Garfinkel, the practical constitution as well as the reception of gestalt contextures in social action can equally be viewed as intrinsically accountable, since meaningful wholes are coherently constituted through their details. Due to the intrinsic unity of the constitutive details and the verbalization and typification, they possess what Garfinkel has called a "haecceity" that would be destroyed if the gestalt coherence would be divided into descriptive and (practically) constitutive elements, as science sometimes aspires to do. Therefore, an intrinsic and inevitable part of any gestalt contexture is its accountability and glossability: its analyzability, detectability, countability, recordability, comparability, picturability, representability, reportability, and tell-a-story-about-ability, in short, its accountability (Garfinkel 1967:33-34). As a sociological endeavor, Garfinkel thought in the 1960s of a possible systematization of these verbalizations,

glossabilities, and accountabilities as socially differentiated "vocabularies", "grammars" and "rhetorics of motives" in reference to Mills (1940) and Burke (1945, 1950) (cf., e.g., Rawls 2002:10-14; Rawls/Turowetz 2019:37 as well as Garfinkel/Sacks 1970).

Accounts co-constitute the settings that they are part of, thus reflecting them as familiar sceneries. This is also true for what Garfinkel called Lebenswelt pair, that consist of instructions and instructed actions as parts of some settings (2021:32-33; 2007a). For one, Lebenswelt pairs are an important part of the endogenous instructability and observability of social phenomena (Garfinkel 1993:49). As any social object, they unfold and change in time. Secondly, however, Lebenswelt pairs demonstrate particularly well the principal unity of practices and verbalizations in the sense of above: when separated, instructions and instructed action produce troubles when they have to be re-translated into one another. The reason for this is that the endogenous instructability and observability of social phenomena is essentially a haecceitic gestalt coherence perceived "from within", and any separation of account and practice creates troubles of mutual application.

The expression of "from within" figures prominently in ethnomethodology, often marked with inverted commas or italicized. For example, Garfinkel says that ethnomethodological studies are

> directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, common sense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning analyzeable; and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical common sense actions, 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings (Garfinkel 1967a:1-2).

"From within-ness" is temporal: Courses of action both as process and product are "known *from within* this development" by the co-participants (Garfinkel 1967a:40; original emphasis). Thus, "over the temporal course of their actual engagements, and 'knowing' the society only from within, members produce stable, accountable practical activities, *i.e.,* social structures of everyday activities" (Garfinkel 1967a: 185). This is true for laypersons as well as for sociologists, whose "discovery of common culture consists of the discovery *from within* the society" (Garfinkel 1967a:76-77; original emphasis).

The expression "from within" establishes several references, one being to Durkheim's principle that "social facts are to be treated as things" (Durkheim 1938:xliii), which means, for him, "from the outside" (Durkheim 1938:xliv), for a "thing differs from an idea in the same way as that which we know from without differs from that which we know from within" (Durkheim 1938:xliii). Durkheim thus distinguishes between society as objective reality experienced "from within" through membership and as a thing observable "from without" by sociologists. Ethnomethodology, in contrast, claims that Durkheim's sui generis order of society as a "thing" is, inescapably, experienced as objective reality "from within" that order – even by sociologists. There are simply no means to discover, to *know with*, culture and society from without, that is, from the outside of "thematic" or "phenomenal fields". For Gurwitsch, as soon as someone tries to thematize a theme *from without*, the thematization unavoidably becomes part of the thematic field and co-constitutes, and is co-constituted by, the gestalt contexture.

For, to paraphrase Gurwitsch, "from within-ness" has methodological consequences. He advocates a purely descriptive attitude towards perception, focusing on exactly what is given in perceptual experience, and precisely how. In this process, "no extra-phenomenal reality may be admitted as basis or presupposition of the descriptive analysis, nor may it be permitted to intervene 'from without' in such an analysis" (2010 [1955]:117). To do justice to the objects of experience, as they are "unified in themselves and from within" (2010 [1964]:210) and as they possess their endogenous indexicality, external elements should be included only when the object itself "actually points and refers beyond itself" (2010 [1955]:117).

The only reference that Garfinkel (e.g., 1966a:13) directly makes in this context, however, is to the Dreyfuses' introduction to Merleau-Ponty's *Sense and Non-Sense* (1964). In this text, Merleau-Ponty – referring to Gurwitsch whose lectures he had attended in the late 1930s in Paris (Embree 1981) – claims, they (Dreyfus/Dreyfus 1964:x-xi) say:

> that we discover meanings by responding to solicitations already in our experience. Thus we are not the absolute source of meaning. We do not give ready-made sense to our experience from a transcendental position outside the world as in Husserl, but rather we make sense out of our experience from within it. (…) Merleau-Ponty following Heidegger, calls the activity of organizing the world by responding to it from within 'being-in-the-world' or 'ex-istence'.

Thus, as Merleau-Ponty continues in their summary, "whatever appears suggests in its very appearance something more which does not appear, which is concealed. For this reason the figure can be said to have meaning since (…) it refers beyond what is immediately given" (Dreyfus/Dreyfus 1964:xi).

Merleau-Ponty, according to the Dreyfuses (1964:xiii), concludes that:

> since it is from within the world that we perceive, our experience is always perspectival, i.e., incomplete. For although we can be practically certain for example that we see a house, there is always more to the object than we can ever perceive. The reference of the figure [read with Gurwitsch: theme] which leads us into the ground [read: thematic field] may always be misleading, and upon further investigation we may discover aspects of the object which bring about a re-organization of our experience so that we see the object in a different way or even see a different object [think of autochthonous configuration of phenomena]. True, we do not often notice this feature of experience; and when we do, we discount it as a change in our perception of the object rather than a change in the object itself. The object, we assume, is completely determinate and independent of our investigation of it. This is an inevitable prejudice, according to Merleau-Ponty. The basic task of phenomenology is to overcome this '*préjugé du monde*' by describing the way experience *develops*, uncovering the steps by which perception hides its activity of organization and thus leads us to see the object as an independent entity.

Garfinkel (1967a:182; cf. 1966b:23-24) directly refers to the Dreyfuses' rendering of Merleau-Ponty's expression of 'préjugé du monde' – which is a direct translation of Husserl's student Eugen Fink's expression *Weltbefangenheit* (cf. Bruzina 2002) – concerning the assumed objectivity of the world. In reality, the putative objectivity of social facts consists "of a serious, situated, and prevailing accomplishment (..) produced in concert with others by activities whose prevailing and ordinary success itself subjected their product to Merleau-Ponty's 'prejuge du monde'" (1967a:

182). The concept "from within" played an immense role in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, with which Garfinkel was highly familiar, and cannot be explored here in sufficient detail (but see Dastur 1993). With the idea of a consistent epistemology "from within", Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel also followed Heidegger's concept of "being-in-the-world" (*Dasein*), which was directed against Husserl's methodological proposal of transcendental reduction. Heidegger held that no transcendental reduction is possible, and that we can only study the structure of our own consciousness (Husserl) or of being (Heidegger) "from inside", i.e. "by becoming aware that we are in the midst of it" (Follesdal 1979:371). In Heidegger, this awareness is not brought about by mental exercise, but by, e.g., "some familiar tool's breaking down, or by our facing death" (Follesdal 1979:372). Garfinkel (2002:chapter 4), instead, used his well-known breaching experiments and tutorials.

9. Conclusion

In the quote presented at the beginning of this text, Garfinkel spoke of "organizational Things produced in their details", of his goal to "describe Durkheimian Things by addressing their neglected (figural) (contextural) (configurational) characteristics". He stated that, to analyze them, one needs to consider that "Durkheim's Things are (deep gestalten) (patterns)", consisting of "accountable analytic units composed endogenously, in-and-as-of-their-lived-temporal-in-course sequentiality, in-vivo, local historicities" and that they encompass "'strings' of coherent contextural constituents of lived orderlinesses in practices."

As opaque as these expressions might have appeared at the outset, we have seen that by reference to Gurwitsch, they can be clarified. We have seen that the properties of social objects as ethnomethodology conceptualizes them can be grounded in Gurwitsch's gestalt phenomenology: They are produced and achieved, they occur in time, are ever-changing and ongoingly accomplished, they are constituted by the elements themselves. They are practical insofar as they are accomplished in practical circumstances and with practical purposes. And they are indexical, reflexive, incarnate, and accountable.

Sequentiality from this perspective refers to the ever-changing gestalt contextures with which co-participants constitute social objects in and as a setting. The social objects appear external to the co-participants, but are produced by those to whom they appear as such themselves through their activities of being part of them. These gestalt contextures, of which both co-participants and observers are part, are produced and accomplished in time, i.e. in an incremental, step-by-step, and moment-by-moment process: Past contextures provide the environment, or context, for succeeding ones. This includes possible conditional relevancies as in adjacency pairs when a first part makes a next expectable. Gestalt contextures consist of the elements of which they are constituted without anything added as framing device or "contextualization cue" (Gumperz 1992). The individual elements of a gestalt contexture possess a functional significance for one another and thus an intrinsic indexicality *and*, at the same time, accountability, since accounts are themselves genuine parts of the contexture, if not always realized. Temporally, the incrementally emergent gestalt contextures are constantly driven forward by the ever-changing here-and-now of ever-singular practical circumstances (haecceity) as experienced by those who experience and, at the same time, constitute them. Ideally, this

character of the social has to be methodologically respected when doing sociological research, either by re-creating the moment-by-moment co-responsivity of the co-participants through stills or by focusing on their subjective experiencing of the fleetingness of ever-changing haecceitic singularities.

We have also seen that the ethnomethodological idea that in the social world, actions are materially accomplished and at the same time rendered recognizable through the production of those phenomenal field properties that members judge as characteristic of them and that they are able to perceive as coherences, is to a great extent inspired by Gurwitsch's transcendental gestalt phenomenology, though Garfinkel has turned it mundane, adapting it to the realm of the social. This orientation to Gurwitsch entails that the empirical individual (*ego*) becomes irrelevant. Furthermore, when applied to the realm of the social instead of perception, it involves that consciousness becomes inconsequential, a point that Garfinkel has made time and again. Instead, practices constituting order achieve their sense endogenously through a kind of pre-reflective sociality that can be called "culture". When, as Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) have shown, the mastery of natural language is essential to any sense-making, meaning cannot arise from a pre-constituted subject. Thus, Garfinkel also uses Gurwitsch's theory to grasp the relationship between the interpretations and actions of individuals and their membership in a culture.

Moreover, we have also seen, however, that Gurwitsch is not the only salient reference for an understanding of these expressions. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Dreyfus, whom we could only touch upon *en passant*, are no less important. Other authors of paramount importance, such as Parsons or Wittgenstein, could not be considered here at all. As I see it, however, Garfinkel has not, as he himself frequently claimed, *misread* Gurwitsch (on Garfinkel's "misreading" see Lynch 2004). Instead, he had read Gurwitsch's writings in a profound and detailed fashion, producing in his lectures exegeses that are well-founded and philosophically advanced.

Let me close with a statement that Garfinkel made in relation to Merleau-Ponty's concept of the "invisible" (1968), but that could equally be connected to Gurwitsch's idea of ongoing reconfigurations of recognizable gestalt contextures that index realities beyond themselves:

> I mean to be talking about something awesome and beautiful, which is what I take it that Merleau-Ponty spoke of as the familiar miracles of ordinary society. And here we are coming upon a familiar miracle. Obviously it's a miracle, a miracle being: Well, yeah, it happens like that. Don't ask me, I don't know. Nobody knows, it just happens like that. It's that kind of appreciation of the givenness of it (Garfinkel 2002:206).

The "miracle of ordinary society", grounded in the endogenous self-organization of any perceptual object, that social objects, ranging prominently among them, are, while *produced* by the parties as part of the setting, are *experienced* by them as external objective reality. For this miracle to work society must hide from its members the steps of organization whereby the seemingly determinate and independent objects are constituted. Ethnomethodology is interested in these self-invisibilizing qualities of the steps of producing social objects.

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Explikation und Vergegenständlichung im Kontext von Sequenzialität und Sequenzanalyse

Jens Loenhoff

Abstract
Die sequenzanalytischen Verfahren korrespondierende Kritik an der objektivistischen und strukturalistischen Rückführung des Handelns auf vorgeblich Sinn und soziale Orientierung garantierende transsubjektive und transsituative Ordnungen oszilliert zwischen einem entfesselten Kontextualismus und dem eher stillschweigenden Zugeständnis der Inanspruchnahme von Strukturmomenten und Formvorlagen, die dieser Interaktion einerseits vorausliegen und andererseits aber auch durch die situative Auslegung verändert werden. Der Beitrag versteht sich als Diskussionsanregung hinsichtlich der mit dieser Doppelseitigkeit verbundenen theoretischen Reflexion der Handlungskoordination und der dieser erwachsenden kontexttranzendierenden Lösungen des Problems der Reduktion von Kontingenz.

Keywords: Sequenzanalyse – Interaktion – Performanz/Struktur – Kontextualismus – Indexikalität – Transsituativität – Abstraktion – Vergegenständlichungen – Sprachtheorie – Theoriebildung.

English Abstract
Conversation analysis through its investigation of sequencing criticizes attempts to derive action from transsubjective and transsituational forms of order, which these attempts take as a guarantee of meaning and social orientation. Within conversation analysis, positions range from an unbounded contextualism to the mostly unstated confession that any action makes use of structural moments and formal precedents, which precede this interaction on the one hand, but are also altered by the situative process, on the other hand. The present contribution is intended to spark a discussion on the double-sidedness of theoretical reflection that straddles both coordinated action and the coordinated-action-based, yet context-transcendent solutions to the problem of reduced contingency.

Keywords: conversation analysis – social interaction – performance/structure – contextualism – indexikality – transsituativity – abstraction – objectification – theory of language – theory construction.

1. Einleitung

Sequenzanalytische Forschungen stehen Nachfragen hinsichtlich der Bedeutung ihrer Detailbeobachtungen für die Weiterentwicklung von Interaktions-, Sozial- oder Gesellschafts*theorie* in der Regel distanziert gegenüber und verweisen dabei auf erst noch zu erbringende Ergebnisse, mangelnde Zuständigkeit für die Theoriebildung oder die grundsätzliche Obsoleszenz makrosoziologischer Ambitionen. Der damit gerechtfertigten Konzentration auf das Hier-und-Jetzt korrespondiert mithin die Abstinenz gegenüber einer systematischen Evaluation des Verhältnisses von Performanz und Struktur. Die diesbezügliche Kritik sequenzanalytischer Traditionen an einer objektivistischen und strukturalistischen Rückführung des Handelns auf vorgeblich Sinn und soziale Orientierung garantierende transsituative Ordnungen oszilliert zwischen einem entfesselten Situationismus und dem eher stillschweigenden Zugeständnis der Inanspruchnahme von Strukturen, die der Interaktion einerseits vorausliegen, andererseits aber durch die kontextualisierte Auslegung verändert werden. Diese diskursinterne Ausgangslage wie auch die zu beobachtende Zunahme und Intensivierung der empirischen Interaktionsforschung sollte Anlass sein, das Potential sequenzanalytisch inspirierter Studien in Bezug auf ihr Verhältnis und ihren möglichen Beitrag zum Theoriediskurs zu evaluieren. Gerade weil kontexttranszendente Lösungen der Reduktion von Kontingenz der Interaktion erwachsen wie sie umgekehrt durch diese verändert werden, kann die Sequenzanalyse diesbezüglich in die Pflicht genommen werden. Im Folgenden soll es deshalb nicht um eine Fundamentalkritik oder die Delegitimierung der entsprechenden empirischen Forschung gehen, die ja insbesondere in Gestalt der ethnomethodologischen Interaktions- und Gesprächsanalyse zu wichtigen Einsichten geführt und aus guten Gründen innerhalb ganz unterschiedlicher Disziplinen ihren festen Platz hat. Eher sehe ich die Identifikation von blinden Flecken und systematischen Defiziten als Voraussetzung für neue Synthesen, die mit den Einsichten der Sequenzanalyse vermittelt oder zumindest ins Gespräch gebracht werden könnten. Dies wird am ehesten erkennbar, wenn man die Frage zu beantworten versucht, welche Problemstellungen sich durch sequenzanalytische Verfahren kaum oder gar nicht erschließen und hängt, wie noch zu klären sein wird, eng mit dem Umstand zusammen, dass der Sequenzanalyse mitunter ein radikaler Situationismus korrespondiert, der zu einem Vokabular kontexttranszendenter Ordnungsformen Abstand hält und der entsprechenden Begrifflichkeit misstraut. Dies verstellt mögliche und sich lohnende Anschlüsse an kommunikations-, differenzierungs- und gesellschaftstheoretische Perspektiven, die weitere und andere Dimensionen von Sequenzen in den Blick zu nehmen hätten als dies im Mainstream der empirisch praktizierten Sequenzanalyse der Fall ist.[1] Die Diskussion anderer Einwände, die sich auf spezifisch sequenzanalytische Behauptungen und Glaubenssätze beziehen, wie sie wirkungsmächtig das Gründungsdokument von Sacks, Schegloff und Jefferson (1974) artikuliert, in der

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[1]   Innerhalb des konversationsanalytischen Forschung gibt es natürlich hinsichtlich der Radikalität eines solchen Situationismus ein breites Spektrum an Positionierungen einschließlich der entsprechenden Differenzierungen, auf die hier allerdings nicht en detail eingegangen werden kann. Stellvertretend für zahlreiche andere Beiträge aus Interaktionslinguistik, gattungsanalytisch inspirierter Gesprächsforschung und Kontextualisierungstheorie, die kontexttranszendente Dimensionen kommunikativer Sinnproduktion durchaus in Rechnung stellen, siehe z.B. Deppermann/Reineke (2018), Gumpertz (1982), Günthner (2016), Habscheid (2000, 2016) und Hausendorf (2015).

Folge innerhalb der Gesprächsforschung prägend und vielfach – auch unter Immunisierung gegenüber Kritik – übernommen wurden, bleiben unberücksichtigt.[2] Diese betreffen vornehmlich

(1) die Behauptung, Sequenzialität sei die dominante Vollzugsform *aller* Phänomene, die unter den Terminus "conversation" fallen,

(2) die Frage, ob es sich bei der Reifikation beobachteter Regelmäßigkeiten zu einer "turn-taking-machinery" überhaupt um eine empirisch gewonnene Begriffskonstruktion handelt (Schmitz 1998a, 1998b, 2014),

(3) die damit in Zusammenhang stehende Universalitätsbehauptung des *turn-taking*-Systems (Philips 1976),

(4) die der Sequenzanalyse eingeschriebene und sich in den entsprechenden Transkriptionsverfahren manifestierende Sprecherorientierung (Goodwin 1979; Schmitz 1998c) und schließlich

(5) die Fixierung auf die sprachliche Dimension der Interaktion und ihr notorisch dyadischer Bias (Diagne et al. 2011; Mondada 2007; Meyer 2018; Schmitz 1998b; Schmitt 2005).[3]

Nach einigen Bemerkungen, die die guten Gründe des sequenzanalytischen Misstrauens gegenüber strukturdeterministischen Ansätzen in Erinnerung rufen, werden anschließend deren explikativen Defizite benannt, die mit der entweder programmatischen oder ahnungslosen Abstinenz von transsituativen Dimensionen der Interaktion zusammenhängen. Die Rekonstruktion der Genese von auch jenseits konkreter Handlungskontexte verfügbaren Problemlösungen in Gestalt von Explikation, Abstraktion und Generalisierung, die eine Aktualisierung von Konzepten der Objektivation und der Vergegenständlichung plausibilisieren sollte, zeigt ihr analytisches Potenzial vor allem innerhalb des sprach- und kommunikationstheoretischen Diskurses, zu dem sequenzanalytische Verfahren als Modus empirischer Forschung zwar in einem komplementären Verhältnis stehen könnten, diesbezüglich aber nur in Ausnahmefällen Ambitionen entwickeln. Überlegungen zur möglichen Relevanz der Sequenzanalyse im Kontext gesellschafts- und differenzierungstheoretischen beschließen den Beitrag.

2. Sequenzen und Sequenzanalyse

Ungeachtet des problematisierbaren Verhältnisses von Gleichzeitigkeit, Sequenzialität und Synchronizität ist nicht nur innerhalb der Gesprächsforschung einsichtig, dass Sozialität, insbesondere ihre Realisierung als Interaktion, ein auch sequenziell organisierter Modus gesellschaftlicher Wirklichkeit ist. Die wissenschaftshistorischen Gründe, warum die genaue Analyse dieser spezifischen Vollzugform von Sozialität zunächst wenig Aufmerksamkeit für sich in Anspruch nehmen konnte, sind

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[2] Dies gilt vor allem für Schegloff (2006), der gegenüber allen Forderungen nach Kontextualisierung quasinaturalistisch die situationsübergreifende Gültigkeit der des *turn-taking*-Apparates behauptet.

[3] Ebenfalls ausgeklammert bleiben müssen Formen der Sequenzanalyse, wie sie innerhalb der Objektiven Hermeneutik entwickelt wurden.

vielfältig, haben aber auch mit der Dominanz von Strukturalismus, Strukturfunktionalismus, hegelianischer Objektivationslehre oder der von ihr inspirierten Theorien der Gebilde und Institutionen zu tun. Die mit solchen Traditionen verbundenen deterministischen Tendenzen in Gestalt der Annahme, die in der Theorie formulierten Regel- und Bedingungszusammenhänge seien mit dem kontextualisierten praktischen Wissen und den Gebrauchsanweisungen der Akteure identisch und würden darüber hinaus auch noch ihre eigene Anwendung regeln, hat aus guten Gründen Widerspruch provoziert, von Wittgenstein (1984) über Garfinkel (1967) bis zu Bourdieu (1987) oder Schatzki (1996).

Das damit ins Spiel kommende starke Argument einer situationistischen Radikalisierung, die Teile der Sequenzanalyse prägen (Sacks 1972, 1984:22; Schegloff 1987, 1997:166ff., 2000:718f.), kann sich zunächst auf die Einsicht stützen, dass die kontextadäquate "Anwendung" explizit formulierter oder formulierbarer normativer Erwartungen in der konkreten Situationen ohne den Durchgang durch im praktischen Wissen der Akteure verankerten implizite Regelanwendungskompetenzen schlechterdings nicht auskommen kann. Vor allem, dass solche normativen Erwartungen hinsichtlich der Fälle, in denen sie gelten, notwendig unbestimmt sind, zumal ihr Gehalt gerade nicht in ihrer expliziten Formulierung, sondern in der unscharfen Gesamtheit inferentiell und situativ angemessener Folgerungen aus solchen Formulierungen liegt.[4] Gleiches gilt für die Behauptung, dass es diese kreativ zu erbringende Leistung, eine Handlung adäquat hervorzubringen, nicht ohne die unhintergehbare Rückbindung an deren Hier-und-Jetzt und die Indexikalität der Situation möglich ist, in der erst die Angemessenheit der Regelbefolgung, ihre flexible Auslegung oder Abänderung beurteilt werden kann (Taylor 1995).

Allerdings ist die Identifikation einer Sequenz kaum möglich, ohne dabei schon etwas vorauszusetzen, z.B. dass das beobachtete Ereignis zum Typ x oder y eines be- oder gekannten Handlungsschemas gehört, das in der Vergangenheit bereits reziprok typisiert, institutionalisiert und in einen geteilten Wissensvorrat eingewandert ist. Sequenziell organisierten Vollzügen erwachsen nämlich ihrerseits eingeschliffene und standardisierte Formen, die als Strukturmomente der Interaktion fungieren, denen die stillschweigende Erwartungen und Erwartungserwartungen hinsichtlich der Frage "what next" unschwer abzulesen sind (Heritage 1984:248f.). Die allen Vollzügen eingeschriebene implizite Normativität stößt aber spätestens bei der alltäglichen Bearbeitung von Handlungsproblemen eine folgenreiche selektive Explikation an, die die Frage aufwirft, ob und inwiefern aus den Sequenzen etwas hervorgeht, dass als das Andere dieser Sequenzen verstanden werden muss und wie dieser Zusammenhang begrifflich zu fassen ist. Selbst Schegloff, dessen Version der Konversationsanalyse exemplarisch für das Primat situierter Sinnproduktion steht, kommt nicht umhin, die von ihm untersuchten Interaktionssequenzen als Garanten jener Infrastruktur zu identifizieren (2006:70),

> [...] that allows it to supply the infrastructure that supports the overall or macrostructure of societies in the same sense that roads and railways serve as infrastructure for the economy, and that grounds all of the traditionally recognized institutions of societies and the lives of their members.

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[4] Siehe dazu vor allem Renn (2013).

Zu solchen kontexttranszendenten Institutionen zählt er auch Recht und Religion, die er als "the most powerful macrostructures of societies" (ibid.) bezeichnet. Innerhalb des interaktionsanalytischen Diskurses hat vor allem Levinson der Behauptung widersprochen, soziale Ordnung(en) sei(en) ausschließlich das Produkt lokaler Sinnproduktion, denn "[…] interactional reductionism has all the problems that radical reductionism has in any field – it throws out other levels of analysis at which principle and order can be better captured" (2005:451). Dabei geht es auch ihm nicht darum, eine strukturdeterministische Position zu rehabilitieren, die ja bereits Garfinkel mit guten Argumenten kritisiert hatte (Levinson 2005:451):

> Interactional constructivism […] is not a pernicious doctrine at all. It holds that interaction constructs social relations, which in turn construct social institutions […] It also holds that uses of language can construct new rules of usage, which can construct new rules of grammar. Social systems change, and languages change, under the motor of lots of little changes in interaction […] Even if one thinks of social systems and grammar as the outcome of aeons of interactional events, at any one point they have a coercive, constraining influence on what interactants can do and what they can mean. Those constraints are best understood by treating them as systems in their own right.

Die Grundlinien der zwischen Schegloff und Levinson geführten Diskussion erinnern zwangsläufig an vertraute Mikro-Makro-Debatten, die mit wenigen Ausnahmen allerdings eher innerhalb der soziologischen Theoriediskussion als in der interaktionalen Linguistik und der empirischen Interaktionssoziologie geführt werden, oder aber in Gestalt grundsätzlicher Fragen nach Emergenz, Supervenienz und Reduktion Bestandteil philosophischer und wissenschaftstheoretischer Debatten sind.[5] Die mit sog. Mikroperspektiven unterschiedlichster Art verbundenen Überzeugungen konvergieren bekanntlich im Bemühen, kleine oder kleinste Einheiten des Sozialen zu identifizieren und dabei der methodologischen Richtlinie zu folgen, alle sozialen Phänomene – also auch die unter Makrokategorien behandelten Sachverhalte – nur in ihrer situierten Erzeugungsrealität auszuweisen. In seiner detaillierten Diskussion der Mikro-Makro-Problematik rekapituliert Hirschauer (2014) einschlägige interaktionstheoretische Positionen, die jeweils als Suche nach den kleinsten Einheiten des Sozialen, als methodologische Überzeugungen, reduktionistische Dogmen oder posthumanistische Angriffe auf soziologische Anthropozentrismen in Erscheinung treten. Insbesondere die Allianz zwischen radikalem Situationismus und weitgehendem Theorieverzicht verharre (2014:111)

> […] in einer separierten Untersuchung sozialer Situationen. Ganz offen bleibt so die Frage einer *Verbindung* mit anderen Soziologien und auch die Frage nach der *Verbindung* jener Situationen.

Indessen könnten Konzepte der Intersituativität (Hirschauer 2014; Knorr 2005, 2009) eine solche situationistische Tradition und damit den erschöpften Mikro/Makro-Dualismus auf eine neuartige Weise hinter sich lassen, insofern die Diffe-

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5 Siehe dazu etwa Alexander/Giesen (1987), Barnes (2001), Coleman (1987), Collins (1992), Coulter (2001), Giddens (1979), Heinz (2004, 2007), Hilbert (1990), Hirschauer (2014) Knorr-Cetina (1981, 1988). Im Kontext der Gesprächsforschung hatte Habscheid (2000, 2016) die weitgehend unbearbeitete Konkurrenz von handlungs- und strukturtheoretischen Konzepte diskutiert und dabei bereits auf wesentliche Aspekte des hier diskutierten Problems hingewiesen.

renz von Mikro und Makro in der Frage nach der medialen und materialen Verbindung von Situationen aufgehoben würden. Demgegenüber kommt Renn zu der Einschätzung einer bis heute anhaltenden und weitgehend ungebrochen "mono-paradigmatischen" Tendenz, alle Kontexte sozialer Ordnung als jeweils nur ein Format zu behandeln, seien es "Systeme" oder aber "Praktiken". Vor allem erlaube es die zu beobachtende (2018a:199f.)

> […] Verengung der theoretischen Alternativen auf entweder transsubjektive (also Intentionalitäts-externe) systemische Kommunikation oder aber stets im subjektiven (Akteurs-) Sinn hinterlegte und 'verwaltete' (und hierarchisierte) Institutionalisierungen […] nicht, das Problem der Übergänge zwischen Ordnungen (Sinn-Transfer wie Ressourcenaustausch), die nur über indirekte Dependenzen einander beeinflussen, adäquat sichtbar zu machen.

Spätestens, wenn es um Zusammenhänge geht, die mehr als seine Situation umfassen und sich auf die Wiederholung und Verklammerung, mithin auf Sequenzen *von* Situationen beziehen, müssen intersituationelle Perspektiven entwickelt werden, die mehr und anderes bieten als die Identifikation von Formen des *turn taking* und die die Herausforderung der Analyse translokaler und transsequenzieller Episoden annehmen.[6] Zwar sind Interaktionen unterschiedlich stark an strukturelle Vorgaben gekoppelt, die von den meisten Sequenzanalysen als schwache Kontexte behandelt werden (Scheffer 2008:376), doch verweisen Mikroordnungen trotz ihrer relativen Autonomie stets auch auf transsituative Rahmen, die das situative Geschehen mitbestimmen (Goffman 1983) und sich Interaktion gerade deshalb nicht, wie Hirschauer pointiert formuliert, "[…] einfach zu gesellschaftlich folgenloser 'Geselligkeit' verharmlosen lasse(n)" (Hirschauer 2014:116).

3. Zu den temporalen Strukturen der Interaktion

Die sequenzanalytische Dominanz diachroner Zeitlichkeit und die Fixierung auf das Hier-und-Jetzt legt es nahe, die temporalen Strukturen der Interaktion hinsichtlich ihrer situativen Unabhängigkeit etwas genauer zu befragen. Allein schon durch die Erfahrung ihrer Irreversibiliät und Knappheit fungiert Zeit als eminente, alle Interaktion strukturierende Ressource. Angesichts des unbestreitbaren Zwangs zu Sequenzialität besteht in der Handlungskoordination nämlich ein außerordentlich vielschichtiges Verhältnis von Nach- und Nebeneinander, sowohl innerhalb der Interaktion wie auch in Bezug auf synchron existierende andere Handlungszusammenhänge, die mit dieser in einem Verhältnis der Bezugnahme stehen. Den entsprechenden Antworten auf derartige Probleme erwachsen transsituative Zeitregimes in Gestalt temporaler Strukturen, die das Hier-und-Jetzt überschreiten und

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6   Für die Berücksichtigung transsequenzieller Perspektiven plädiert auch Scheffer: "In Interaktionsanalysen verkommen Ereignisse [...] leicht zu Kammerspielen: ohne ein Davor und Danach und ohne eine Idee von dem, was folgt oder nicht mehr folgen kann" (2008:395). Ebenso setzt sich Goodwin (2018) im Kontext seiner empirischen Analysen von radikal situationistischen Positionen ab, indem er die einzelne Episoden transzendierende Funktion von aus der Vergangenheit übernommenen Koordinationsressourcen für die die Strukturierung der Interaktion betont. Dies führt zu einem über das zeitlich begrenzte Hier-und-Jetzt hinausgreifenden Kooperationsbegriff, der in den Blick nimmt, wie Beteiligte auf den Ergebnissen des in anderen Situationen erfolgten Handelns aufbauen und diese in den laufenden Abstimmungsprozess kreativ einfügen ("co-operative action with predecessors", 2018:243).

die unter Rückgriff auf institutionalisierte Synchronisationstechniken und -instrumente, seien es materielle Artefakte, die eine kleinschrittige Zeitmessung erlauben. Elaborierte Zeitsemantiken und eine standardisierte Weltzeit unterstützen oder ermöglichen überhaupt erst die Koordination des Handelns, z.B. als Verabredungen, was zu welchem Zeitpunkt gleichzeitig geschehen soll (Luhmann 1990). Der von der Sequenzanalyse zentral gestellten und der Grammatik ihres Leitbegriffs korrespondierenden diachronen Zeitlichkeit (vorher/nachher) steht die synchrone Zeitlichkeit als Leerstelle gegenüber, sei es als Gleichzeitigkeit der Reflexivität der Wahrnehmung oder deren Unterbindung, als Gleichzeitigkeit des Sprechens oder des zeitgleichen Eintretens anderer situations- oder kommunikationsrelevanter Ereignisse. Gerade im Kontext der Analyse multimodaler Interaktion (Deppermann 2013; Jewitt 2009; Loenhoff/Schmitz 2015; Mondada 2007) dürfte einsichtig sein, dass die Handlungskoordination fortlaufend damit konfrontiert ist, dass sich Ereignisse gleichzeitig vollziehen und dass dieses synchrone Geschehen in der Interaktion mit einem Ordnungs- und Kontrollproblem verbunden ist. Synchronisation bedeutet dann die Lösung des Abstimmungsproblems innerhalb der Handlungskoordination, das den mit der Gleichzeitigkeit verbundenen Komplexitätslasten erwächst, die wiederum mittels Korrekturen, Zeitgewinn oder Vorgriff auf erwartete Sequenzen die Desimultaneisierung des Geschehens erzwingt (Luhmann 1997:84).[7]

Nun bestimmt die Systemtheorie, deren Distanz zu Theorien der Praxis nicht eigens betont werden muss, die Operationsweise sozialer Systeme auch jenseits interaktiver Kommunikation als *sequentiell* (Luhmann 1980:257).[8] Weil zeittheoretisch für Luhmann jedoch die Gleichzeitigkeit das Fundament aller Zeitlichkeit bildet – "[...] in ihr wird zwischen Vorher und Nachher entschieden, und nur in einer gleichzeitigen Welt kann so unterschieden werden" (Luhmann 1990:64) – gewinnt die Theorie eine aufschlussreiche Analyseperspektive auf das Verhältnis von Gleichzeitigkeit und Synchronisation innerhalb und zwischen sozialen Systemen, insbesondere den Funktionssystemen. Denn deren spezifische Operationen müssen längere Zeitstrecken organisieren und für Wiederholungen verfügbar halten.[9] Weil sich in komplexen, mithin funktional differenzierten Gesellschaften solche subsystemspezifischen Operationen nicht umstandslos von selbst synchronisieren, bilden

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[7] Dies sah bereits Goffman (1983), neuerdings dazu auch Deppermann/Streeck (2018).

[8] Der Antagonismus von Systemtheorie und Ethnomethodologie täuscht leicht über den Umstand verschwiegener Gemeinsamkeiten hinweg, die nicht nur, aber auch mit der geteilten Kritik an Parsons Handlungs- und Gesellschaftstheorie zusammenhängen. Der Systemtheoretische Sinn- und Kommunikationsbegriff als ereignisbasierter Kategorie, die Temporalisierung des Strukturbegriffs, die einem sozialphänomenologisch-handlungstheoretischen Verständnis entgegengesetzte Verlagerung der Sinnproduktion in den durch doppelkontingente Selektion dynamisierten Interaktionsprozess, der die egologische Sinnproduktion von Beginn an transzendiert und der die Beteiligten (ggf. gegen ihren Willen) in eine "semantischen Zugewinngemeinschaft" verwandelt (Feilke 1996:102f.), sind nur einige der zu nennenden Konvergenzen. Zur Vereinbarkeit von Systemtheorie und sequenzanalytischen Forschungsmethoden siehe auch Schneider (2008).

[9] Man denke auch an die Diskussion innerhalb der Geschichtswissenschaft der 1970er Jahre, in deren Fokus die wechselseitige Erhellung von Ereignissen und Strukturen stand. Dazu gehört vor allem die Einsicht, dass Ereignisse stets mehr und zugleich weniger realisieren als mit ihren Voraussetzungen vorbestimmt ist – anders wären Innovation, Differenz und Überraschung kaum fassbar – und Strukturen somit als Ereignisse begriffen werden müssen, die hinsichtlich ihrer Zeitlichkeit nicht in der strikten Abfolge solcher Ereignissen aufgehen und Rahmenbedingungen darstellen, "[…] die in die momentanen Ereignisse eingehen, die aber diesen Ereignissen in anderer Weise vorausliegen als in einem chronologischen Sinne des Zuvor" (Koselleck 1973:562).

sich abstrakte Koordinationsformen und Techniken der Synchronisation heraus, deren Leistung darin besteht, gleichzeitige Ereignisreihen in eine Sequenz von Entscheidungen zu überführen und als Abläufe zu koordinieren (Brose 2004; Brose/Kirschsieper 2014:197). Der diachronen Differenzierung kommunikativer Episoden unter Anwesenheitsbedingungen steht mithin das synchron differenzierte gesamtgesellschaftliche Gefüge von Organisationen und Subsystemen gegenüber, die durch gleichzeitige, aber inkompatible Sachbezüge und Codierungen charakterisiert sind, so dass Diachronizität und Sychronizität von Ereignisreihen sowohl innerhalb wie außerhalb konkreter Situationen vermittelt werden müssen (Luhmann 1984:566, 1997:819). Insbesondere die Kommunikation unter Abwesenden ist nicht ohne Synchronisationsleistungen realisierbar, die die Vermittlung von Simultaneität und Sequenz bewerkstelligen. Auch am Beispiel der grundlegenden Bedeutung temporaler Strukturen der Interaktion, den jeweiligen Eigenzeiten konkreter Situationen und ihrem Verhältnis wiederum zu abstrakten chronometrischen Ordnungen als situationstranszendenten Größen zeigt sich der Reflexionsbedarf der entsprechenden Zusammenhänge. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist zu fragen, welche grundsätzlichen konzeptionellen Vorstellungen man sich von der Rekonstruktion entsprechender Übergänge machen muß, um den angesprochenen Zusammenhang besser verstehen zu können.

4. Explikation, Abstraktion und Generalisierung

Explikation, Abstraktion und Generalisierung sind Operationen, die eng miteinander verschränkt sind und die sich handlungs- und kommunikationstheoretisch rekonstruieren lassen. Zwar sind Generalisierungen bereits in der Interaktion angelegt, zumal sie die Identifikation einer Handlung überhaupt erst ermöglichen und dem Vollzug einer Sequenz vorausliegender und anschließender Handlungen funktional zugeordnet sind. Neben der hier zu benennenden fundamentalen, alles Handeln orientierenden Leistung der Typisierung gib es aber weitere und andere Modi der Generalisierungen, die sich als kontexttranszendent herausbilden und als neue Problemlösung bewähren, weil sie Formen der Handlungskoordination etablieren, die sich von den interaktionsförmig organisierten kommunikativen Anschlussoperationen relativ oder weitgehend unabhängig gemacht haben. Das Phänomen einer von den einzelnen Fällen ihres situierten Gebrauchs abgezogenen und vergegenständlichten Sinnstruktur kennt man in seiner grundlegendsten Form etwa in der Transformation der Greifbewegung in die Zeigegeste, die wiederum in dem Artefakt des Wegweisers oder in deiktischen Ausdrücken objektiviert ist.

Gilbert Ryle hatte in seinem in den frühen 1960er Jahren erschienenen Aufsatz "Abstractions" die Differenz zwischen der performativen Ebene impliziter Orientierung und einer abstraktionsgestützten Generalisierung am Beispiel der praktischen Vertrautheit mit dem Territorium eines Dorfes einerseits und der abstrakten Bezugnahme auf Plätze, Wege und Gebäude im Horizont einer Kartierung (z.B. als Landkarte, Stadtplan etc.) andererseits erläutert. Dabei wird das Orientierungswissen und die Praxis des sich-Zurechtfindens im Gelände durch die Kartierung nicht wiedergegeben, sondern selektiv transformiert. Die Abstraktion – hier also die Karte – unterstützt aber diese Orientierung und ermöglicht, was das praktische (implizit bleibende) Wissen um die Beschaffenheit des Geländes nicht leisten kann,

nämlich das Wandern in unvertrauten Umgebungen, den Anschluss an und den Vergleich mit anderen Karten oder ganz andere, bislang ungekannte Operationen, die ohne die Kartierung nicht möglich wären (Ryle 1962; Renn 2006:353).

Als Explikationen fungieren Abstraktionen mithin durch die Kodifizierungen, die Generalisierungen und damit situationstranszendente Problemlösungsstrategien ermöglichen, wie sie ebenso anhand anderer Abstraktionen in Form des Rechts, des Geldes und der Sprache und insbesondere der Schrift exemplifiziert werden können. Explikationen stoßen mithin die Genese von Strukturen bzw. Formen an, indem sie implizite in explizite Normativität transformieren und damit die Formalisierung und Kodifizierungen von Erwartungserwartungen stimulieren. Unschwer erkennt man in dieser Argumentation das klassische, aus dem Pragmatismus bekannte Motiv der Krise und der negativen Erfahrung: Enttäuschungen von Erwartungen führen zu kritischen Situationen, die durch die Blockade von Handlungsabläufen gekennzeichnet sind, die wiederum eine Explikation und damit eine Distanzierung von der performativen Einstellung und den mit ihnen verwobenen aktuellen Bedeutungen anstößt. Zu einer dauerhaften Rückwirkung auf das Sprach- und Handlungswissen kommt es dann, wenn die reflexive Rekonstruktion von Erwartungen, Routinen oder Schemata die konkrete Situation als abstrahierende Objektivation oder Vergegenständlichung überschreitet.[10]

Zeitgenössische Theoriediskussionen innerhalb der Soziologie gehen bei ihrer reflexionsgeschichtlichen Aneignung der Objektivationsproblematik kaum hinter die diesbezüglichen Überlegungen bei Berger und Luckmann (1969:22) zurück, deren wissenssoziologischer Begriff der "Objektivierung" bekanntlich auf die von Schütz vorgenommenen Analyse der Vergesellschaftung des Wissens rekurriert (Schütz/Luckmann 1979:317ff.). Weiter zurückreichende Rezeptionslinien führen zu Hegels Begriff des Objektiven Geistes (1999:478ff.) und Schopenhauers Konzept der Objektivation als eines "Sichdarstellens des Willens in der Körperwelt" (1988:151), lebensphilosophischen Interpretationen durch Diltheys "Objektivationen des Lebens" (1970:177) und Simmels "Vergegenständlichungen" (1989:627) oder Cassirers Begriff der symbolischen Form (1956:175) und Elias Zivilisationstheorie (1997:432f.) bis zu Lukács' marxistisch inspirierter Verdinglichungskritik (1988:170).[11] Die nicht erst im sozialphänomenologischen Kontext erscheinende Metapher der "Sedimentierung", deren verschlungene Wege einer eigenen begriffsgeschichtlichen Studie bedürfte, hatte dabei aus guten Gründen die externen Dimensionen der Vergegenständlichung und damit eine soziologisch und sprachtheoretisch vielversprechende Perspektive im Sinn, die Konzepte der Gegenständlichkeit etwa von Brentano (1924), Stumpf (1907) oder Husserl (1996) hinter sich lassen will. In deren Überlegungen bleiben "Gebilde" im Wesentlichen rein mentale und durch intentionale Akte konstituierte Größen. Zwar verfügen solche Akte über

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[10] Zur damit unmittelbar verbundenen Funktion impliziten Wissens siehe auch Loenhoff (2012a, 2012b, 2015).

[11] Die hier aufschlussreiche Rekonstruktion der verschlungenen Pfade des Objektivationsdiskurses von den genannten Autoren bis zu Adorno (1973), dessen Ambivalenz hinsichtlich der Funktion von Objektivationen zwischen ihrer Funktion als Bedingung ästhetischer Autonomie, die gleichsam Einspruch gegen die Realität erheben könne, und der Gefahr autoritären Strukturen zuarbeitender Erstarrung kann aus verständlichen Gründen an dieser Stelle nicht geleistet werden. Zur Rekonstruktion des Verhältnisses von Gegenständlichkeit und "Verflüssigung" im philosophischen Diskurs siehe ferner Figal (2007).

gegenständliche Korrelate, doch stellen sie keine Vergegenständlichungen im engeren Sinne dar, denen das Merkmal zukäme, gegenüber den sinnkonstituierenden Bewusstseinsakten eine gewisse Eigenständigkeit erlangt zu haben.[12] Erst in der stark durch die Lebensphilosophie Diltheys und Simmels beeinflussten Kulturphilosophie Freyers kommt es zu einer von Diskursen in Bewusstseinsphilosophie und Psychologie abgesetzten Analyse von Objektivationsschritten, die an der semantischen Körperbewegung des Zeigens ansetzt und von dort her die Genese solcher "Gebilde" und "Geräte" als Vergegenständlichung von Teilstücken von Zwecktätigkeiten aufzuklären versucht (Freyer 1973:61f.). Primär ist dabei die Ablösung vom je aktuellen Vollzug, die in drei Objektivationsschritten erfolgt, nämlich (1) vom individuellen Erleben, (2) vom ursprünglichen Entstehungs- bzw. Konstitutionsprozess und schließlich (3) vom direkten ausführenden Akt, die durch eine materiale Vergegenständlichung besonders sinnfällig wird, etwa indem die situierte Zeigebewegung im Hinweisschild oder Wegweiser objektiviert wird. Die von ihm so benannten *Formen* des objektiven Geistes teilt Freyer in fünf Kategorien ein ("Gebilde", "Geräte", "Zeichen", "Sozialform" und "Bildung"), die (1973:65)

> [...] von den Akten ihrer jeweiligen Erfüllung unabhängig [sind] im Sinne des dritten Objektivationsschrittes, sie erlangen einen selbständigen Bestand, die einzelnen Realisierungsakte finden sie vor und strömen in sie ein wie in ein vorbereitetes Bett.

5. Kommunikations- und sprachtheoretische Dimension

Theorien der Objektivation und der Vergegenständlichung konvergieren in der zentralen Figur der "Ablösung" eines Sinngehalts vom Hier-und-Jetzt, die Bühler, dabei Freyers Überlegungen folgend, sprachtheoretisch wendet und als "Erlösung des Satzsinnes aus der Sprechsituation" (1982:54) begreift. Die damit verbundene und die Unterscheidung der Sprachphilosophie Humboldts (1973:36) ("ergon" und "energeia") aufgreifende Differenzierung zwischen Sprechhandlung und Sprachwerk wird von Bühler bekanntlich zu einer Zweifelder-Lehre ausgebaut, die rekonstruiert, wie die gestisch-deiktische Operation des Zeigens in die Sprache einwandert und dort als Demonstrativum symbolisch gefasst wird. Dass in der gleichen Logik aus der deiktischen Geste die syntaktische Funktion des Artikels ableitbar wird, veranschaulicht zudem die Entkopplungseffekte der Grammatikalisierung. Die Leistungssteigerung vom Zeigfeld zum Symbolfeld mittels "Darstellungs"-, "Ordnungs"- oder "Feldgeräte" wird hier offensichtlich: Während sich die referentielle Funktion des Zeigens in komplexen und kontingenten Kommunikationskontexten, z.B. bei Abwesenheit der Referenzobjekte schnell als insuffizientes Instrument erweist, liegen die Mittel zur Unterscheidung und Kennzeichnung nun in der Sprache selbst und ihrem Kombinationsreichtum.

Weder Freyer, noch Bühler oder Berger und Luckmann verleugnen dabei die Notwendigkeit einer kreativen und flexiblen Situationsauslegung, die von ihnen

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[12] In seiner Arbeit *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen* (1907) hatte Stumpf im Anschluss an seinen Lehrer Brentano "Gebilde" als Gegenständliches begriffen, auf das sich intentionales Bewusstsein richtet. Als objektiven Pol des Aktes werden Gebilde hier in Differenz zu "psychischen Funktion" gesetzt und zur Abgrenzung von Akt und Gegenstandsbezug eingeführt. Seine Überlegungen bleiben aber ebenso wie Husserls (1976:194) Unterscheidung von Noesis und Noema im Kern reine Bewusstseinsanalyse. Der Bezug zu einem Handeln, das in der wahrnehmbaren Welt Spuren hinterlässt bzw. zur "Welt des Wirkens" (Schütz 1971), bleibt sekundär.

kriterial im Konzept der Objektivationen, der Gebilde oder Geräte berücksichtigt ist. Gerade die Einsicht in das logische und genetische Primat des aktuellen kommunikativen Sinns gegenüber propositionalen Bedeutungen sprachlicher Ausdrücke hatte Bühler zur Kritik an der Vorstellung bewogen, es könne so etwas wie in Sprachzeichen verkörperten "Sinn an sich" geben. Dessen Präzisierung sei zwar "[...] nur in der Sprechsituation hic et nunc zu finden", gleichwohl aber wäre der Sprecher (1978:126)

> [...] nicht in vollem Ausmaß und in jeder Hinsicht der Sinnverleiher des gerade so und nicht anders von ihm produzierten Sprachzeichens [...] ähnlich anderen 'Geräten des Lebens' (Freyer), die durch Generationen Bestand haben und im Besitze der Lebenden sind.[13]

Am Beispiel der Sprache und insbesondere der Schrift zeigt sich also besonders eindringlich, dass den implizit geregelten kommunikativen Praktiken selbst erzeugte Bedingungen auferlegt werden, insofern sich Beziehbarkeiten jenseits der Kontexte herstellen und abstraktere Sprachspiele konstituieren. Zwar ist jede situierte Äußerungspraxis durch eine unaufhebbare Indexikalität gekennzeichnet, zugleich aber besteht Bedarf nach einem geordnetem Umgang mit dieser Indexikalität (Garfinkel/Sacks 1970). Insbesondere wenn sich die Kommunikationspartner den Schwierigkeiten zuwenden, die sie mit den Kommunikationsmitteln und Prozeduren, den kommunikativen Rollen oder den sozialen Konventionen der Kommunikation haben, versuchen sie, diese Indexikalitätslasten in Form einer metakommunikative "Vergewisserungspraxis" zu bewältigen, mittels derer sie nach nichtlokalen Bedeutungen suchen, um sich den Gebrauch von Ausdrücken verständlich zu machen und die Kontingenz der Kommunikation und des Verstehens zu reduzieren.[14] Die verschiedenen Modi der Entindexikalisierung lassen sich als Prozess der semantischer Rückversicherung begreifen, deren von situationsinternen Bezügen weitgehend gereinigte Vergegenständlichungen Knobloch und Feilke in ihren linguistischen Studien als "Rekodierungen" bezeichnen. Diese sind vornehmlich am Beispiel von Grammatikalisierung und lexikographischer Semantik untersucht worden, insofern die aus soziogenetisch und ontogenetisch beschreibbaren Prozessen hervorgegangene Rekodierungen "[...] zu einem außerordentlich hohen Grad an gebildemäßiger Formierung und Strukturierung" führen (Feilke et al. 2001:1f.).[15] Trotz also der unbestreitbaren empraktische Steuerung der laufenden Handlungskoordination ist innerhalb des sprachtheoretischen Diskurses einigermaßen unstrittig, dass einzelsprachlich unterschiedliche "Instruktionsformate" aufgrund der Verbindlichkeit etablierter syntagmatischer Ordnungsstrukturen als Quelle der Erwartbarkeit und der Stabilität sprachlichen Handelns fungieren. Dazu gehört dann auch

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[13] Inwiefern Vergegenständlichungen auch antideterministisch, nämlich als stabil und situiert zugleich konzipiert werden können, zeigt Freyer vor allem am Beispiel der "Sprache als objektivgeistiger Form": "[...] indem wir jedes Wort, das wir verwenden, um es überhaupt sinnvoll aufzufassen, schöpferisch aufbauen müssen, wird das Sprachgut von unserem lebendigen Sprechen nicht nur unablässig wiedergeboren und verjüngt, sondern unablässig abgewandelt und fortgebildet" (1973:83). Siehe dazu auch Loenhoff (2013, 2018).

[14] Siehe zu diesem Problemzusammenhang vor allem die Beiträge von Knobloch (1994, 2003a, 2003b), Loenhoff/Schmitz (2012), Schmitz (1998d) und Ungeheuer (2004).

[15] Dies gilt wohl auch für die sog. "soziale Semantik", von der Luhmann spricht und der er die Funktion einer "bewusstlosen Strukturierungsressource der Anschlussselektion eines Systems" (1980:235) zuweist.

der Befund, dass die Formen der Grammatik von den stets wechselnden Gegebenheiten der Erfahrung in ihrem Funktion im Hier und Jetzt nicht ernsthaft abhängen, geschweige denn aus diesen Gegebenheiten erklärbar sein könnten (Feilke 1996: 217f.).

6. Gesellschaftstheoretische Implikationen

Nun fungieren Explikation, Abstraktion und Generalisierung impliziter Praktiken durch Medien der Objektivation in Gestalt von Sprache und Schrift stets als zentrale Antriebskräfte sozialer Differenzierung, weil sie nicht nur die Übertragung von Problemlösungen auf andere Situationen, sondern auch die Pluralisierung von Interpretationskontexten antreiben. Begreift man soziale Differenzierung als Entstehung manifester und folgenreicher Praktiken des Unterscheidens und der Spezialisierung, durch die etwas auseinander und damit in ein wechselseitiges Abgrenzungsverhältnis tritt, wird deutlich, dass und inwiefern die Genese einer solchen Nichtidentität als Folge von abweichenden Wiederholungen zu begreifen ist, die ihrerseits nicht mehr in den Unschärfen der eines Mehr-oder-weniger, sondern die als Praktiken des Anders-Machens Anschlussoperationen blockieren, Kommunikation gegen andere Kommunikation abgrenzen und symbolische Praktiken und ihre semantischen Ressourcen ausdifferenzieren. All dies verändert die Bedingungen des Handelns und erzeugt neue Strukturvorgaben, etwa Verpflichtungen auf institutionell oder technologisch realisierte Kommunikationsformen bis hin zur Codierung des Handelns durch systemische Imperative, wie sie komplexe Gesellschaften kennzeichnen. Der Hinweis auf den Prozess und die Eigendynamik sozialer Differenzierung ist deshalb nicht belanglos, weil diese Differenzierung durch die Explikation habitueller Praktiken nicht nur angestoßen und auf Dauer gestellt, sondern nachgerade erzwungen wird.[16] Die damit jeder situierten Regelapplikation auferlegten "Übersetzungszwänge" (Renn 2006:360) zeitigen reale Effekte in Gestalt von nichtintendierten Nebenfolgen und Rückwirkungen auf das Verständnis der Anwendungssituation, der weitere Differenzierungseffekte nachfolgen.

Die Emergenz einer eigenen, spezifisch expliziten Ebene der Identifikation und Koordination von Handlungen lässt sich also nicht nur an der Ko-Evolution von sozialer und semantischer Differenzierung im Sinne der Verschränkung sozialer Praktiken mit semantischen Mitteln rekonstruieren, sondern auch an der Evolution von Rechtssystemen oder Märkten.[17] Denn in der Emanzipation von eingeschliffenen Routinen und Konventionen und von Moral, Sitte, oder Ehre nimmt die Evolution des kodifizierten Rechts und formalisierter Verfahren ihren Ausgang, der sich wiederum in der Interaktion als zunehmende Lockerung der Umgangsformen bemerkbar macht, oder – um ein anderes Beispiel zu nehmen – in einer Tauschökonomie, die über das Medium "Geld" bis zur Digitalwährung und den zeitgenössischen Praktiken des Hochfrequenzhandels am globalen Aktienmarkt vollkommen

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[16] Die folgenden Überlegungen stützen sich vor allem auf die gesellschaftstheoretischen Studien von Renn (2006, 2013, 2018a, 2018b), dessen Begriff der "Übersetzung" und dessen diese Kategorie zentral stellenden Vorschläge zur Differenzierungstheorie für den hier behandelten Problemzusammenhang instruktiv sind.

[17] Die Relevanz von Schrift und Schriftlichkeit in ihrer Funktion für die Genese von Vergegenständlichung liegt größtenteils im blinden Fleck situationistischer Beobachtungspraxis. Zum Einfluss der Schrift auf Sprechen und Denken siehe Agel (1999) und Stetter (2007).

von der Interaktion im alltäglichen Sinne ablöst und die Marktmechanismen mit neuen und eigenen Phänomenen wie z.B. Konjunkturzyklen, globalen Geldströmen oder Inflation als nichtreduzierbare und selbstreferenzielle Phänomene entstehen lässt, die rekursive Beziehungen zu sich selbst etablieren und dabei neue interaktionsrelevante Rahmen, Normenkomplexe oder kommunikative Gattungen und damit spezifische Sequenzordnungen ausbilden, die die Kontingenz des Handelns folgenreich einschränken.

Die Rekonstruktion der Genese von unabhängigen und in diesem Sinne eben emergenten oder supervenienten Logiken ebenso wie die Erklärung von Schwellen, Phasenübergänge und Irreversibilitäten im Kontext der soziokulturellen Evolution, die zu einer langfristigen Umstellung der Praxis führen, ist aus der Analyse allein interaktiver Vollzüge nicht zu bewerkstelligen, auch weil dazu andere Vokabulare, Identitätskriterien und Geltungsbedingungen als auf der subvenienten Ebene erforderlich sind. Kurzum: Das Verhältnis von Sequenzanalyse und einer Theorie der Gesellschaft, sozialer Differenzierung und einer Theorie soziokultureller Evolution, die unter Bezug auf die Kernbegriffe Variation, Selektion und Stabilisierung aufzuklären hätte, a) warum und durch welche funktionalen und strukturellen Veränderungen sich neue Problemlösungen herausbilden und b) welche dieser Generalisierung in Form von Objektivationen und Vergegenständlichungen sich als weitgehend "einspruchsimmun" (Gehlen) erweisen und dauerhaft durchsetzen, ist bislang zumindest unterbestimmt. Dabei dürfte es unstrittig sein, dass die mit aller Sequenzialität verbundene Selektivität und Variation genau die Strukturbildung in Gang setzt, ohne die diese Evolution ihre Dynamik nicht entfalten könnte und die ja ganz unmittelbar mit dem Umstand zusammenhängt, dass Explikaktionen, Abstraktionen und die mit ihnen verschränkten Regeln eben keinen determinierenden, sondern einen eher instruierenden Status haben.

Im Lichte dieser Analyse erscheint die Rekonstruktion von Übergängen, Rekodierungen und Rekontextualisierungen nicht als Frage einer Vor- oder Nachrangigkeit oder einer hypostasierten (und gegenstandsinadäquaten) Unabhängigkeit, die man gerade unter Bezug auf das Potential der Sequenzanalyse und einer im weitesten Sinne praxeologischen Forschung mit guten Gründen abweisen kann. Das innerhalb der Systemtheorie programmatisch in Anschlag gebrachte Phänomen der "Interdependenz-Unterbrechung" (Luhmann 1997:768) in Gestalt der Annahme der Entkopplung direkter funktionaler Abhängigkeiten zugunsten eigensinniger durch jeweils spezifische Systemlogiken, nimmt Renn (2006:345ff.; 2018b:176) zum Anlass, das Verhältnis von Mikro- und Makroebenen anders als in der klassischen Lesart als Problem der Übersetzung zwischen kontext- auf der einen und system- oder organisationsspezifischen Handlungslogiken auf der anderen Seite zu begreifen. Das Auseinandertreten der Einheit von explizitem Handlungsformat und der kontextualisierten, durch implizite Normativität strukturierten einzelnen Handlung führe zu in komplexen Gesellschaften forcierten Zwängen der Rückübersetzungen in die Ebene milieuspezifisch regulierter Interaktion. Dass sich auch in den Modi gesprächsförmiger Interaktion systemisch organisierte Ordnungsbildung zeigt und umgekehrt solche Ordnungen durch veränderte gesellschaftliche Praxen irritierbar sind, dass also die von der Sequenzanalyse untersuchten lokal organisierte Formen der Handlungskoordination Effekte auf die Veränderung systemspezifischer Ordnungsformate haben können, muss schon deshalb als plausibel unterstellt werden,

weil sonst nicht verständlich würde, wieso z.B. die zu beobachtende aktuelle gesellschaftspolitische Agenda von Gleichstellung, Teilhabe, Diversity oder der Lockerung traditioneller Identitätszwänge bei gleichzeitiger Forcierung anderer Unterscheidungen die Form neuer Sprachregelungen, institutioneller Programme oder der Verrechtlichung entsprechender Praktiken annehmen kann. Dies steht nicht im Widerspruch zu dem Umstand, dass die Imperative systemischer Kontexte nur indirekt Einfluss haben können. Schließlich nehmen, wie Renn in seinen gesellschaftstheoretischen Studien betont, solche Abhängigkeiten unter den Bedingungen komplexer Gesellschaften (2018b:165)

> [...] nicht länger die Form einer direkten Intervention z. B. systemischer Imperative in lokale Lebensform oder umgekehrt: einer subjektiven Repräsentation gesellschaftlicher Bedingungen im 'Wissens-Vorrat' an, sondern sie gehen in jedem Falle den Umweg durch Sinn-*Transformationen*, die in der Summe als Übersetzungsdynamiken begriffen werden können.[18]

Gerade weil die Einbettung der Interaktion in sozial-evolutiv herausgebildete Ordnungen zu Einschränkungen des Aushandelns führen und in den Wiederholungen der Sequenzen und den Formen ihrer Performanz eine relative hohe Stabilität aufweisen, können generalisierte Strukturen, abstrakte Reglements und explizite semantische Horizonte zum Ausgangspunkt kreativer Abweichungen werden, die für die Art des Fortbestehens dieser Strukturen folgenreich sein können. Das ist deshalb zu betonen, weil die programmatisch proklamierte Flexibilität und Kreativität der Regelanwendung gerade den organisatorischen oder funktionssystemspezifischen Kodierungen geschuldet ist, die eine solche Flexibilität zulassen, ohne deren spezifische Funktionen unbedingt zu gefährden.[19]

7. Schlussfolgerungen

Die feinkörnigen Beschreibungen der Sequenzanalyse, die mittlerweile bis in multimodale Mikroanalysen kleinster Bewegungen und ihrer Funktion für die Koordination des Handelns und die Generierung und Inanspruchnahme semiotischer Ressourcen vordringen, können eindrucksvoll zeigen, wie und mittels welcher Vollzüge sich Sozialität konstituiert, Situationen initalisiert und als das verhandelt werden, was sie in den Augen der Beteiligten sind. Andererseits rücken derartige Analysen aufgrund ihres mikroskopischen Fokus einzelne Sequenzen derart in den Vordergrund, dass die Einbettung der jeweilige Situation und deren weiterer Kontext in Gestalt organisations- oder systemspezifischer Formatierungen nicht mehr als möglicher Bezugspunkt berücksichtig wird oder werden soll. Die hier vornehmlich

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[18] Der Entkopplung dieses Zusammenhangs und der damit einhergenden selbstgenügsamen Bearbeitung der Sinnkonstitution entweder in lokalen in Mikrowelten oder aber in entgegengesetzter Richtung einer auf aggregierte Daten gestützen Strukturbeschreibung will Renn (2018b) durch die Entwicklung einer "Makroanalytischen Tiefenhermeneutik" begegnen, die die multiplen Übersetzungen zwischen den Ebenen empirisch bestimmen und im Kontext einer Theorie multipler Differenzierung einsichtig machen.

[19] Gegenteiliges lässt sich etwa im Kontext schriftloser kultureller Lebensformen beobachten, in denen die Aufrechterhaltung der sozialen Ordnung an genaueste Wiederholungen von Handlungen und Handlungsketten mit vergleichsweise geringer Abweichungstoleranz gebunden ist.

beobachtbare Tendenz zu einem mitunter entfesselten Situationismus und der Überbetonung der Kreativität des Handelns hinterlässt mehrere Problemkomplexe, die noch einmal in Erinnerung zu rufen sind:

Unter Bezug auf das vermutlich wichtigste kommunikative Mittel zur Strukturierung sozialer Beziehungen, nämlich der Sprache, gibt es mit der soziokulturellen Evolution von Darstellungsmitteln mit und trotz aller Situierung auch die Emanzipation der Sprache von ihren indexikalischen Kontexten und einer sich damit herausbildenden eigenständigen Kombinationslogik. Das Diktum von der letztendlich unmöglichen "Erlösung vom Zeigfeld" hatte ja schon Karl Bühler nicht davon abgehalten, Formate bzw. jene "Gebilde" und "Geräte" zu thematisieren, die eigenständigen Formatierungsregeln gehorchen.

Im Hinblick auf das zentrale Erkenntnisinteresse an den Formen der Handlungskoordination lässt sich behaupten, dass sich die Stabilisierung entsprechender Erwartungserwartungen gerade durch die Begrenzung der Eigenlogik der interaktiven Bedeutungskonstitution realisiert. Es gilt schließlich auch die Frage zu beantworten, warum angesichts der kreativen Auslegungen von Strukturvorgaben einzelne Handlungen und Interpretationen nicht hoffnungslos auseinander laufen bis zu dem Zeitpunkt, an dem weitere Anschlusssequenzen unmöglich werden (Renn 2006:360). Der Rekonstruktion der Genese solcher Strukturvorgaben, denen man mit den Mitteln der Sequenzanalyse auf die Spur kommen kann, wäre die Einsicht zur Seite zu stellen, dass soziale Ordnungen nicht immer und nicht ausschließlich nur als Produkt von lokalen sequenziell organisierten Interaktionssystemen zu begreifen sind. Das Verhältnis solcher ad hoc-Interpretation zu Generalisierungen und der Genese derjenigen situierenden Strukturvorgaben, in die spezifische Sequenzen eingebettet sind, auf die sie verweisen und die in der Rekonstruktion funktional auszuweisen wären, bleibt innerhalb der sequenzanalystischen Perspektive, wie sie heute mehrheitlich vertreten wird, ganz offensichtlich unthematisiert. Diese Problemlage betrifft auch den möglichen Anschluss an eine durch Theorien sozialer Differenzierung inspirierte gesellschaftstheoretische Reflexionsebene, die verständlich machen sollte, inwiefern die durch ein implizites und praktisch wirksames Wissen gestützte Sequenzialität mit der ihr folgenden sozialen und kulturellen Differenzierung und den längerfristigen evolutiven und insofern irreversiblen Phasenübergängen zusammenhängen.[20]

Hier zeigt sich die hinsichtlich der Fragestellung notwendige Verschiebung der "klassischen" Objektivationsproblematik vom Interesse am Verhältnis individueller Erlebnisdimensionen oder eines wie auch immer subjektiv gemeinten Sinns zu objektiven Gebilden hin zur Programmatik interaktiver Koproduktion *sozialen* Sinns und damit zur Genese situationsübergreifender Ordnungsmuster durch Explikation, Abstraktion und Generalisierung. Bisherige Theorien der Vergegenständlichung, der Objektivierung oder der Objektivation hinterlassen bezüglich der Rekonstruktion dieser Übergänge von lokaler Sinnproduktion und kontexttranszendenten Strukturen, von der interaktiven Erzeugung über die Erfahrung ihres einschränkenden zugleich aber entlastenden Potentials bis zum Verlust über ihre Kontrolle und der damit verbundenen Differenzerfahrung zumeist eine Leerstelle. Wenn es nicht

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[20] Die Programmatik einer konsequenten Agentivierung teilt die ethnomethodologische Konversationsanalyse übrigens mit der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie (Latour 2005), was dort zu einer verstärkten Rezeption gegenüber diesem Ansatz geführt hat.

bei unverbindlichen Hinweisen auf das wechselseitiges Konstitutionsverhältnis von Handlung und Struktur oder eine Dialektik von vermeintlich subjektiven und objektiven Ebenen der Sinnkonstitution bleiben soll, bei pauschalem Verdinglichungsverdacht gegenüber Vergegenständlichungen oder dem Vorwurf des Essentialismus, dann muss die reflexive Rekonstruktion der Genese situationstranszendenter Formvorlagen des Handelns und ihr antideterministisches Verständnis als stabil und situiert zugleich an die Stelle bisheriger Positionen treten. Letztendlich bleibt die Frage aktuell, ob ein Gegengift gegen makrosoziologische Determinismen und ihre reifizierenden Vokabulare notwendig die Gestalt eines performanzbesessen interaktionstheoretischen Reduktionismus annehmen muss, der nur gelten lässt, was sich im Hier-und-Jetzt vollzieht und was sich in und durch die Methoden der Sequenzanalyse abbilden lässt.

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The method of sequence analysis within the framework of Objective Hermeneutics - Origins and exemplification

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Abstract

In Objective Hermeneutics, sequence analysis is the name of a methodical procedure for the interpretation of meaning-structured expressive forms and textual data. This contribution describes the concrete circumstances of its emergence in the context of the research project 'Elternhaus und Schule' (Parents and School), which was led by Ulrich Oevermann and colleagues in the early 1970s. The article explains the research questions, initial problems of data collection and important milestones from which sequence analysis gradually emerged. Using the example of a letter analysis from the context of youth welfare, the procedure is explained in the second, empirical part.

Keywords: sequence analysis – Objective Hermeneutics – meaning structure – Ulrich Oevermann.

German Abstract

Innerhalb der Objektiven Hermeneutik bezeichnet Sequenzanalyse ein methodisches Verfahren der Auswertung von sinnstrukturierten Ausdrucksgestalten und textförmigen Daten. Dieser Beitrag schildert die konkreten Umstände ihrer Entstehung im Kontext des Forschungsprojektes 'Elternhaus und Schule', das von Ulrich Oevermann und Kollegen Anfang der 1970er Jahre geleitet wurde. Er erläutert die Forschungsfragen, anfängliche Probleme der Datenerhebung und wichtige Wegmarken, aus denen sich allmählich die Sequenzanalyse gebildet hat. Am Beispiel einer Briefanalyse aus dem Kontext der Jugendhilfe wird das Vorgehen im zweiten, empirischen Teil erläutert.

Keywords: Sequenzanalyse – Objektive Hermeneutik – Bedeutungsstrukturen – Ulrich Oevermann.

1. Introduction

In the German speaking countries, sociology underwent an important phase of methodological innovation in the 1970s, which considerably refined its instruments of data collection and analysis and opened up new approaches to qualitative empirical research. Today, these innovations are also used in other disciplines such as anthropology, political science, education or psychology to collect and analyse non-standardised data, such as open-ended interviews, biographic narratives, group discussions, or protocols of natural interactions such as parent-child interactions or doctor-patient conversations. Today, these methods are usually labeled as 'qualitative' because they analyse 'non-numerical' data, i.e. entities that are constituted by language and semantic or symbolic meaning. They include a wide range of methodological traditions, ranging from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to various discourse-analytical, content-analytical, and interpretive social-phenomenological methods.

During that era, a group of sociologists with an interest in the sociology of language played a decisive part in this innovative development. Within various research projects, several research groups were formed from the 1970s onwards, which tested new methods in parallel with each other and established their own approaches in the process. Some of these methodological groups were inspired by developments in the USA and are now well connected to the international discourse. These include, for example, the work of Jörg Bergmann or Fritz Schütze, who fostered the ethnomethodological approach and conversation analysis in Germany (Kallmeyer/Schütze 1976). Other approaches have emerged largely independently of the English-language discourse on methodology and have so far not been widely received in the English-speaking world. This is especially true of Objective Hermeneutics, although it has produced a completely independent methodology.

The fact that there has been little reception of Objective Hermeneutics in the English-speaking world might also be related to some practical hurdles. Objective hermeneutics has produced a method that is geared towards a very literal and detailed interpretation of linguistic data and requires extensive linguistic competence of the social researcher in the language of the data. Since Objective Hermeneutics originated in the German-speaking world, most analyses have been developed on German-language data. Admittedly, some analyses have long been available on data from the English-speaking world and there are also presentations of the method in English.[1] But Objective Hermeneutics is still hardly practiced and taught in the English-speaking countries and is therefore less well known. In a sense, the method is waiting to be discovered internationally.

In this contribution, the context of the emergence of Objective Hermeneutics will be briefly sketched. The original questions and research problems from which the methodological procedure emerged in the early 1970s will be described and some basic features of its methodology will be presented. Emphasis will be placed on the concept of sequence and sequentiality, which is used differently in Objective Hermeneutics than it was by the founders of conversation analysis Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (part 2). After that, the basic rules of methodology and procedural doctrine of Objective Hermeneutics are briefly explained

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[1] A list of English-language publications on and deriving from Objective Hermeneutics can be found here: https://www.agoh.de/bibliographie/literaturdatenbank/englische-texte.html

(part 3). Finally, an example of sequence analysis is given based on a letter from a girl to her sister (part 4), before returning to the notion of sequentiality in the conclusion.

2. The Emergence of Objective Hermeneutics

Objective Hermeneutics emerged in the early 1970s in the context of a research project funded by the Max Planck Society in Berlin entitled *Elternhaus und Schule'* (Parental home and School), which was intended to examine children's success at school in the context of different social influencing factors. In the context of educational policy debates of the 1960s and 1970s in West Germany, this project aimed to focus primarily on non-school influencing factors that affected learning processes. That included personal factors such as intelligence, motivational structures, children's extracurricular interests and hobbies, milieu-specific characteristics of the parental home such as level of education, occupation, regional culture or religion, as well as family-specific and micro-sociological factors such as parenting styles, language codes or educational practices, for example in supporting homework. This project *Elternhaus und Schule'* ran between 1968 and 1974 and was led by Ulrich Oevermann, Lothar Krappmann and Kurt Kreppner.[2]

One focus was on the effects of educational styles on learning performance and school motivation. Oevermann had previously introduced the British sociolinguist Basil Bernstein's distinction between elaborated and restricted code into the German debate as part of his dissertation and now wanted to make this approach fruitful for other questions (Oevermann 1970; Bernstein 1964). From today's perspective, the methodological approach of this ambitious project was quite conventional: the original plan was to conduct a comprehensive survey of standardised data representing the various factors and then to analyse these data sets using correlation analysis. The survey was to be conducted by means of a questionnaire, which was to contain scales as well as yes/no answers, and which was to be sent to about one thousand households with children between 4 to 6 years of age.

In preparation for the creation of such a questionnaire, individual families were first to be visited and observed in their everyday life. The project leaders wanted to study typical parent-child interactions more closely in order to be able to formulate the questions of the questionnaire more precisely and purposefully. Typical situations of a family were to be observed: having dinner together, helping with homework, or playing the board game 'Mensch-Ärgere-Dich-Nicht' (known in the English-speaking world as Ludo or Parcheesi). Some families were also selected who were known to receive support from the youth welfare office because the families were financially or otherwise burdened. These family observations were mainly carried out by Oevermann and his co-worker at the time, Yvonne Schütze.

In addition to the observations that took place in teams of two, many interactions were recorded using an audio recorder with a tape reel. This was to compensate for the disadvantages of observation. It had already become apparent at the beginning

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[2] I refer to various sources on what happened, in particular to some conversations I was able to have with Oevermann, most recently in the spring of 2021. Of particular interest is the reproduction of a long conversation between Oevermann, Fritz Schütze, Detlev Garz, Klaus Kraimer and Gerhard Riemann on the beginnings of Objective Hermeneutics: Garz/Kraimer/Riemann (2019); cf. also my earlier account, which also includes the later development (Franzmann 2016).

of the project that the social researchers were not able to record all the information and impressions that seemed important to them in a situation, because the processes and interactions were simply too complex. Sometimes important information was missing, e.g. the number of dice in a game, and sometimes it turned out afterwards how important the exact wording of a statement would have been, but this was not available and could not be recalled from memory without gaps. The project members subsequently had the problem of no longer fully recognising the situation they had experienced in their notes. If, on the other hand, meticulousness in note-taking was increased, the attention to other details during the situations suffered. Thus, the impression remained that observation as a method, as indispensable as it is in the social sciences, does not do justice to the complexity of such social situations and remains comparatively incomplete and superficial. Therefore, the situations were recorded with the help of an audio device from the Revox company. It supported the project members and gave them the opportunity to focus on those aspects of the situation that the recording device could not capture. This was especially important for the Ludo game. In order to be able to adequately interpret the interactions of the adults and children, the exchanges of words were recorded. But at the same time the emotional movements of the players were noted by the observer and the numbers thrown on the dice or the moves on the game board were also recorded, so that one could better understand the overall events and know which events the spoken contributions reacted to.

What was initially intended as an aid shifted in importance over time: the observation notes complemented the audio recordings, not the other way around. The audio recordings had the unbeatable advantage that their content was an authentic protocol of what actually happened. They reproduce and hold the lively interactions of a family as they actually took place, albeit limited to the auditory dimension.[3] However, this expanded the methodological operations. One could listen to the recordings again and again, make them the subject of one's interpretations, but also compare one's interpretations with the wording. Another advantage of recordings is that, unlike observation notes, they have not passed through a filter of subjectivity, a filter of the current attention, interpretive capacities or prejudice structures of the social scientists themselves. They give a raw but undisguised and unabridged account of what happened, creating a kind of corrective to the datum against hasty, simplistic or ideological conclusions.[4] They enable a method-critical discussion

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[3]   In opposition to other traditions of audio analysis, Objective Hermeneutics rests on the assumption that the audio recordings preserve an authentic reflection of what actually happened. Authenticity in this context is to be understood as a term that refers to an occurrence or happening, which really took place. The recording preserves a trace, a leftover, which is technically produced. The recording preserves insofar the situation itself and everything which was technically detectable. Of course, the range of data represented in a recording is limited by the possibilities of the technology. Audio recordings are limited to the audible range, sounds, noises, speeches. Video technology extends the range of recording to the visible range, but still includes limitations, especially of perspective. Nevertheless, such recordings contain the situation itself as it was, what was really spoken, authentic, unaltered, or - for whom this sounds too ontological - something of it, a trace that allows us to reconstruct operating structures in a situation. However, this is always only possible as far as the data available to us allow. Therefore, the interpretation of data in Objective Hermeneutics is always only an approximation to reality.

[4]   In Objective Hermeneutics, the recording of a natural practice is preferred to any other method of data production, as long as it is technically possible and there are no ethical reasons for not

about which interpretations do justice to what has actually happened, and helps confirm whether the interpretation actually takes adequate account of all phenomena in the record and whether it explicates them in a logic and comprehensible way.[5]

2.1. Protocols and transcription

However, the advantage of logging social interactions using audio devices only really becomes tangible when the audio recordings are also transcribed. From linguistics and conversation analysis, the demand for the most accurate transcription possible was already known at that time. In the transcript, not only are phonemes transferred into graphemes, but an originally diachronic event, which on the audio tape still presents itself as a fleeting practice and temporal succession of linguistic utterances, is transferred into a synchronic-spatial structure. This structure is one whereby the written language provides the natural notational system of this transfer and the utterances are reproduced line by line as a spatial succession according to the reading direction of a language (e.g. from top left to right, in Indo-European languages). With such transcripts, many things become methodically possible again that would otherwise remain unthinkable: the reproduction of the wording can be checked on the tape and made more precise. One does not have to constantly rewind if a statement is to be interpreted, as one can deal with the question of what a statement means while reading.

Such interaction transcripts hold many astonishing experiences in store for scientists. One immediately notices, for example, how grammatically impure the spoken language often is, how many pauses, sentence breaks, nested sentences are employed. This observation had already inspired Chomsky to claim that children's language acquisition could never be explained by mere imitative learning, because parents do not present the many rules of a language adequately and without error. An inferential rule consciousness must be assumed in the native speaker, which reconstructs the rules of a language from the incorrect language material presented.

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doing so. Protocols of natural practice are also used in other schools of social research methodology, but they have a specific status in Objective Hermeneutics. Protocols are data collected in situ, as Oevermann calls it in reference to medicine or archaeology and palaeontology: images of real events in their original position without distorting or superimposing changes. In this respect, the protocol establishes its own type of data, for which there must be a corresponding method of evaluation. A method that is capable of adapting to the character and content of those protocols and unlocking their content.

5   The problem of reactivity, i.e. the concern that the collection of the protocols could change the situation itself to such an extent that the structures would no longer be reflected unaltered, is something I will only briefly address here. The concern was initially shared and discussed in Objective Hermeneutics, but the sequence analyses of the family structures contained in the material soon fostered the conviction, still widely shared in Objective Hermeneutics today, that the presence of outside social researchers or the seemingly artificial situations of interviews or conversation recordings is not a real problem. It may indeed have an influence on the spontaneity of the interactants. But one can trust that the structures one is interested in will express the relational logic of a family anyway. Parents with authoritarian parenting styles, for example, would not, or only very rarely, allow themselves to be carried away into rudely snapping at or chastising their child in recording situations. And yet such a parenting style is expressed and is usually easy to understand. Linguistic interaction usually depicts much more than people are aware of and can control, including unconscious dispositions or things that should not leak out. Therefore, the problem of reactivity is not considered to be so important.

Another observation concerns the idioms, the many linguistic peculiarities of oral language. Above all, however, one has the succession of utterances spatially in front of one and can discuss the question of what an utterance means along the lines of the question of at which point in a speech and utterance an interpretative option is raised and at which point it is eliminated. The notation of written language makes it possible to break down what is said into units that are arranged in a sequence.

But which aspects should one use to explore such transcribed interactions between parents and their children? What can a methodological approach be based on? Oevermann and his colleagues in the project 'Parents and School' arrived at their own approach only after a phase of experimenting with different options and experiencing various wrong turns and detours.[6]

During the trial phase, 1969-1974, conversation analytic approaches had also been considered. Oevermann oriented himself for a while on Labov or Wunderlich and also on Robert Freed Bales' model of interaction process analysis for observing small groups. There was also a DFG group on 'Verbal Interaction' involving the sociologists Fritz Schütze, Thomas Luckmann or the linguists Konrad Ehlich, Jochen Rehbein and Norbert Dittmar (cf. Ploder 2018). Oevermann withdrew from this group, again because, in his view, the type of interaction analysis practiced there was driven by a linguistic interest in general flow diagrams of conversations. His real interest was in specific family constellations and his questions were originally sociological. He thus wanted to know how the internal life of a family could be understood from the recorded family interactions and how the structural interrelationships between the way parents and children interacted in everyday life and the children's learning processes at school could be investigated. He was convinced that conversation analysis and linguistics could contribute to this goal. But he was also convinced of the necessity to go beyond them and find a way to evaluate the observations and interaction protocols in such a way that, on the one hand, the specifics of a family could be worked out from them and, on the other hand, the transferable dimensions and impact factors could be made visible.[7]

At some point the debates in the group on sociology of language petered out because they became unfruitful, and Oevermann recalls the situation as follows (Garz/Kraimer/Riemann 2016:22; translation by the author):

> How do you evaluate the things now? Then I realised that the instruments that were available were not sufficient. We tried things out for a long time. It was a dramatic process with many arguments. And at some point it died, and then I turned the rudder around 180 degrees... . Now, in addition, I did most of the observations myself together with Yvonne Schütze... And we knew the families really well. So that we could say that in what we now find out with the instruments, mostly classification systems, i.e. subsumption logic, ... we do not recognise our cases sufficiently. So at some point we relied on our perception.

Oevermann thus tried to avert the threat of the failure of the project by no longer work with known models at all and trying something completely new. Obviously, his own experience played an important role in this as, similar to the observation notes themselves, all the models that had been used did not seem to do justice to the

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[6] A first systematic presentation of the methodology of Objective Hermeneutics was presented at the Sociology Congress in Kassel in 1976, and the first relevant publication followed in 1979 (Oevermann/Allert/Konau/Krambeck 1979).

[7] I am referring to an interview with Oevermann in the summer of 2020.

complexity of real family life as it was experienced in practice. The impression always remained that important dimensions and relationships could not be adequately represented through those models. When Oevermann says that he then relied on his perception, this of course does not in itself describe a method, but at best offers a habitual corrective against reductionist models. Habitual corrective means a perceived discrepancy between empirical data and personally observed reality that appeared to be much more complex. However, this corrective had an important consequence. Oevermann then began to read the transcripts of the protocols without preconceptions and search schemes. He brushed aside all questions of how one could identify and read out any features and codings in these texts and set about understanding the interactions from the linguistic material alone, as far as possible without presuppositions.

If one chooses such an approach, one must first read the text. Here one encounters a simple initial question. How far must one read in order to understand an utterance? Should one read it in its entirety, i.e. to the end of a speech, because only then will one know what something is leading up to? Or should you read the counter-speech of an interlocutor, for example, because then you know the reactions of the interlocutor and how he or she received that speech? Or should you read a transcript in its entirety before interpreting it, because then you can better assess all the turns of phrase and themes? One can already see from this simple question how many different options and pitfalls there are. On this question, too, Oevermann arrived at a radically different practice after trial and error, namely a form of interpretation diametrically opposed to normal reading habits. He thus made it a rule to initially read only so far until a first chance opened up in the text to form a reading. This could come after the first word, a clearing of the throat or after a sentence, any meaning-bearing unit that allows one to ask the question: What does it mean and who could have said it under what circumstances?

2.2. Developing a new method of interpretation

By following this procedure, Oevermann reacted to the experience that reading larger sections of text, no matter how comprehensive they are, always only leads to the fact that one can no longer control the formation of readings. This was the case, for example, when individual sections of an actor's speech were read, and even more so when entire changes of interaction were read in one piece. If you proceed in this way, the formation of readings becomes completely uncontrollable after only a few sentences. It is simply too complex. It is no longer possible to keep track of which readings come up at which point, and at which point they are refuted and excluded if necessary.

Reading large amounts of text is an understandable procedure because it corresponds to our reading habit, but it is useless scientifically. For understanding, a comparison of practical understanding and methodical understanding is helpful. In practice, people usually proceed by reading or listening in such a way that they abandon themselves to a text until it has come to a natural end. Reading long passages and listening until a speaker has spoken is the norm. In oral interactions, this is already a requirement of politeness. Even when reading written texts, one trusts that an author has worked through her or his text editorially in such a way that one may abandon oneself to it. Such abandonment is only interrupted in exceptional

cases when there are manifest crises of comprehension and we can no longer make sense of a text, which we then indicate by frowning, questioning or other gestures of incomprehension. We are even prepared to bridge any difficulties of understanding that arise for a long time by continuing to listen and hoping that any misunderstanding that arises will be clarified by later statements. Such an advance on sense is necessary in practical conversations, but scientific understanding must proceed in exactly the opposite way. Various arguments support this claim (cf. Oevermann/Allert/Konau/Krambeck 1976):

(i) Unlike practical understanding, methodological understanding cannot afford to start with the assumption that there is always already a consistent meaning inherent in the text, and that we only have to follow a speaker/author long enough for it to be presented to us or for it to become apparent to us. On the one hand, this would underestimate the possibility that in verbal interactions there can also be logical breaks, inconsistencies, ambiguities, which are not mere linguistic errors, but in themselves meaningful indications of structures of personality operating behind the language, the social relational structure of a family, milieu-specific patterns of interpretation, and so on. On the other hand, one would unquestioningly follow the assumption that we as interpreters want above all to understand what a speaker wants to say, i.e. what his or her intentionality is. So, it is important to understand what he actually said. One must not unquestioningly assume that the two coincide. It is about the difference between what is objectively said and what is subjectively meant. This would mean that a speaker/author more or less consciously controls and masters the meaning of his speech, or that if he fails to do so, it was merely a matter of linguistic errors. This is a misleading assumption. The expressive forms of human interactions also contain motives and motivations that a speaker/author need not always be aware of and cannot control, an observation also emphasised by neuroscience and previously by psychoanalysis. And an analysis of interaction protocols also confirms that neither the speakers nor even the listeners to a speech can be fully aware of the complexity of what is being said.

(ii) Another argument concerns the sequentiality of the interactions themselves: Interactions are a sequence of individual acts that react to each other. In the interaction protocols, these are speech acts. At that time, Oevermann was already familiar with speech act theory, probably through Habermas (cf. Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Every speech act produces meanings and is structured or framed by the type of speech act, (assertion, question, promise etc.). Each of these utterances is to be understood as a reaction to preceding utterances, insofar as it responds in some way to what was said before, just as it in turn represents a potential stimulus for subsequent utterances. But what does 'react' mean in the context of speech acts? It means that an actor (B) has not only heard the utterance of an interlocutor (A) but has inwardly interpreted it and given it a mental representation. Interpretation here means taking meaning from a linguistic material, and something is meaningful to us when we know what follows from something said and how we can react to it.[8] So action structures meaning, and meaning structures action. Something has mean-

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[8] Oevermann later referred to authors of American pragmatism, first and foremost Charles S. Peirce, as well as George Herbert Mead, but also to Noam Chomsky or Claude Levi-Strauss, for the methodological justification of Objective Hermeneutics.

ing when a structured set of possible actions logically follows from it. Understanding a speech act therefore means knowing what to do and being able to design meaningful responses. Which of these possible actions actually takes place is then no longer the decision of the speaker (A), but a function of the selection that person (B) makes from the set of possible responses.

Now, on the one hand, the methodological question arises as to how one can actually recognise whether an interlocutor has understood the utterance of an interlocutor correctly and completely. We cannot look into the head of an interpreter. Subjectivity is never directly accessible, introspection is not an acceptable intersubjectively testable method. As external observers, we can only indirectly conclude from the reactions how the interlocutor has received the utterance. But we only recognise from this whether there must have been a meaningful interpretation, because a response forms a logically meaningful connection and the interaction continues in a meaningful way. However, whether the actor had actually understood all possible interpretations of what was said and had actually mentally gone through all conceivable meaningful connections usually remains hidden from us. On the other hand, however, the question arises of the factors and patterns according to which an interpreter takes in the wording of an utterance and extracts a meaning from it. This is what the project *Elternhaus und Schule* (Parents and School) was interested in, because it asked about parenting styles and educational practices and their significance for success at school. What mental structure determines how certain interpretations are created and connections formed or not in interactions with children?[9] In order to be able to discuss such a question based on linguistic material, one must first have designed and worked out oneself which options of interpretation a given utterance raises and which it excludes. So we must first interpret a sequence ourselves and explicate possible readings that can be brought up and that represent a meaningful connection within a data. Only then, when we have such a foil, can we ask which of the objectively possible interpretations may have been taken up by the actor and which not.[10] Only with such a draft of objective options of interpretation can the subsequent utterance in turn be interpreted in terms of the open interpretations a speaker takes up and how he or she does so.

We can make a certain argumentative shortcut at this point. Oevermann did not relate this logic of reconstructing meaningful connections solely to the sequence of whole speech units in an interaction, but already did so in relation to the smallest meaningful units of an expressive gestalt within a speaker's speech. In this context, the term *gestalt* is used without any specific reference to gestalt theory. He means a formation of possibilities. Objective Hermeneutics prefers the concept of structure, which is not understood as a static entity, but as a process-like order of sequence.

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[9] In 1973, Oevermann began to work out theoretically what he meant by mental structures as an interpretation model. Later, he differentiated the model and supplemented it by habitus formations that are unconscious, worldviews and ideologies (Oevermann 1973, cf. Oevermann 2001).

[10] The concept of objective possibilities was first introduced in German sociology by Max Weber, even though Weber did not yet refer to linguistic options for interpretation, but more generally to real options for action in a concrete situation. The name of the method 'Objective Hermeneutics' is derived from the same basic idea. It is not a matter of assuming that an objective interpretation could be achieved with the help of the method, which would no longer be contestable, but rather that with its help the field of objectively given possible interpretations in a concrete data can be methodically opened up.

As a consequence of these considerations, a practice of hermeneutic text interpretation was developed that explicates readings along the natural course of speech acts and adapts to the sequences of linguistic utterances. This gave rise to the methodological procedure of sequence analysis, which is considered the core of Objective Hermeneutics.

2.3. From sequence to sequence analysis

Sequences are understood as units of action in a dynamic order of actions. The term sequence in Objective Hermeneutics refers to meaning-bearing elements in a protocol and is not congruent with the way it is used in conversation analysis. Sequences are first of all linguistic signs, sentences, utterances which, in a sequential order controlled by syntactic rules, produce a structure of meaning which can be interpreted on its own. 'Meaning structure' refers to the set or totality of possible interpretative options opened up by the wording of the text. Their development takes place by first patiently interpreting an initial utterance and explaining what it can mean: Who could have meaningfully said such an utterance under which circumstances? At the beginning, this can also be an audible sigh or a prolonged 'ah' that makes a first interpretation necessary. Only when all possible options of readings have been pronounced does the analysis progress and move on to a next sequence, whereby it is then deduced from the sensible connection which of the previously opened interpretations can be continued with a second sequence and which interpretations are eliminated or which ambiguities, if any, remain. Between the sequences, therefore, there are basic, logical relationships of meaning and sequence. Sequences are therefore not to be equated with a linguistic unit, e.g. with a sentence, nor diffusely with non-linguistic units of action.

Understanding the sequential order of meanings seems to be a special feature of Objective Hermeneutics. In any case, there are hardly any cross-references to the conversation analysis of Sacks or Schegloff, in which the concept of sequence is also prominently used and applied to the sequence of interactions. Oevermann has linked the concept of sequence with the meaning-generating structures of language controlled by syntactic rules and in doing so has oriented himself more towards Chomsky's linguistics (Chomsky 1957, 1965), although Chomsky does not use the concept of sequence himself. Linguists like Chomsky are more oriented towards the question of how syntax and grammatical rules can be adequately described and explained. How is the position of individual linguistic word categories in a linguistic unit such as the sentence assigned and how must the words be constituted (inflected) so that they are considered to conform to the rules and be perceived as well-formed by a listener/speaker of a language? The interest in the grammatical production structure of language aims at the rule system of a single language itself and the fact that language can produce an infinite number of sentences with a finite number of rules (Humboldt 1998). This is also relevant to sociology, insofar as it relates to linguistic data. However, sociology does not want to understand grammatical structures for their own sake, but those parameters which, beyond the grammatical and pragmatic rules, explain the concrete contents and expressive forms of linguistic products. This not only means rules of pragmatism, but also parameters that operate in a respective concrete practice, e.g. the relational logic of a family, the parenting styles of parents. Oevermann uses linguistic knowledge to analyse the laws of the

social operating behind language, i.e. those parameters that are responsible for a listener/speaker speaking his or her sentence in a certain way in a certain situation.

Although Oevermann had postponed collaboration with linguists and conversation analysts for the reasons mentioned above, modern linguistics nevertheless plays a major role in the emergence of Objective Hermeneutics. Following Noam Chomsky's theory of language, it is possible to make use of the fact that native speakers have an intuitive awareness of grammatical rules that allows them to form linguistically well-formed sentences, i.e. sentences that conform to the rules, or to recognise and correct non-rule-conforming constructions. From this, Chomsky's linguistics derives the assumption that it must be possible to determine in principle for every linguistic entity whether it is appropriate or not, which makes it possible to reconstruct the rule effective behind it. Doubtful cases are an exception and can usually be overcome with the formation of clear cases.

The concept of rules is central to Objective Hermeneutics. Oevermann made use of Chomsky´s argument of an intuitive awareness of rules, which is available to every native speaker, for the analysis of meaning structures. He saw the possibility of interpreting the protocols of family interactions directly and asking at each sequence point of a text which potential readings are opened up by the text itself. It is left to the subsequent sequences to reveal which of the hypothetical readings raised are continued or discarded in the protocol. The meaning structures generated in this process are objective insofar as it is assumed that the interpretive options raised in the text are given independently of the interpreters, even if it requires appropriation for a meaning structure to be mentally manifested. The claim, then, is that it is not the scholarly interpreter who constructs the readings, but the text itself.

The goal of interpretation is the formation of a case hypothesis about the parameters operative in a life practice, which, beyond the rules of grammar, pragmatics, etc., control the selection of interpretive options. Such a hypothesis becomes possible as soon as a pattern emerges in a text over several sequences and selections of an interpretive option become permanent or repeated. This points to deep-seated habitual routines and patterns of action.

3. Basic rules of sequence analysis in Objective Hermeneutics

Sequence analysis follows three basic rules with which the procedure is condensed (cf. Oevermann 2002).

3.1. Totality rule

All conceivable 'readings' raised by the wording of a first sequence are to be explicated. In doing so, the interpreters ask: 'Which person could have said such a statement under which circumstances to whom and what does it mean?' Readings that seem unusual or meaningless or that one already thinks will not apply should also be explicitly raised. All readings that can be applied from the wording are to be made explicit. The goal is maximum accuracy and appreciation of detail. It is best to work together in a team because this ensures that no readings are forgotten or left out. For the practice of reading, this means that one should not continue reading until all readings have been made explicit!

3.2. Literalness / Thrift / Frugality

The second rule of literalness is a complementary rule to the rule of totality. All readings should be raised, but ideally only those that are really covered by the wording. Constructions that go beyond this, that hypothetically design those conditions under which something could have been said by adding complex assumptions, should be avoided, because they cannot be methodically controlled and decided at this point in the sequence. What is required are those readings that must be, not those that can be. In the practice of analysis, this makes it necessary to learn how to critically weigh readings according to whether they contain more complex assumptions or implications. What is required is to use such assumptions sparingly and to favour those readings that have the fewest assumptions. Linked to the rule of parsimony is the requirement of not adding contextual information for interpretation unless this is absolutely necessary. Instead, a text should always be interpreted from within itself before information from other sources about the case, an author or an era is consulted. This is called: 'Immanence before context!' Exceptions are only recognised in relation to proper names or historical data.

3.3. Sequentiality

Only when all the readings of a first sequence have been explicated does one move on to the next sequence and continue the interpretation. This next sequence is not interpreted in isolation, but the formation of the readings is continued following the first sequence. The question is asked which readings can be continued in the light of the second sequence and which are eliminated. In most cases, some of the initially applied interpretations are already eliminated here. However, only those readings that are really logically no longer tenable are excluded. Therefore, as the sequence analysis progresses, it remains important to always remember the original readings and for all open interpretive paths to formulate what a subsequent utterance sequence means for them. Through this procedure, readings are not only evaluated logically in the sense of a logical connection or exclusion, they are updated and enriched in terms of content, becoming more concise and more contoured.

In this way, it becomes possible that the answers to the question posed at the beginning, namely, 'Who could have said this statement and under what circumstances to whom?' allow increasingly clear statements to be made about the situation and the persons acting in it, and furthermore about the nature of their relationship.

3.4. From text interpretation to case hypothesis

The analysis of the meaning structures of texts is not an end in itself but pursues the goal of reconstructing the generative structures in a practice that has produced a textual form of expression. As soon as this is possible, an initial hypothesis is formed in Objective Hermeneutics. This is the case, for example, when one notices that ways and modes of speaking are repeated or that certain behaviours or interpretations are repeated and solidified, although one can design in the analysis that

it could also be otherwise. This points to structural routines and deep-seated patterns. Here, a methodological operation of cross-checking begins again that is in a sense one level of explication higher. Cross-checking means the targeted search for possible text passages that could falsify the hypothesis.

The checking of a case hypothesis takes place either on other passages in the same text or on other data that comes from the same practice and is a possible falsifier.11 Once a case hypothesis has been formulated, a targeted search is made for passages that could be possible falsifiers, because they do not easily conform to an emerging interpretation. If a case hypothesis is confirmed and repeated, one can ask what predictions the case hypothesis regarding the people who produced the interaction protocols.

In the next chapter, I will illustrate the basic features of the procedure with the example of a letter.

4. 'Dear Angelina' - A letter analysis as an example

The letter does not come from the data of the project 'Parents and School,' but from a completely different, much more recent context. The background is not even a research project, but a question in the context of a pedagogical intervention practice in youth welfare. More will be mentioned about this later. The letter is nevertheless well suited for exemplifying the procedure because it is short and because it allows the development of a relatively far-reaching case hypothesis on the structural background of its occasion and the life practice from which it emerges in relatively few sentences.

The letter is reproduced anonymously for reasons of data protection and is also not reproduced in facsimile. The addressee also does not need to know more. A few pieces of information on the context will be added after the analysis. At this point, only its wording will concern us.

The letter begins with a typical German form of address.

(Sequence 1) 'Liebe Angelina' (Dear Angelina)

This form of address contrasts with formal forms of address such as 'Sehr geehrte' ('Dear Madame'), which are common in business letters or letters from authorities, law firms or companies. Formal forms of address would always be appropriate in German when people are not known to each other and face each other in a role-like manner. To address a complete stranger as 'dear' would risk being perceived as hastily friendly, as aloof and encroaching. The underlying pragmatic rule is that a form of address must always do justice to a person's social position, and that strangers first meet each other in a respectfully distanced manner before choosing forms of address that presuppose closeness and familiarity. A business letter or similar can therefore be practically ruled out at this point.

The form of address implies familiarity and closeness, as is customary among people who know each other well and feel a friendship or are even related to each

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11 The term *practice* (Praxis) has become a basic concept in Oevermann's sociology and has been elaborated by him since the 1970s in the theoretical pair of terms of crisis and routine. A summary of his work on that topic can be found in his farewell lecture *Krise und Routine als analytisches Paradigma in den Sozialwissenschaften* (Oevermann 2016).

other. Among spouses, relatives, friends or friendly colleagues, the form of address is customary today, especially if they have offered each other the 'Du.' Incidentally, a familiar form of address, 'dear,' is always appropriate and customary when addressing children, even when addressed by adults who do not know the child.

Unlike phrases such as 'hello' or 'hi,' this form of address has a semantic meaning in that it predicates the person being addressed. 'Liebe/Dear' implies that a person is benevolent, sympathetic, lovable, not evil. Children are assumed to be 'lieb/kind' per se, which is probably to be understood as an expression of an assumed childlike innocence, whereas for adults this cannot necessarily be assumed. The formal address respectfully leaves this question undecided.

Furthermore, we can infer that the person addressed is female and that she is being doted upon, another expression of familiarity and closeness. The salutation 'dear' can also exist in combination with a surname, for example 'Dear Mrs. Herzog,' while the reverse usage 'Dear Angelina' is practically excluded. Addressing someone by their first name therefore either speaks for a relationship between people who have been familiar with each other for a long time or intend to be familiar. Or here a person is speaking to a child.

> (Sequence 2) 'Heute mochte ich mich bei dir melden.' / 'Today I wanted to get in touch with you.'

The letter begins with a deictic reference to a period of time. In contrast to yesterday or tomorrow, it refers to the current day. This period refers to a concrete event. 'Today' formally encompasses the time between 0:00 a.m. and midnight, and in practical terms the time between waking up in the morning and going to sleep in the evening. The word opens a statement about this day. 'Today is the day when...'; 'today the following happened'; 'today I did/will do such and such,' etc.

It is striking that the sentence is then continued in the past tense. This is also unusual in German, even if it does not violate the rules. Those who are familiar with the German language could read it as a typing or spelling mistake, and that the two dots above the ö have been forgotten. Then the o would be read as ö ('would like') and the word would not be read in the past tense but in the present tense. However, this would undermine the literalness rule of the sequence analysis and possibly skip a reading. A spelling mistake cannot be ruled out, but we must take the trouble to also look for a meaningful interpretation for the use of the past tense. And one can also find an option:

Reported is an impulse, an impulse to an action. The verb 'liked,' from 'to like,' means that something should be done gladly. However, it is reported as if this impulse had occurred earlier in the day, did not immediately turn into action, and was only carried out later. Something inhibited or hindered the concrete execution of the writing of the letter. The impulse could not be acted upon spontaneously. The desire to establish contact must have been irritated or unsettled by something. And this complicated and puzzling inhibition of the impulse is reported, indeed it is with this that the letter is begun. So it does come to fruition later, but only in that this inhibition is expressed in it. It is placed at the beginning of the letter, as if the letter writer wanted to remember the original impulse again at the moment of writing. In this way, he or she is communicating more than simply the completion of a contact.

The word 'melden' now makes it clear that it is initially only a matter of establishing a contact in the first place. The word 'melden' has many technical connotations in German and is used in 'Meldewesen' (reporting system), 'polizeiliche Meldestelle' (police reporting office), 'eine Meldung machen' (make a report) etc. It also means in the present sentence that a contact is to be established. What is presupposed here, however, is that it is not a matter of transmitting information, but of establishing or renewing a contact that is to be established for its own sake. The author of the letter thus assumes that Angelina and the letter writer already have a relationship, a contact, and that the author wants to refresh the relationship after a long time. The contact is itself the information, or that there was an impulse to do so. It expresses an interest in Angelina, a desire for a mutual exchange.

We can now hypothetically consider at this point which person might have said something like this in which situation. Speaking for oneself, this is still comparatively vague and abstract at this early stage. It is conceivable, for example, that a person is trying to resume contact with a friend after a long break or even after an argument. This does not happen unencumbered, not spontaneously, as she still has to overcome herself. What could be the reason for her inhibited impulse? Either she is afraid of being rejected again or she has difficulty taking the first step and overcoming her pride. In any case, it is assumed that Angelina is not a complete stranger and that the desire for contact follows on from something that has already been shared.

(Sequence 3) 'Ich bin deine Schwester Emma' / 'I am your sister Emma.'

The sender now introduces herself. She marks her kinship relationship to the addressee and predicates herself from Angelina's perspective in the position she occupies for Angelina in the kinship system. Logically, it follows that both have the same mother or father or parents. The reading according to which a religious clergywoman could also express herself here can be ruled out, because she would have introduced herself as 'Sister Emma' without the personal pronoun ('your'). The personal pronoun forces the assumption of a kinship category. Logically, by the way, it is possible that there are other sisters with other names.

For the outsider, it becomes apparent that there must be exceptional circumstances here, because obviously the sisters do not know each other at all. They have either never lived together or it may have been only a short period of time long ago, so that they have subsequently lost touch with each other. It is not even certain whether Angelina even knows of her sister's existence. On the other hand, a quarrel can be ruled out as the background, because in such a case Emma would not introduce herself as if she were a stranger. Siblings who quarrel break off contact, sometimes to the point of death, but they still know very well who they are even after decades, and even if they would perhaps no longer recognise each other. Here, however, practical life contact can be ruled out; it is opened with this letter in the first place.

Such contact now raises numerous questions: Does one of the sisters still live with their parents? What are the reasons for their separation? Here, too, various options can be sketched out: Either the children have been orphaned and separated by a catastrophe such as war, displacement, accident or illness, or the parents had to give up or relinquish at least one of the girls sometime after their birth, so that she grew up elsewhere. A third option would be that the girls do not have the same

mother, but the same father, who had another child with another woman outside of an existing or then existing relationship, so that the sisters grew up separately from each other.

> (Sequence 4) 'Ich bin 12 Jahre alt und lebe schon 10 Jahre und ein halbes Jahr in meiner Pflegefamilie.' / 'I am 12 years old and have been living in my foster family for 10 years and a half.'

The introduction continues, the reading finds its affirmation, after the two do not know each other. What does it mean when a girl is 12 years old? Some general characteristics can be listed. At twelve, a girl is at the beginning or in the middle of her puberty. The physical change towards sexual maturity has begun. Menstruation may have started, for example, and their appearance changes. In many industrialised countries, 12-year-olds already attend secondary school, the sixth or seventh grade depending on the age of enrolment and the school system. According to Piaget's developmental psychology, at the age of 12 adolescents are in the transition between the concrete-operational and formal-operational phases of their cognitive thinking. With the onset of adolescence, the desire for independence becomes great, questions about one's own identity become important: Who am I and will I be? What do I want to do with my life? Where do I come from? Detachment from the parental home is on the horizon with its many positive gains in freedom as well as threatening demands. Conflicts about domestic rules and norms are increasing. Contact with friends in the peer group is becoming more and more important and young people are very concerned with themselves and their appearance and how they are seen in the eyes of others. Of course, we don't know what exactly applies to Emma and how she experiences her twelfth year. But it can be hypothetically narrowed down.

If she now writes that she has been living in 'her' foster family for ten and a half years, this gives us further information that we can enter into the interpretation. First of all: She would have lived with her mother for a maximum of one and a half years, if there was no other previous outside care in infancy. It is striking that she explicitly mentions the half year and does not round it off. It seems to be very important to her to count each half year. She counts the years and the months, something that children living with their birth parents would never do in this way, because birth and admission to a family or length of stay and age would coincide and would never be considered worth mentioning. Here, however, the two stand apart. There was a life before foster care and a life after removal from the milieu of origin.

Life in the foster family is thus perceived and presented as a kind of special achievement. This special achievement is to be understood in a positive way: It is not 'counted down' as in the case of a prisoner in fortress detention who scribbles the days until his release on the wall, but the months of the stay are added up. It is counted as an achievement. Of course, this is very specific. It expresses that Emma does not take it for granted that she has lived this long in her foster family. She has indeed arrived there, because it is 'her' foster family with whom she identifies. But she has never managed to get rid of the worry of a possible renewed failure there. Only against the background of a possible failure is it a record to have lived there 'already ten and a half years.' The German particle 'schon' is to be read here in the sense of a positive valuation of something achieved. So Emma has not been able to integrate herself into her family in such a way that she has been able to put aside the worry of failure. We can only speculate about the reasons for this. Either she

herself clung to a special status as a guest, a foster child or a child in exile, or the foster parents were never able to give her the feeling that she was accepted unconditionally. Both together are also conceivable.

The fact that she speaks of 'her' foster family can only mean that she has nevertheless developed a bond of some kind with the people of this family. With such a long duration and the age of admission, anything else would also speak for a pedagogical disaster. We do not have to assume that here. Nevertheless, the way she speaks is also distancing; she does not speak of her 'new parents' or of the 'Meyer family.' She expresses that she understands her life as the fate of a foster child and as the source of a special life situation.

We can leave it open at this point whether Emma knows that the word 'foster family' is also an official term in Germany for those families who take in children from other people's parents without adopting them. Foster parents do not have custody and guardianship rights, which can remain with the natural parents or be transferred by the court to a legal guardian. Foster families also receive financial compensation from the state. This is regulated in the German Social Code § 33 SGB VIII. Foster families are assigned by youth welfare offices. However, Emma uses the term, and we follow her in it as long as we have no indication that her family deviates from it.

(Sequence 5) 'Ich hab dich ganz doll lieb' / 'I am fond of you/I love you very much.'

This is followed by a gesture of affection, which is nevertheless somewhat clichéd. 'Ganz doll' means something like 'immeasurable,' 'extraordinary.' While the German word 'lieben' (to love) and the phrase 'Ich liebe Dich!' (I love you!) are reserved for a special, extraordinary situations and are used for declarations of love from which something follows, the phrase 'lieb haben' (be fond of) is also said in everyday life, when one wants to remind someone of an affection which, however, is not critically in question. Or which one also says to someone whom one likes and who also knows this, but with whom one does not necessarily have to have an intimate partnership. That's why it's said even when not much depends on it. It is typical of youth jargon. It has even made it into its own acronym in WhatsApp communication (hdgdl).

It is striking that the formula is used although the author Emma does not yet know her addressee Angelina. How does she know whether she really 'loves' her? The formula therefore seems premature, even encroaching, since Emma cannot be sure that her professed affection is really welcome by Angelina. Even though it is somewhat clichéd, which can be less than binding, we must nevertheless not doubt that Emma does mean it. But what does this mean here, in the context of this letter? Emma unintentionally expresses that she does not derive her affection for Angelina from her and a perceived sympathy for her. After all, she has no contact with her. Rather, she derives the expression of affection from herself. One possibility: Because Emma has formed an inner image of Angelina that is great and likeable, just as fans form an image of their idols that they think are great, although this has less to do with reality than with their image and staging on a screen or stage. This would mean that Emma had already built up a fictional relationship with Angelina. And this would also give a motive for her inhibited impulse at the beginning of the letter to contact Angelina. For contacting her would put her sister's fictional imagination to the test and could destroy an idea she had perhaps grown fond of. The other possibility: Emma expresses affection out of a general normative expectation of

sibling solidarity, which she wants to live up to because 'sisters just love each other.' Angelina is assumed to be in need of affective solidarity from her sister and it must mean something to her when she is told that her sister loves her. The latter would mean that Emma does not wait to see if Angelina deserves or wants to reciprocate this sibling solidarity, but it is simply insinuated. And Emma claims to be able to perform it here in the name of a higher normative family bond.

Both interpretations ultimately converge in that Angelina is incorporated into an inner world of Emma. At the same time, the letter is an activity that exposes these inner worlds to a test of reality. That alone would be enough to motivate the initial uncertainty.

> (Sequence 6) 'Ich hab dich ganz doll lieb und Mama hat dich auch ganz doll lieb, das weiß ich ganz genau.' / 'I am fond of you and Mum is fond of you very much too, I know that for sure.'

Emma even expands her statement and assures Angelina of her mother's affection. It is implied that Angelina does not know her mother, but that she is needy to hear that she loves her. It assumes that Angelina does not have sufficient contact with her mother, but she does. She becomes a transmitter here, a medium and witness to an experience with the mother. Her sister appears as a girl who longs for her mother and is unsure whether she is loved or not. Emma assures her of this. So the mother thinks of the children, loves them, is not malicious or indifferent, but is attached to her children. Whatever had caused the separation from the mother is not due to a lack of affection, but to other reasons: To illness, prison or the Youth Welfare Office, - in any case, an external power to which the mother has had to bow. But her love for the children themselves is true and unbroken.

Emma seems to make it her mission here to restore the affective cohesion of a family of origin. Knowing nothing of Angelina, she imposes this cohesion on her. She does not know whether Angelina also feels a desire for closeness right now. It stands to reason that she acts out her own longings and worries and transfers her desires to her sister.

Finally, the use of the child's pet name 'Mum' for the birth mother shows that the foster mother has not moved up to the position of an affective-intimate mother. A distance has always remained, while an originally existing symbiotic social relationship is maintained with the birth mother, although this social relationship can hardly have consisted of more than extraordinary visiting contacts after the child was one and a half years old.

> (Sequence 7) 'Ich weiß leider nicht, wo Mama im Moment ist.' / 'Unfortunately I don't know where Mum is at the moment.'

Now the text comes to a dramatic head. Emma herself has lost contact with her mother. Her mother has disappeared and can no longer be reached. The news itself should also worry Angelina. There is the possibility that something has happened to the mother. Another motive becomes apparent as to why Emma is contacting Angelina at this point in time. Emma obviously had contact with her mother, but now she fears losing contact for good. It is conceivable that she is trying to compensate for the impending loss of contact with people from her family of origin by contacting her sister. At the same time, she makes herself into a person who actively does something for the cohesion of the family of origin.

> (Sequence 8) 'Eins verspreche ich dir, dass Mama uns niemals vergessen wird' / 'One thing I promise you is that Mummy will never forget us.'

Now the assumptions become more and more gloomy. The mother is written off, never comes back. She doesn't die, but she falls into some kind of derangement and disappears forever into psychiatry or drug use or something else. But she will never forget her children. Why can Emma promise this? Apparently, she not only wishes it, but she firmly believes it. She appears here as a prophetess and witness to motherly love. It expresses her own hopes as unshakeable convictions. As it contrasts with the fact that Emma has not lived with her mother for years and that there must have been reasons for the original separation, this is of course an idealisation that is set against the contrary consideration that the mother may have abandoned or neglected her children. Another reading is more aggressive: 'I promise you one thing' also means that one will make sure that something happens. It shows traits of anger against the mother. Both readings, the certainty of never forgetting and the angry demand, are of course not compatible with each other and remain logically as well as affectively contradictory.

Against this background, we can further spell out our overall interpretation of the case. It stands to reason that Emma herself is in a biographical crisis, which is expressed here. She is going through puberty and is dealing with questions of her identity and detachment from the parental home. To do this, she needs stability. She has apparently also received this stability as a foster child over ten years. But this involves an inner identity as a foster child who knows and imagines a double belonging: On the one hand the belonging to her foster family in which she lives and goes through her socialisation processes, the world of reality, demands and conflicts. On the other hand, the affiliation to her family of origin, especially to her mother, which is not very real and which she idealises as a kind of fictitious family novel against the foster family. From this she draws strength and confidence in her conflicts and it gives her stability with regard to the pressing questions of puberty: Why is she alive at all? What are the motives for her birth? And does her mother (and father) like her? All these questions cannot be answered satisfactorily by the foster parents themselves. It is quite possible that detachment conflicts have already begun in her foster family. What is important for us, however, is that the stability of their construction is threatened because the birth mother has now disappeared. This coincidence is threatening for Emma. Her solution: She seeks contact with her sister and assumes the position of a 'big sister' who, as a substitute for the mother, ensures the cohesion of the family. She pushes into a position that the sister will find in need of help and consolation, while she is able to give that help.

This is a complex case hypothesis, but one that is inferred from the wording. It is not claimed that it has already been established. For this, further expressive figures, e.g. interviews with Emma, would have to be evaluated. But so far it is an interpretation that could plausibly explain what was said and that takes into account the details of the speech.

> (Sequence 9) 'Ich bleibe dran mit Mama, dass auch du sie nochmal sehen kannst und ich sie nochmal sehen kann.' / 'I'll keep on with mum so that you can also see her again and I can see her again.'

The promise will be extended. The gloomy prognosis is also increased once again. Emma will actively work to regain contact with the mother. She promises a social

work-like, detective-like persistence, and presents herself as the one who, like a big sister, takes on the task and mission of taking care of the matter 'with mother' on Angelina's behalf. It seems as if Emma is expecting the worst and hopes to be able to see her mother at least once more. So it is about a last contact with the mother. The scenario is very bleak and suggests that the worst is to be expected and even a final contact is not certain. Therefore, Angelina would have to be grateful to her sister if she succeeded in making this last contact again. The message is: Here is someone who really cares about you and stands up for the family!

We can now summarily take note of the conclusion of the letter:

(Sequence 10) 'Ich hoffe, dass wir uns auch mal sehen bei Frau Lindenthal. Ich gebe dir ein Foto dann siehst du mal, wie ich aussehe.

Liebe Grüße

Deine Schwester'

'I hope we'll see each other at Mrs Lindenthal's. I'll give you a photo so you can see what I look like.

Best regards

Your sister'

The end of the letter returns to a rather unspectacular, pragmatic approach to contact and is also no longer phrased in a pushy way. 'Let's see' means to leave it to chance, not to purposefully bring about an opportunity, but merely to initiate it. Ms Lindenthal is the employee of a youth centre that both children know independently of each other, so the insinuation suggests. The desire to get to know each other is thus not intrusive at the crucial point, but reserved, and this seems quite appropriate considering that the sisters have not met before. Even the offer of a photo is mentioned as if in passing, 'then you'll see what I look like.' Emma insinuates a certain curiosity about Angelina's appearance, but she doesn't want to attach any further importance to it, but she doesn't shy away from expression of it either. It is noticeable that there is no longer any complicated action, but rather a completely appropriate childlike initiation of contact. The greeting is also friendly. Finally, the sentence 'I am fond of / love you' is handwritten under the word 'sister,' which reinforces the statement from the beginning of the letter. By the way, Angelina is nine years old at the time of the letter; neither sister has lived with the other for a single day with their common mother. When Angelina read the letter, she didn't react to it for a period of three months. Then she asked to get in contact with her sister but didn't renew it after a while. Their mother really had been absent due to her drug abuse and mental problems.

We have before us a letter with which a 12-year-old girl seeks initial contact with her sister, who is three years younger. Both are placed in different (specialised) foster families within the framework of youth welfare, where they have been living for years. Various reasons can be established from the letter that the letter writer Emma seeks contact with the sister also because she herself is in a crisis, although she instead suggests in the letter that Angelina has a crisis-like need for reassurance of the love of her mother and sister. Emma poses as a big sister who assures Angelina of her mother's and sister's love as representatives of the family of origin. She presumably engages in 'family cohesion' because the disappearance of her mother threatens the illusion of an idealised counter-concept to her own foster family and

Emma saves herself by taking Angelina's place as big sister and substitute for her mother.

The analysis of this letter was carried out in the context of a pedagogical consultation with Angelina's foster parents in a youth welfare organisation. The professionals wanted to know how Angelina should be accompanied and supported when she reads this letter with its stimuli.

5. Conclusion

I return to the starting point. First, I described the beginnings of Objective Hermeneutics based on empirical problems in the research project 'Parents and Schools'. Then I explained the basic methodological rules of sequence analysis and finally presented the procedure using an example. Now I revisit the notion of sequentiality. This is unfolded in Objective Hermeneutics largely independently of the development of conversation analysis. Although it ultimately refers to the same social phenomenon, the concept of sequentiality in Objective Hermeneutics means something different. It not only refers to the sequence of individual actions in interactions such as turn-taking, openings and closings, but to the sequential structure of the linguistic data itself, which generates a structure of meanings in a speech. These structures of meaning and the patterns of interpretation, which select some options and ignore others, are the real object of interest for Objective Hermeneutics. Although there are many similarities between conversation analysis and Objective Hermeneutics, e.g. the emphasis on the importance of interaction protocols collected in a real situation, or the importance of precise transcription of such audio recordings, the methodological differences are nevertheless unmistakable. Like conversation analysis, Objective Hermeneutics assumes that interactions are singular events that can only be explained by the circumstances of a specific situation. But in contrast to conversation analysis, Objective Hermeneutics assumes that higher-level social structures operate in them and regulate the way in which interactants conduct their conversation. These superordinate structures are, for example, habitual dispositions and interpretive patterns, which perceive or block objective possibilities of actions opened up in previous actions. Such a habitus is the biographical result of many other situations before, in which action problems were mastered for the first time and in which decisions were made successfully, decisions that have worked and therefore have become the basis for routines, which regulate an action in the present.

In our example, we were reconstructing the action of a pubescent girl within a complex family structure, which let her live without their mother in a context of youth welfare in a foster family. In detail, many questions were raised, but with little data we have developed a complex non-trivial hypothesis regarding the presumable biographical identity crisis of Emma in her foster family. Such a hypothesis could easily be corrected or specified more precisely through other data, discussions and surveys, so that conclusions and pedagogical recommendations can be based on it.

Objective Hermeneutics assumes that such dynamic structures of action can be reconstructed from the meaning structures of every type of textual protocols. It thus sees the reason that this is possible in the fact that structures of meaning are generated by two types of parameters, that can be reconstructed in a generally valid way.

The first parameter operates in and through the rules of grammar, syntax, logic, speech acts, and social rules of situational pragmatics (such as greetings etc.), which are shared by all actors. These rules open up objective meanings and connections that can be designed as hypothetical scenarios and must be explicated at any sequence if one wants to do justice to a piece of data, even if a potential scenario doesn´t actually take place.

The second parameter is the entity that chooses from the given objective possibilities. It follows certain possibilities while it blocks or fends off others. This entity is the life practise itself, a person, a family, a company or country, every social entity, which makes its own decisions and has to live with them. Every life practise follows its own pattern. Every family or person is able to use chances, while it does not take advantages of others, which are nonetheless objectively possible. To explore those case specific patterns, it is useful to reconstruct protocols of interaction in which they occur.

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The historical development of the Documentary Method and its sequence analysis in the range of text and visual data

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Abstract

The article outlines the historical development of the Documentary Method and its sequence analysis with special reference to the basic social theoretical and methodological assumptions. While the sequence analysis has been mainly developed on the basis of text, its development in picture and video analysis is still ongoing. One essential methodological difference between text and picture or video analysis is the difference of the sequentiality on the one hand and the simultaneity of visual data on the other. By discussing the special relation of both the sequential and the simultaneous dimension in video analysis, the paper will outline the methodological implications and specifics of sequence analysis and will demonstrate them by an exemplary interpretation of a video recorded classroom interaction. Based on the historical development and the empirical analysis, perspectives for the further development of the method are derived.

Keywords: Praxeological Sociology of Knowledge – sequentiality – simultaneity – iconology – video analysis – videography.

German Abstract

Der Beitrag skizziert die historische Entwicklung der Dokumentarischen Methode und ihrer Sequenzanalyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der sozialtheoretischen und methodologischen Grundannahmen. Während die Sequenzanalyse auf der Grundlage von Textanalysen entwickelt wurde, steht ihre Entwicklung im Bereich der Bild- und Videoanalyse noch am Anfang. Ein zentraler methodologischer Unterschied zwischen Text- und Bild- bzw. Videoanalyse ist die Unterscheidung zwischen der Sequenzialität einerseits und der Simultaneität der bildhaften Daten andererseits. Die methodologischen Besonderheiten und Implikationen der Sequenzanalyse werden vor dem Vergleichshorizont der Simultananalyse herausgearbeitet und exemplarisch anhand der Interpretation einer videographierten Unterrichtsinteraktion dargestellt. Ausgehend von der historischen Entwicklung und der empirischen Analyse werden Perspektiven für die Weiterentwicklung der Dokumentarischen Methode abgeleitet.

Keywords: Praxeologische Wissenssoziologie – Sequenzialität – Simultanität – Ikonologie – Videoanalyse – Videographie.

1. Introduction

Rooted in the Sociology of Knowledge (cf. Mannheim 1952a) as well as in Ethno-methodology (cf. Garfinkel 1967a), the Documentary Method as a methodological concept and empirical program (cf. Bohnsack 2017, 2020a) aims at the analysis of the implicit or "atheoretical" (Mannheim 1952a:39) methods of everyday practice, which are primarily based on collective experience in the sense of what Karl Mannheim (1980:219) termed the *conjunctive space of experience* ("konjunktiver Erfahrungsraum"). Thereby, the method tries to go beyond the reconstruction of the mainly theoretical and utilitarian constructions of common sense (cf. Bohnsack 2017:36ff.).

Originally developed in the context of group discussions and the analysis of talk (cf. Bohnsack 1989), the Documentary Method is currently being adapted for the analysis of visual data. One essential focus of the Documentary Method lies on the sequentiality of social interaction. The sequence analysis is thus based on the sequentiality of the interaction process itself. Since sequentiality is not present in pictures, the Documentary Method focuses on the simultaneity in pictures. In films or videographs, however, sequentiality and simultaneity are interwoven, which is why the method integrates sequence and simultaneity analysis for these types of data (cf. Bohnsack 2009, 2020b). In both kinds of analysis, it differentiates between the immanent or literal meaning of an utterance or expression and its implicit or "documentary meaning" (Mannheim 1952a:67). The documentary meaning of an indexical utterance (cf. Garfinkel 1967a) is analyzed by referring to the *context* of the utterance. Moreover, the documentary meaning is based on the *modus operandi* of the interaction, which is constituted by *how* something is being said or done, and thereby provides information on the habitus (cf. Bourdieu 1977) of the actor(s). The habitus is acquired primarily in collective experiences, which can refer to group-

specific (e.g., peer groups), society-specific (e.g., gender), or organization-specific (e.g., school classes) spaces of experience or milieus, respectively (cf. Bohnsack 2020a). One central strategy of the Documentary Method is to analyze this sort of multidimensionality of habitus or milieus by comparing different cases, which are documented, for example, by group discussions (cf. Bohnsack 1989) or videographs (cf. Wagener 2020) that deal with a very similar topic.

The paper focuses on sequence analysis in the Documentary Method and its relation to visual data. First, it presents the historical development of sequence analysis (section 2) with its epistemological foundations in its present constitution (section 3), followed by the depiction of its methodological specifics (sections 4). Although the sequence analysis was mainly developed on the basis of group discussions, interviews, and other forms of text, its development is still ongoing, especially in picture and video analysis (e.g., Bohnsack 2009; Asbrand/Martens 2018; Wagener 2020). One essential methodological difference between the analysis of texts and the analysis of pictures or videos concerns the principles of *sequentiality* and *simultaneity* (cf. Bohnsack 2009). By discussing the special relation of both the sequential and the simultaneous dimension in video analysis, this paper will outline the methodological implications of sequence analysis in the Documentary Method (section 5) and will demonstrate them by an exemplary interpretation of a video recorded classroom interaction (section 6). The paper will end with a conclusion as well as some perspectives on the future development of the method (section 7).

2. Historical development of the Documentary Method

The German sociologist Ralf Bohnsack first developed the Documentary Method in the 1980s being inspired by the work of Karl Mannheim and Ethnomethodology. With his draft of the "documentary method of interpretation" in the 1920s, Mannheim (1952a), as Bohnsack (2014a:217) puts it, presented "the first comprehensive argument for a particular approach to observation in the social sciences". However, Mannheim's work was of little relevance in the methodological discourse until Harold Garfinkel took up the "documentary method of interpretation", which he understood as a method that is "prominent in and characteristic of both social-scientific and daily-life procedures for deciding sensibility and warrant" (Garfinkel 1961:57). Although Garfinkel acknowledged the "documentary method of interpretation" as a methodological approach for "the epistemological substantiation of the social sciences" (Bohnsack 2014a:217), according to Bohnsack (ibid), "[n]either Mannheim nor Garfinkel conceived it as a method for practical empirical inquiry".

The development of the Documentary Method as a methodology for qualitative research as well as a method for practical empirical inquiry only started in the 1980s based on the analysis of group discussions in a study on "collective orientations in juvenile groups" ("Kollektive Orientierungen in Gruppen Jugendlicher"; Mangold/ Bohnsack 1988). The study was based at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg and funded by the German Research Foundation. Based on Mannheim's distinction between "communicative" or theoretical knowledge on the one hand and "conjunctive knowledge" as an implicit or tacit knowledge on the other (Mannheim 1982: 204), the analysis attempted to go beyond the explicit meaning in social interaction and targets its implicit or tacit dimension, which is grounded in collective or conjunctive experience (cf. Bohnsack 2014b). Whereas a consistent methodology was

first presented in Bohnsack's habilitation thesis (Bohnsack 1989), the development of the approach goes back to previous research (cf. Bohnsack/Schütze 1973; Bohnsack 1983).

2.1. Implicit knowledge and self-referentiality in social interaction

Bohnsack (1973) already dealt with Ethnomethodology in his diploma thesis on action competence in the context of juvenile delinquency. In a paper published in the same year in the German *Kriminologisches Journal*, Bohnsack and his former colleague at the University of Bielefeld, Fritz Schütze, took up the criticism of the labeling approach, which was directed at the *intentional* structure of action. In their view, the labeling approach fell short of being able to identify unconscious structures in the interaction of police and underprivileged youths (cf. Bohnsack/Schütze 1973). As a consequence, they targeted the *implicit* or tacit dimension of the interaction of police and juvenile suspects (cf. ibid.). In outlining their planned research design, which included participant observation, group discussions, and interviews, the authors theoretically referred to sociolinguistic aspects of communication such as turn taking in conversation analysis (cf. Sacks/Jefferson/Schegloff 1974), especially with reference to police questioning (cf. Bohnsack/Schütze 1973:281). However, they did not present an empirically based sequence analysis.[1]

In his doctoral thesis, Bohnsack (1983) then conducted empirical research on the interaction between counselors and clients in youth drug counseling centers in Western Germany. Referring to Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967a), Phenomenology (Schütz 1962), and Mannheim's documentary method of interpretation (Mannheim 1952a), this analysis aimed at the "reconstruction of the interpretative methods of everyday action" (Bohnsack 1983:2f.) and was framed as various "expressions of the 'documentary method of interpretation'" (ibid).[2] As Bohnsack (1983:3) put it, "[t]he documentary interpretation in its various forms constitutes both theoretical and pre-theoretical action". Taking up the concept of indexicality (cf. Garfinkel 1967a), he reconstructed the methods and expressions of the formally organized interactions in the counseling centers by referring to the context of the utterances, since the actual meaning of an utterance, its significance, can only be reconstructed through the reaction to it (cf. Bohnsack 1983:171). In this way, Bohnsack distinguished his approach from hermeneutics that problematizes context dependency or even attempts to completely suspend the context (cf. ibid). Accordingly, he considered the interaction itself as *self-referential* as it is also stated in conversation analysis (cf. Sacks/Schegloff/Jefferson 1974), to which Bohnsack (1983) referred.[3] Although also referring to other methodological categories of the ethnomethodology-based conversation analysis such as "formulating" practices and

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[1] The German Research Foundation rejected the research project entitled "Die Selektionsverfahren der Polizei in ihrer Beziehung zur Handlungskompetenz der Tatverdächtigen" due to legal concerns.

[2] A differentiated comparison of Bohnsack's, Mannheim's and Garfinkel's understandings of the Documentary Method cannot be done here. For a detailed account, see Bohnsack (2017:29ff.; 2018).

[3] Sacks (1995:536) stated already in the 1960s, "[if] one is doing something like a sociology of conversation, what one wants to do is to see what the system itself provides as bases, motives, or what have you, for doing something essential to the system".

"account" (Garfinkel/Sacks 1970:350ff.), which in general aim at the analysis of *formal* structures of practical action (cf. ibid), the sequence analysis in Bohnsack's doctoral thesis followed a different approach, which is being depicted in the following.

2.2. Sequence analysis, reflection and comparison

In Bohnsack's (1983:173) doctoral thesis, the analysis of text was led by the differentiation of 'what is being said' and 'how it is being said', while the latter aimed at the "latent" (ibid:174) structures of meaning and thus went beyond the analysis of merely formal interaction structures. Central to this was the comparison of (topically) similar interaction sequences. This had two implications. The first one concerns the type of comparisons, which – according to Luhmann (1975:74) – are essential for reflection and thus also for interpretation. As Bohnsack (1983:180f.) stated in contrast to hermeneutic methodologies (e.g., Oevermann/Allert/Konau/Krambeck 1979), the premise of the "reflecting interpretation and observation" of the deeper structure of interaction is the use of *empirical* instead of imaginative 'horizons' or cases of comparison. The imaginative 'horizons' of comparison, which we find in Objektive Hermeneutik, are not empirically provable and mainly based on the researcher's own socialization and thus may cause cultural bias. In terms of Luhmann's system theory, "reflexion" "requires a 'horizon' of other possibilities and opens up an orderly access to these possibilities" (Luhmann 1975:74). Second, referring to "grounded theory" by Glaser and Strauss (1967), the comparative analysis was the basis for generating new theories on general processes of interaction by identifying the commonalities and the differences of various cases (cf. Bohnsack 1983:182ff.).[4]

Whereas these methodological aspects were later integrated in the development of the Documentary Method, some of the meta-theoretical assumptions changed profoundly (cf. Bohnsack 1989). While focusing on "subjective intentional action" of "reflective subjects" ("reflexionsfähige Subjekte"; Bohnsack 1983:155) in Bohnsack's doctoral thesis, the meta-theoretical framework was still strongly influenced by Phenomenology (Schütz 1962). Although Bohnsack (1983:155) contrasted the subjective-intentional level of action with "collective processes", he excluded the latter from his work. As he stated, the collective processes, which also should be reconstructed, "prevail relatively independently of the reflection and the 'subjective-intentional representations' of the actors involved" (ibid). However, it was not until Bohnsack's habilitation thesis (Bohnsack 1989) that he turned to these empirically.

The later change of perspective towards the collective and pre-reflexive structures of interaction came along with a broader reception of Mannheim's epistemological views in his Sociology of Knowledge (Mannheim 1980), especially his critique of rationalism (cf. ibid:97), and his concept of the so-called "conjunctive space of experience" ("konjunktiver Erfahrungsraum"; ibid:219). In his concept of Weltanschauung, Mannheim distinguishes between theoretical and atheoretical under-

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4   For a more detailed account of these methodological principles in the current state of the Documentary Method, see Bohnsack (2014b:85ff., 2017:107).

standing and regards the latter as the primordial level of sociality. It is the atheoretical knowledge that, as conjunctive knowledge, enables immediate understanding between social actors (cf. ibid). Within this meta-theoretical framework, Bohnsack (1989:343ff.) developed a consistent sequence analytical methodology based on the reconstruction of group discussions with juvenile groups in small towns and villages in Bavaria. In later projects, the methodology was used for analyzing group discussions with hooligans in Berlin after the German reunification (cf. Bohnsack/ Loos/Schaeffer/Staedtler/Wild 1996), and with young migrants in Berlin at the turn of the century (cf. Bohnsack/Nohl 2001). Today, the Documentary Method is being used in very different fields of research, especially in education science, but also in computer science, medicine, theology, and architecture (cf. Bohnsack 2020a:62). Before discussing the sequence analysis in detail, however, some of the central meta-theoretical and methodological assumptions of the Documentary Method in its present constitution will be portrayed.

3. Meta-theoretical und methodological assumptions of the Documentary Method in its present constitution

The Documentary Method takes a certain perspective on social realities, which Mannheim called "genetic" or "socio-genetic" (Mannheim 1982:80ff.). From this perspective, the observer does not primarily focus on *what* a social reality is but *how* it is being established (cf. Mannheim 1952a:67). If we put it in Garfinkel's terms, the 'how' is about the "practical accomplishment" (Garfinkel 1967a:9). Mannheim (1952a:67) further differentiates between "the objective meaning" and the "documentary meaning" of an expression. The objective meaning corresponds to the 'what', which is the immanent meaning of an expression with its explicit and literal or, as Bohnsack (2017:63, 2018:202) calls it today, its "propositional" character. The documentary meaning on the other hand refers to the 'how' of an expression, which Bohnsack (ibid) synonymously terms the "performative" meaning. Moreover, the change of the analytical perspective from 'what' to 'how' corresponds to what Luhmann (1990:87) has described as "second-order observation".

The distinction between these two meanings or analytical perspectives in the Documentary Method is grounded in Mannheim's distinction between "communicative" and "conjunctive knowledge" (Mannheim 1982:265). Together with Mannheim's notion of the "conjunctive space of experience" (ibid:204), they are of central importance. As Bohnsack (2017:102) points out, the conjunctive space of experience is at the heart of the Documentary Method and its methatheoretical framework.

3.1. Communicative and conjunctive knowledge

The 'how' is represented in the practice-orientating knowledge of the social actor, which Mannheim (1952a:39) calls "atheoretical" because of its implicit or tacit dimension. Referring to the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977) on praxeology, Bohnsack (2017:104, 2020a:66) calls the practice-orientating knowledge in its habitualized or incorporated forms the "habitus" or the "frame of orientation", respectively. As

Bohnsack (2020a: 63) argues, not only "everyday practice" but also "scientific practice" is primarily based on implicit or tacit meaning. As a consequence, the atheoretical or implicit meaning ought to be reconstructed on both sides. Bohnsack (2020a:63) calls the empirical reconstruction of the scientific practice a "praxeological epistemology". Accordingly, the methodological and meta-theoretical framework of the Documentary Method, which has been mainly reconstructed on the basis of empirical analysis, is called "Praxeological Sociology of Knowledge" ("Praxeologische Wissenssoziologie"; Bohnsack 2017, 2018).

The term 'reconstruction' in the Documentary Method refers to Schütz' understanding of social scientific constructs as "constructs of second degree" (Schütz 1962:6), e.g., the reconstruction of common sense constructs, which are constructs of "first degree" (ibid). However, as Bohnsack (2020a:64) argues, compared to Mannheim's concept of the atheoretical knowledge of everyday action, Schütz did not go beyond the theoretical, explicit, and intentional dimension of everyday practice with its "utilitarian and rationalistic bias". In contrast, Mannheim (1982:265) speaks of a "duality" of "concepts as well as realities" existing in each individual, which he also describes as the duality of the "communicative" and the "conjunctive knowledge".

3.2. Conjunctive space of experience

The tense relation of both kinds of knowledge, which Bohnsack (2017, 2018) almost synonymously calls the "propositional" and the "performative logic", constitutes what Mannheim (1982:204) terms the "conjunctive space of experience". This category describes "collective experiences in the sense of milieus" as Bohnsack (2020a:65) puts it. For example, the communicative knowledge *about* a reality such as a family includes general theoretical knowledge about the identity norms and the role expectations associated with the family as an institution. On the other hand, the conjunctive knowledge results from *existing* in a certain family with its everyday practices and routines, which only the members of the family share. In this respect, the family can be considered a conjunctive space of experience or a milieu because its members have to deal with both kinds of knowledge and their tense relation in everyday practice (cf. ibid).

Bohnsack (2017:103) refers to this as the "double structure of the conjunctive space of experience" ("Doppelstruktur des konjunktiven Erfahrungsraums"; ibid). He differentiates between the frame of orientation in a narrow sense, which he equates with the habitus, and the frame of orientation in a wider sense, which is the habitualized practical processing of the tension between the externally experienced (identity) norms and the habitus (cf. ibid:102ff.). Bohnsack (ibid:104) emphasizes that this is primarily a theoretical-analytical distinction, since in empirical reconstruction we already find the relation between norm and habitus. While earlier work on the Documentary Method focused more on the conjunctive knowledge of actors, some recent analyses also focus more on the significance of (identity) norms in social practice and their complex relations to the habitus (cf. e.g. Geimer 2019). This ultimately reflects in the current basic theoretical development of the Praxeological Sociology of Knowledge with its differentiation between the frame of orientation in a narrow and wider sense as well as the differentiation of implicit or tacit

knowledge, in which, among other things, the identity norms have been elaborated (cf. Bohnsack 2017:143).[5]

As Mannheim (1952b:297) has shown, conjunctive experience is not necessarily bound to face-to-face-interaction like the one we find in families. In Mannheim's essay on the formation of generations in society, generations are constituted by commonalities in the so-called "stratification of experience" ("Erlebnisschichtung"; ibid). "Such commonalities (…) result from the existential involvement in a common practice of historical events, especially but not only in periods of radical development, change, and crisis" (Bohnsack 2020a:67) such as the division of Germany after WWII or its reunification. This shared experience is not necessarily identical but "identical in structure" (ibid). This also applies to milieu, gender, education, or migration-related spaces of conjunctive experience (cf. Bohnsack 1989; Bohnsack/Nohl 2001). In empirical analysis, each single case, for example, a group or an individual, can be differentiated by the reconstruction of different spaces of conjunctive experience. Therefore, a central element of the Documentary Method is the construction of a typology that reflects the multidimensionality of spaces of conjunctive experience based on comparative analysis.

Bohnsack (2017:128ff.) points out that especially in organizations, the complexity of the conjunctive space of experience increases even further, since the members of an organization are confronted not only with the societal milieus and identity norms, but also with the specific role expectations and normative procedural programs of the respective organization. If, under these conditions, habitualized practices form over time, i.e. so-called organizational milieus, Bohnsack (ibid:129) also speaks of the "double double structure" ("doppelte Doppelstruktur"; ibid) of the conjunctive space of experience. An empirical example of such an organizational milieu is depicted in section 6 on the basis of a videographed classroom interaction.

4. Empirical access to the conjunctive space of experience in sequence analysis

Which understanding of sequentiality underlies the Documentary Method? As mentioned before, sequence analysis is based on the sequentiality of the interaction process itself and therefore does not distinguish between empirical and methodological sequentiality. This becomes particularly clear when comparing text and picture. While text is characterized by sequentiality, pictures are characterized by simultaneity (cf. Bohnsack 2009). Nevertheless, sequence analysis, just like the analysis of simultaneity in pictures (see section 5), is closely related to the meta-theoretical categories described earlier.

The empirical access to the habitus, the frame of orientation, or the conjunctive space of experience, respectively, has two bases. The first is the "proposed performance" (Bohnsack 2020a:66), which means the "metaphorical representations" of a specific practice in "narrations and depictions" of the practice by the social actors themselves. The second is the "performative performance" (ibid), which means the practice in situ. Empirical access to the performative performance is gained by "di-

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[5]   Identity norms belong to communicative knowledge, since they are related to the *imagination* of practice; however, they often remain implicit (cf. Bohnsack 2017:143).

rect observation of the performance of the interaction or talk and by the representation of bodily movements in the medium of material pictures, that is: photographs or videographs" (ibid). Especially in video analysis, the Documentary Method brings together independent picture and text analysis. This reaches a higher analytical level by interpreting picture and text as independent systems in their relation to each other.

4.1. Formulating and reflecting interpretation

Based on the differentiation of the communicative or propositional meaning on the one hand and the conjunctive or performative meaning on the other, the basic working steps of the Documentary Method are the *formulating interpretation* and the *reflecting interpretation*. The *formulating interpretation* focuses on the explicit and immanent meaning. In the analysis of text, this means that the researcher formulates the explicit topical structure of the text. Here, one can differentiate between "paramount topics (PT), subordinated topics (ST), sub-subordinated topics (SST)" (ibid:68) and so on. For the *reflecting interpretation*, on the other hand, it is essential to transcend the explicit meaning of an expression towards its implicit meaning. In other words, the reflecting interpretation is based on the question on how a topic is being dealt with "performatively" (Bohnsack 2020a:68), or as Bohnsack (ibid) also describes it, in which frame of orientation the topic is being dealt with. The empirically controlled analysis of the frame of orientation or the habitus, respectively, is based on the comparison with other cases such as other group discussions or interviews that deal with a very similar topic (cf. ibid). As mentioned earlier, the methodological principle of (minimum and maximum) contrast is based on the notion that all reflection is dependent on comparative horizons that must be empirically reconstructible.

4.2. Formal discourse analysis

The indexical meaning of an expression, its significance, can only be reconstructed by referring to the reaction(s) that follow(s) the expression (cf. Bohnsack 2014b: 125). Therefore, each text (and picture) is considered as a "self-referential system" (Bohnsack 2020:68; Luhmann 1970). In the analysis of interactions such as group discussions, the interactional or discursive units typically consist of *three* "discursive moves" ("Diskursbewegungen"; Bohnsack 2014b:125). These are the "proposition" of an orientation (A), which is followed by either a "following proposition" ("Anschlussproposition"; ibid), an "opposition", or an "antithesis" (B). Whereas an opposition indicates that a mutual frame of orientation is missing, an antithesis shows that the actors antithetically unfold their concurrent frames of orientation somehow in a manner of competition. However, the identification of collective orientation is only possible if the reaction of A following the reaction of B is taken into account. In case of concurrent frames of orientation, the antithesis (B) is followed by a "synthesis" (A) (ibid).

Bohnsack has called the analysis of this formal structure of interaction or discourse the reconstruction of the "organization of discourse" (ibid; Bohnsack 2020a:

68). By reconstructing different "modes" of the discourse organization in comparative analysis, we can identify "to what extent the participants [of a discourse] share a conjunctive space of experience" (ibid). In the last thirty years, especially in analyses of group discussions, a variety of discursive moves and modes of discursive organization have been reconstructed (e.g., Bohnsack 1989; Przyborski 2004). In video analysis, however, where the interaction includes not only verbal expressions but also bodily movements, the reconstruction of the formal categories of interactional organization has just begun (cf. Wagner-Willi 2005; Asbrand/Martens 2018; Nentwig-Gesemann/Gerstenberg 2018; Wagener 2020:63ff.).

5. The analysis of visual data and the relation of sequentiality and simultaneity

This leads to the analysis of visual data. As stated above, not only texts but also pictures are considered as self-referential systems within the meta-theoretical and methodological framework of the Documentary Method. For the interpretation of pictures, the access to self-referentiality is also gained by the reconstruction of the formal structure. However, in contrast to interaction on the basis of text with its sequential structure, the formal structure of a picture is based on its so-called "simultaneous structure" ("Simultanstruktur"; Bohnsack 2009:168f.), referring to German art historian Max Imdahl (1996:23). Whereas the sequence analysis of text has been the dominant approach in qualitative research, the analysis of the formal and simultaneous structure of pictures as self-referential systems, as Bohnsack (2009:169) points out, was a very new step in qualitative analysis.

5.1. Pre-iconographic, iconographic and iconological meaning

The shift of the focus from the immanent meaning of a picture to its documentary meaning corresponds to what the German art historian Erwin Panofsky (1955), who explicitly refers to Mannheim's "documentary method of interpretation", has termed the transition from "iconography" to "iconology". The adaptation of the Documentary Method's basic working steps, which are the formulating and the reflecting interpretation, to visual analysis is mainly based on Panofsky's differentiation of "pre-iconographic", "iconographic", and "iconological" meaning (ibid; Bohnsack 2009, 2020a, 2020b).

The formulating interpretation of pictures includes the *pre-iconographic* description of a picture and its *iconographic* interpretation. As Bohnsack (2020a:71) points out, the pre-iconographic dimension of a picture is comparable to connotation in semiotics. The body movements on the pre-iconographic level can be differentiated into "gestures", e.g., "'bending the trunk'", and so-called "operative actions", e.g., "'sitting down'" (ibid:407). Whereas operative actions are typically composed of several gestures, the single elements of a gesture can be called "kinemes" (Bohnsack 2020b:406f.) referring to Ray Birdwhistell (1952:19).

The iconographic meaning, on the other side, corresponds to denotation. For example, the gesture of "hat-lifting" is first identified on the pre-iconographic level, whereas the identification of the gesture as "a greeting" of a "gentleman" is based

on its iconographic interpretation (Panofsky 1955:26). The iconographic interpretation is bound to social constructs based on common sense such as the ascription of subjective intentions and other kinds of institutionalized knowledge (cf. Bohnsack 2020b:399). As Bohnsack (ibid:400) frames it, the reconstruction of the iconological meaning, which is the "modus operandi" of a gesture or its "process of formation", and which corresponds to the habitus, is based on the detailed pre-iconographic description of the gesture and requires the suspension of iconographic presuppositions.

5.2. Two kinds of picture producers

In picture analysis as well as in video analysis, the habitus can be reconstructed in two dimensions. These are the habitus of the producers of the picture or video on the one hand and the habitus of those who are presented in the picture or video on the other (cf. Bohnsack 2020b:400). The reconstruction of the relation of both types of habitus represented in the picture or video is central to the documentary analysis of visual data. As Bohnsack (ibid) points out, "the methodical problems that result from the complex relation between these two different kinds of picture producers can be solved easily as long as both belong to the same milieu, to the same 'conjunctive space of experience'". For example, this is the case when family members took a photo or a video of their own family. However, as Bohnsack states, "all this becomes methodically much more complex when the habitus of the represented picture producer [the ones being presented in the picture or video – BW] is not in correspondence or congruent with that of the representing picture producer [e.g., the camera operator – BW]" (ibid). In the case of incongruities, this can lead to re-framing of the represented picture producers by the representing picture producers in the sense of a power-structured gaze (cf. Bohnsack 2017:191). This means the construction of a (total) identity of the represented that dissents from their own habitual representation (cf. ibid:275ff.).

Elsewhere Bohnsack does not only refer to the habitus of the producers of pictures, but also to a lifestyle propagated through pictures (cf. e.g. Bohnsack/Przyborski 2015; Bohnsack 2017:197ff.). As empirically shown, the concepts of lifestyle or pose, respectively, and the societal identity norms conveyed therein have been mainly relevant in advertising photography (cf. Bohnsack 2017:197ff.) or in videos on lifestyle (cf. Burghardt 2020). In the analysis of videographies for research purposes, which will be focused on in the following, identity norms can also be of significance. However, this is less about the conveying of identity norms through a picture or video by the representing *and* represented picture or video producers, as is the case, for example, in advertising photography, but rather about the way in which the represented picture or video producers carry out the (tense) relationship between norm and habitus in interaction, i.e. their frame of orientation in a wider sense. In videographic research in organizations (cf. Wagener 2020), moreover, not only societal identity norms can become relevant, but also organizational ones, as the empirical example in section 6 shows.

Similar to the sequence analysis of text, the reconstruction of the habitus (in its relation to norms) represented in a picture is mainly based on the reconstruction of the picture's formal organization or structure. In contrast to the sequential structure of a text, the so-called "formal composition" of a picture is based on what Imdahl

(1996:23) has called the "simultaneous structure". Comparable to sequence analysis, the reconstruction of the formal composition of a picture is based on the comparison with other pictures that are similar in topic but different in composition. Referring to Imdahl (1994:302ff.), Bohnsack (2009:168ff.) calls the comparative analysis of pictures the "composition variation" ("Kompositionsvariation").

According to Imdahl (1996:26), the formal compositional structure of a picture consists of three dimensions, which are the "perspective projection" ("perspektivische Projektion"), the "scenic choreography" ("szenische Choreographie"), and the "planimetric composition" ("planimetrische Komposition"). Referring to Imdahl, "*perspectivity*", as Bohnsack (2020b:402) puts it,

> has its function primarily in the identification of concrete objects in their spatiality and corporality and is thus orientated to the regularity of the world outside of the picture (as it shall be (re)presented within it). With reference to the *scenic choreography*, the same is true for the social scenes in the world outside. In contrast, the reconstruction of the *planimetric composition*, the picture's formal structure as a plane, leads us to the principles of design and to the inherent laws of the picture *itself*. It is first of all the planimetric composition which leads us to the picture as a 'system, which is designed according to its inherent laws and is evident in its autonomy' (Imdahl 1979:190).

In video analysis, the documentary interpretation focuses on both the sequential structure of a video and its simultaneous structure as well as the relation of both structures. The analysis of the simultaneous structure is based on video stills, which are called "photogrammes" (Bohnsack 2020b:407). For videos or films that were produced by the ones being the subject of the research such as a family or the producers of a TV-show (e.g., Bohnsack 2009, 2020b), the analysis of the simultaneous structure targets all three dimensions of the formal composition (i.e., the perspectivity, the scenic choreography, and the planimetric composition). In contrast, the analysis of the formal structure of videographs that were exclusively produced for the purpose of research such as videographs of classroom interaction (e.g., Wagener 2020) is usually less extensive since the habitus of the researcher is of less interest. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the researcher's choice of framing, the camera settings, and the camera perspective is essential in order to methodically control the researcher's implicit (and milieu-related) selective perspective and reflect them in interpretation (cf. Fritzsche/Wagner-Willi 2015; Wagener 2020:56ff.). In video analysis, the comparative analysis of successive photogrammes also provides insight into the relation of their simultaneous and sequential orders. However, this is to be distinguished from sequence analysis, in which audiovisual data with its bodily and verbal utterances is interpreted in detail in its sequence structure (cf. Wagener 2020:62f.). In the following, this is exemplified by videographic data.

5.3. The analysis of videographic data

Comparable to text analysis, the analysis of videographs (cf. Wagener 2020:82ff.) starts with identifying the topical structure of the sequential interaction process in the verbal dimension and, additionally, with identifying the operative actions in the bodily dimension (1). Subsequently, smaller sequences are being selected for a more detailed interpretation (2). The selection of a sequence is mainly based on the

identification of an increased level of interactive density or on discontinuities of the interaction process. In such moments, the frame of orientation is documented more clearly, which is very similar to group discussions (cf. Nentwig-Gesemann 2006: 28). Once a sequence is selected, it may be differentiated into subsequences and parallel sequences or parallel sub-sequences (3). After that, one or more photogramme(s) are being selected (4). Moreover, a selected photogramme should represent the sequence or the subsequence in its corporeal dimension. On the other hand, it should reflect a so-called "focused moment", e.g., a moment of high interactivity. The selected photogramme is first being analyzed on the pre-iconographic and the iconographic level, both of which constitute the formulating interpretation (4.1). The following reflecting interpretation of the photogramme consists of the reconstruction of the implicit perspective of the presenting picture producer, which is the researcher, and the habitus of the presented picture producers by (partly) reconstructing the formal compositional structure as well as the iconological meaning of the corporal expressions (4.2). After the (comparative) analysis of one or more photogrammes, which Bohnsack (2009:168ff.) calls the "variation of composition" (4.3), the selected sequence or subsequence is analyzed in its sequential dimension (5). The formulating interpretation of the sequential structure is based on a video transcript that integrates both the verbal as well as the corporeal dimension on the pre-/iconographic level (5.1). The following reflecting interpretation of the sequential structure (5.2) is similar to the analysis of talk. It is based on the question of how the social actors presented in the video interactively refer to each other. This also includes the interactional organization. As stated above, the reconstruction of the formal categories of the interactional organization, which is complementary to discursive organization, has just begun (cf. Wagener 2020:63ff.). The final working step is the integration of the results of both the analysis of the photogramme(s) and the sequence analysis (6). Here, we also identify homologies and incongruences especially between the verbal and the corporeal dimension.

6. Exemplary analysis of a video recorded classroom interaction

The empirical example consists of a video sequence conducted in a German language class in an urban secondary school in the German speaking part of Switzerland. The video sequence can be divided into one main sequence (ms), two subsequences (ss) and two parallel subsequences (pss):

07:27-08:35 Instructions for working on the worksheet (ms);

07:27-07:41 Instructions (to Fritz) to work on the worksheet (ss);

07:41-08:35 Independent work on the worksheet (by Fritz) (pss);

07:41-08:35 Tolerating the abbreviation of assignments with the help of 'WhatsApp' because of good grades (ss);

08:19-08:31 Quiet conversation between Arda and Fuat (pss).[6]

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[6]   All names are pseudonymized.

For a detailed interpretation, the subsequence *07:41-08:35 Tolerating the abbreviation of assignments with the help of 'WhatsApp' because of good grades* was selected because the interaction is characterized by a high interactive density, which culminates in an expressive gesture by the student Emre (see figure 1). The following interpretation of the simultaneous and the sequential dimensions of the interaction will focus mainly on the presented picture or video producers based on the reflecting interpretation. Since the focus of this paper is mainly on sequence analysis, the photogramme analysis does not include composition variation and is only exemplified here. For examples of composition variation in videography analysis see Wagener (2020:89ff.) and in video or film analysis Bohnsack (2009, 2020b).

## 6.1. Photogramme analysis of a classroom interaction

Figure 1: Photogramme 08:16

The photogramme can be considered as representative of the sequence as the positions taken by the actors are typical for the whole sequence. The focused moment is that Emre is performing an atypical, expressive gesture that is also different from all other gestures presented in the photogramme. He is leaning against his chair, has both arms stretched out over the table and has put his right palm on his left fist. He also shows a big smile and seems to be looking at his classmate Fuat.

Emre's gesture cannot be initially identified as an institutionalized act, e.g., raising-hand in order to gain the teacher's attention. It shows, however, that Emre is not facing the subject, i.e., a worksheet on the table, and that he is a bit distanced from the (work) table. Fuat and partly Arda are also turned away from the worksheet, whereas Arda is turned towards Fuat. In contrast, Fritz, who is sitting next to Ms Wyss, the German teacher, as well as Basil and Cem are facing their worksheets. While Ms Wyss takes a position of coming-and-going, Mr Peters, the Mathematics teacher, and Ms Werner, the special education teacher, take a permanent position sitting next to Cem and Basil. The two teachers flank them on both sides, which makes it more difficult for them to take distance from the subject.

The main results of the reflecting interpretation show the students' different degrees of freedom to act or autonomy, which includes the possibility of distancing from the subject or the student role (cf. Goffman 1961), respectively. The differences can be observed for the students sitting at the tables by the wall as they can act without the direct control or observation of a teacher. In a very similar way, this is also true for the students around Ms Wyss. They interact with each other apart from the subject. Ms Wyss' position at the table also seems to be more short-term compared to the other two teachers, who are sitting next to Cem and Basil and addressing them closely.

Referring to the iconographic contextual knowledge, Cem and Basil are assigned special educational needs (SEN), whereas the other students are assigned to tracks based on higher academic achievements. This leads to the conclusion that the very different degrees of freedom or autonomy are related to the formal code of assessment that is the students' attributed ability of academic achievement. This scenic choreography comes along with visibilizing the SEN students inside the classroom. According to Foucault (1977), visibilization can be considered as a central element of subordination in power relations. In terms of Garfinkel (1967b), here we can see a kind of degradation process, which constitutes the construction of a total identity (cf. ibid), i.e. the personal identity of the low achiever as the subordinated, and which is central to power structured interaction as described by Bohnsack (2017: 136). This is not about reconstructing the common sense theories of power actors in the sense of "practical theorizing" (Cicourel 1968:123), but about the interactive production of power. In this perspective, power means that "first coding" of an action or practice, such as coding through educational assessment, is followed by "second coding" in the realm of identity construction (Bohnsack 2017:136). Second coding has consequences for the person as a whole as it goes along with "moralizations, patholigizing, or ascriptions of total incompetence" (ibid). At the same time, the possibility of meta-communication, or role distance as the equivalent of meta-communication in the bodily dimension, is being suppressed, which results in invisibilization of the construction process (cf. ibid). In our comparative research, we could find this kind of pattern in other sequences related to this school class, but also in other classes (cf. Wagener 2020:90ff.).

6.2. Sequence analysis of a classroom interaction

The following video transcript is based on the interaction between Ms Wyss, Emre, and Fuat and was translated from Swiss German. Due to presentation limits, the transcript mainly includes the verbal utterances following the rules of "TiQ" ("Talk in Qualitative Research"; Bohnsack 2009:242).[7] It takes into account significant changes at the bodily level, which are described pre/iconographically.

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[7] The complete transcript is published in Swiss German and standard German in Wagener (2020: 98ff.).

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Emre:          quickly sliding with his upper body down onto the table toward Fuat, who is writing on his
               worksheet, and whispering something to Fuat.
Meanwhile, Arda turns to the left and leans forward toward Fuat. Fuat then turns to the left with his head
tilted, places his bent right forearm between himself and Arda on the table and leans the left side of his head
against his right hand.
Ms Wyss:       Don't distract him now he has just
               understood the assignment. then you can also @benefit@ from him
               later.
Emre:          °You know, photos and stuff.°
Fuat:          looking up to Emre @(.)@
Ms Wyss:       Photos and stuff.
Emre:          WhatsApp. °@no@°;
Ms Wyss:       @Sure@
Emre:          Yea what do you think why we're always done so quickly? °@no@°
Ms Wyss:       As long as you're good at the exams, (1) I'll be generous
Emre:                                        |Exactly, as long as
               I'm goo- when will I get the results of my German exams?
Fuat:          You got 5.5.
Ms Wyss:       As long as you're stil-
Emre:          5.5?
Ms Wyss:       No, he got 5.6. he was even better than the best of the you got
               5.5, didn't you?
Fuat:          5.4
Emre:          I got 5.6?
Emre:          Damn. I was better than you. hits his left fist with his right hand
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Video transcript 1: "WhatsApp"

1-5 propositions and (role) distance by Emre and Arda; proposition in defensive or oppositional mode by Fuat
First Emre and then Arda (physically) initiate an interaction with Fuat, who in turn is busy working on his worksheet. Emre signals that he is taking action in a subversive or peer-related way that goes beyond the formal student role. In doing so, he distances himself from this role. However, his discreet, unobtrusive behavior indicates that he respects or does not challenge the primary formal framework of instruction. At the same time, he thereby allows Ms Wyss to participate in peer-related activities, exposing them, so to speak. Fuat, on the other hand, does not get involved with the initiation of his two classmates. He shields himself from the physical approach by Arda, while he continues to turn to the worksheet and thus remains in the student role.

6-8 following proposition by Ms Wyss
Due to the reasons given, the teacher's disciplinary request not to distract Fuat takes on a lecturing character, although its seriousness (the seriousness of the disciplining as well as the lecturing) is relativized by her laughter. This documents the fact that the demarcation between formal classroom and informal peer discourse is not meant so seriously.

9-13 following proposition or elaboration by Emre; validation by Fuat; following proposition by Ms Wyss; elaboration by Emre; following proposition by Ms Wyss
Emre's subsequent "Okay" can be interpreted as a confirmation of the non-serious boundary drawing, since he now addresses Fuat again ("You know, photos and stuff"). He thus propounds a shared, presumably peer-specific, knowledge. By expressing this now more openly, he also includes Ms Wyss more strongly in the peer-

related interaction, but without addressing her directly. By picking up on Emre's verbal proposition, Ms Wyss expresses some interest in these 'peer-internal' activities, but without directly asking about them. This documents Emre's 'success' in drawing Ms Wyss into his peer-related activities and thus blurring the formal discourse. With his subsequent statement "What's App", Emre responds to the implicitly expressed interest of the teacher. "What's App" is a digital interactive medium that is usually used with the help of smartphones. Emre's subsequent antithetical retraction documents that he is revealing something that he should not actually reveal, since it is presumably not part of the formal framework of the lesson. His accompanying laughter marks this crossing of the border between peer-cultural and formal discourse. By also laughing and reacting with an ironic remark ("Sure"), Ms Wyss remains in the peer-related frame and thus signals again or further the tolerance of the boundary crossing. Referring to the photogramme, this is also reflected in her posture or bodily positioning, which gives the impression of 'coming and going' (see 6.1).

14-17 elaboration by Emre in the mode of a rhetorical question; intermediate conclusion in the form of a proposition by Ms Wyss; validation by Emre
Emre imforms Ms Wyss about the seemingly illegal practice of shortening tasks. The peers apparently take photographs of finished assignments and send them to each other via "What'sApp". At the same time, Emre again relativizes the seriousness of his statement by laughingly recanting it antithetically. However, as long as the students achieve good grades in tests, Ms Wyss gives them the freedom to shorten the processing of the tasks within the scope of what is actually an impermissible way of dealing with them. This output orientation leads to the toleration of indiscipline or peer subversions as long as they are borne by the 'high-performing' students. Thus, the hierarchy constituted on the basis of formal performance assessment (first coding) is transferred unnoticed to other domains, i.e., the domain of communicative negotiation of discipline, of negotiating the boundary between informal peer discourse and the formal role structure of teaching. To be sure, the concession of generous tolerance of cell phone use in class by those who perform well on tests does not remain latent. What remains latent, however, is that the 'high-performing' student can easily ignore the teacher's attempts to discipline him with regard to limiting peer discourse, or that the blurring of the boundary between peer discourse and formal discourse is tolerated among them, and that, conversely, the deviants from the performance norm, in this case the students Cem and Basil, are altogether subjected to a restriction of their scope of action (see 6.1) (second coding). By then validating Ms Wyss' statement about the legitimacy of 'unauthorized work behavior', which she links to the achievement of good grades, Emre documents that the orientation raised by Ms Wyss is shared.

17-25 following proposition in the mode of a question by Emre; information by Fuat; repetition in the mode of a question by Emre; information and following propositions by Ms Wyss; information by Fuat; following proposition and elaboration by Emre
By asking for the date of the return of his German test, Emre thematically connects to the previous discourse about (his) good grade(s). In the way Fuat takes up Emre's proposition and names his grade, he takes on the role of the teacher, which also

indicates that the announcement of grades is not a private matter, which is also confirmed in the further course of the interaction: by correcting Emre's grade upward, Ms Wyss speaks about Emre in the third person, thus presumably addressing Fuat. Thereupon, she presents Emre in front of the other students as the one who has been "better" "than the best". By subsequently asking Fuat if he had one grade point less, she implicitly makes a one-to-one comparison with the classmate present. By then framing Emre as the "better" one, she establishes a hierarchical difference between the two students as well as the other classmates. By repeating his grade in the mode of a rhetorical question to Fuat and by proclaiming that he was "better than" him, Emre takes up the frame of comparison. At the same time, he physically stages his proposition in the form of an expressive gesture: slapping the palm on his fist (see figure 1), thereby corporately expressing his 'victory' over Fuat in the contest for the better grade. In the staging of his proposition, he thus places it in the context of peer discourse. While up to now the peer discourse was transgressed in the direction of the formal discourse, the opposite is now the case: the adoption of the formal hierarchization of achievement into the peer discourse, which reaches its dramaturgical climax here.

6.3. Summary and further results

In summary, the interpretation of the simultaneous (photogramme analysis) and the sequential (sequence analysis) dimension of the video sequence show a hierarchization according to performance (first coding), which is accompanied by the expansion of autonomy of action for the high performers and its restriction for the low performers (second coding). This goes hand in hand with visibilizing the weakest performers in particular. This power-structured interaction associated with the construction of the total identity of the high-achieving and the low-achieving student is part of this conjunctive space of experience or classroom milieu, indicated in particular by the routinized interaction and shared orientation. Power in this context, however, is not to be attributed to the intentions of the power actors, but to be seen as part of the implicit structure of interaction.

The Praxeological Sociology of Knowledge considers power a typical mode of interaction within "people processing organizations" (Luhmann 1978:248), such as schools, which decide on the identity of their clientele (cf. Bohnsack 2020c). Comparison with other cases drawn from a study of construction of achievement related differences in the classroom (cf. Wagener 2020), from which the sequence presented is taken, led to the reconstruction of other modes of interaction besides power (cf. ibid:89ff.). Within the methodological framework of the Documentary Method, these modes of interaction represent the analytical basis for questions of *professionalism* within people processing organizations and its normative evaluation (cf. ibid:183ff.; Bohnsack 2020c).[8]

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[8]   According to Bohnsack (2020c), professionalism in the analytical sense means the production of a conjunctive space of experience in the interaction with the clientele with reference to the organizational role expectations and programs. The analysis of the formal mode of interaction, in turn, gives insight into the implicit normative or ethical structure inherent in professional practice in terms of "practical discourse ethics" (ibid:109). Only based on the reconstructed practical discourse ethics, the social scientist is able to assess the professional practice (cf. ibid).

Furthermore, the comparison in the dimensions of school type and subject teaching led to a typology of classroom milieus related to the hierarchization of students by achievement in relation to the construction of students' identities (cf. Wagener 2020:89). The comparison of different school types, i.e., high schools (Gymnasien) and 'inclusive' secondary schools, and school subjects, i.e., mathematics, German, and art, then enabled sociogenetic explanations for the differences in the typology (cf. ibid.:153ff.).

7. Conclusion and perspectives

The Documentary Method in its present constitution looks back on more than thirty years of development, beginning with Ralf Bohnsack's habilitation thesis. In historical analysis, however, it can be seen that some of its foundations go back to earlier work by Bohnsack in the 1970s, even if central meta-theoretical and methodological aspects have changed fundamentally since then. In this context, the critical examination of Phenomenology and the turn to Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge, which forms the central point of reference of the Documentary Method, are to be mentioned in particular. At the same time, Bohnsack's earlier engagement with Ethnomethodology as well as empirical studies in organizational settings is of central importance to current research on organizations and professionalism.

Closely related to this is the ongoing development of sequence analysis, which is based primarily on the interpretation of texts such as group discussions and interviews, and, more recently, audiovisual data. Its central goal is the reconstruction of implicit or conjunctive knowledge of groups or individuals. In doing so, the data are viewed as self-referential systems. While text is empirically characterized by its sequential structure, visual data, especially pictures, however, are characterized by simultaneity. Along the distinction between the sequentiality of texts and the simultaneity of pictures, different methodological procedures have been developed. In video analysis, the relation of the analysis of sequential and simultaneous structures reaches a higher methodological level with their respective self-referentiality.

Besides the different characteristics of the sequence analysis and the analysis of the simultaneous structure of pictures or photogrammes, the comparison of both shows one comprehensive methodical principle of the Documentary Method, which is the *comparative analysis*. As Bohnsack (1983:180) stated early,

> the interpretative approach, which is able to also open up the counter horizon and thus both horizons by means of text exegesis [and compositional variation – BW], […] is in my opinion the ideal way of interpretation.

> Die interpretative Vorgehensweise, welche auch den Gegenhorizont und somit beide Horizonte mittels Textexegese [und der Kompositionsvariation – BW] erschließen und immer wieder überprüfen kann, halte ich für den Königsweg der Interpretation.

Comparative analysis enables the reconstruction of the multidimensionality of conjunctive spaces of experience. While the first empirical reconstructions with the Documentary Method were primarily concerned with the conjunctive spaces of experience in society, such as gender or migration specific milieus, more recently the organizational conjunctive spaces of experience or milieus have been the focus of empirical and meta-theoretical analysis. This is expressed, among other things, in

the differentiation of the meta-theoretical terminologies such as 'power' or 'professionalism'. In this regard, the development is still in its infancy, especially concerning the relationship between the analysis of talk and picture or video, and thus also between the analysis of sequentiality and simultaneity. Concerning the sequence analysis of videographic data in particular, the conceptualization of the analysis of the formal structure based on the bodily constituents of interaction has just begun. Especially the analysis of bodily or incorporated practices relies both on the reconstruction of their simultaneous and their sequential structures and their integration.

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9. Appendix: Transcription according to "TiQ" (Bohnsack 2009)

⌊	start of an overlap or direct connection when the speaker changes
(1)	number of seconds of a pause
°no°	very quietly spoken (in relation to the usual volume of the speaker)
.	sharply decreasing intonation
?	sharply increasing intonation
,	softly increasing intonation
goo-	word termination
@no@	laughingly spoken
@(.)@	short laugh

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