1. Introduction

The international colloquium *Inferences in Interaction and Language Change*, organized by Oliver Ehmer and Malte Rosemeyer, was held from November 10th-13th, 2016 at the Freiburg Institute of Advanced Studies (FRIAS) in Freiburg.

In their introduction, Malte Rosemeyer (from a diachronic linguistic background) and Oliver Ehmer (with an interactional perspective on language) stated that there is (still) too little contact between synchronic and diachronic linguist(ics). Even though both approaches might have a common ground (or a common understanding of language), there are several obstacles hindering a successful collaboration. Mainly, this concerns the different data synchronics and diachronics are dealing with, where the former benefits from having much more data available.

As the aim of the colloquium was to contribute to bringing both disciplines (closer) together, Oliver Ehmer then raised a number of questions, concerning (1) the different domains and phenomena that can be studied (Which types of inferences are there? Do we need inferences to the same extent to explain (different) phenomena, reaching from grammatical items like 'modal particles' to concepts like 'indirectness'?), (2) the currently available methods (What are the benefits and limitations of qualitative and quantitative analyses? Can both methods be combined?), (3) the modeling of discourse participants ((How) can the concept of turn-taking that is so essential for spoken language (and the inferences therein) be applied to written discourse? Whose inferences are we talking about? In how far can or should cognitive assumptions be integrated into the analyses?).

2. The relevance of inferences in interaction and language change

Arnulf Deppermann (Institute for the German Language, Mannheim): *(Why) do we need inferences in conversation analysis?*

Presenting the first talk of the colloquium, Arnulf Deppermann provided a helpful overview of different understandings of *inferences*. He then examined three ways of inferencing: explicit inferences, indexical inferences, and inferences that are not displayed (but still needed for the understanding of a turn). Finally, methodological problems concerning the concept of inferences in conversation analysis (CA) were discussed.

First, Deppermann presented perceptions of inferences by Bruner (1957) ("to go beyond the information given") and Horn (2012) (speakers imply, hearers infer) as well as pragmatics (e.g. Grice 1975) and conversational (Gumperz 1982) perspectives. He pointed out that the boundary between the concepts of *inference*
and *implicature* is fuzzy, and made clear that *inference* can be understood in a cognitive, rational or socio-normative way or, on the other hand, as an analytical category.

After presenting a segment of conversation in which an erroneous inference has been made and then overtly becomes an object of negotiation, Deppermann discussed cases of German *dann* and *also*, both explicitly displaying that the subsequent utterance is to be understood as an inference from a prior turn. But whereas *dann* prefices unilateral inferences (mainly in conflict talks), *also* projects intersubjective inferences, which are expected to be confirmed by the co-participant. Often *also*-prefaced inferences transform prior speech according to institutional relevancies.

The responsive particle *eben* is a case of indexed (but not formulated) inference: *eben* implies a relationship between the partner's prior turn and the prior speech of the *eben*-speaker. This prior speech serves as an anchor for the *eben*-utterance, as the *eben*-speaker therein displays some knowledge on what the partner then utters in his turn (anchor – partner's turn – *eben*). *eben* then confirms the partner's turn and thus retrospectively claims an inferential relationship between the confirmed turn and the anchor.

In the next case, Deppermann examined analeptic utterances lacking an object (e.g., 'denk ich auch' – 'think I also' and 'weiß nicht' – 'don't know'). Here, inferences are not displayed at all, but needed for the correct understanding of the turn. In such cases of topic-drop analepsis, the antecedent may be simply copied from a prior turn, but most often it has to be assembled from several prior turns and also adapted syntactically. Thus, participants must rely on inferential processes in order to resolve such analeptic structures.

Addressing methodological problems, Deppermann pointed out that inferences can be recovered but are not directly displayed by participants. Thus, conversation analysts can only rely on the next turn proof procedure or study deviant cases (like the first example of an erroneous inference that is being negotiated explicitly). Deppermann concluded that inferences are perceptibly a participant's concern even though they are often implicit and not displayed.

**Elizabeth Closs Traugott (Stanford University):**

**Rethinking the role of invited inferencing in change: From the perspectives of constructionalization and interactional texts**

Elizabeth Closs Traugott's talk dealt with the role of inferences within language change, taking as a starting point the Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (IITSC). Revisiting the theory from the perspective of constructionalization and interactional discourse, she raised the question whether inferences can be seen as a 'trigger' for change, and within this context analyzed the development of the attention-getter *look* and the projector construction *what happened was* in English.

First, Traugott talked about her original conception of invited inferences: In the context of working on grammaticalization in the late 80's/early 90's, Traugott star-
ted looking for historical evidence concerning the Gricean implicatures and suggested that, among others, one factor enabling change is the association of implicatures with syntax. The term 'invited inference' within IITSC points out that change happens in interaction and that it is the language users who (unconsciously) enable change. Change then does not mean innovation, but the conventionalization of pragmatic inferences in a community of speakers (the pragmatic ambiguity of the inferences is considered a prerequisite for grammaticalization (Gzn) by some scholars).

As a second point, Traugott presented the concept of constructionalization (Cxzn); it includes modifications that have been made against the backdrop of a critical questioning of the Gricean perspective and the term of *conversational implicature*: Both Gzn and Cxzn embrace inferences, but according to the latter, they are located in larger, chunked expressions. According to Traugott/Trousdale (2013), Cxzn is the development of form→meaning→new combinations that are contentful/lexical as well as procedural/grammatical, and are subject to analogical and onomasiological as well as semasiological analysis. Furthermore, Traugott pointed out that at least 2 types of inferencing must be distinguished: local inferences (which can be both linguistic, semasiological and onomasiological, frame-oriented) and discourse structuring inferences (concerning coherence as well as back-/foregrounding).

Traugott then proceeded with the analysis of the role inferencing plays in interactional discourse (ID): As in ID – consisting of turns that again are built of turn-constructional units (TCUs) – clause-initial (CI) position plays an important role (e.g. within turn-taking), Traugott focused on constructions occurring in these positions. She raised the question of which inferences (if any) might have led constructions appearing CI (like *look* and *what happened was*) to be used in this position. A distinction between several kinds of inferences is made: local inferences (e.g. a sequence being inferred as a causal relation: 'since (after) X Y' > 'Y was caused by X'), discourse structuring inferences (e.g. concerning (counter-)expectation: (clause-final) *after all*), turn-taking inferences (morphosyntactic markers of a turn (MTCUs) can for example mark the initiation of a turn: *well, so*; they are both local and discourse structuring).

Subsequently, Traugott mentioned the case of the Italian imperative *guarda* (*look*) that changed from a literal imperative to an attention-getter. Detges/Waltereit (2011) hypothesize that this was due to *guarda* having one conversational implicature (listener needing to look at something) that is associated with its use as an attention-getting phrase-marker. At some point, it started being used in contexts where there was nothing to look at (cf. Detges/Waltereit 2011). Examining the question whether something similar happened to the English *look*, Traugott came to a different conclusion: Starting from a local inference (*loc- ('look') + complement > 'look to it that/consider how'), the construction then lost the complementizer and appeared at the beginning of turns, and finally became established as attention-getter. Thus, not turn-taking but a semantic shift from literal vision imperative to cognitive understanding can be seen as the initial enabling factor for the new function of *look*.

Concluding her talk, Traugott made clear that even if turn-taking contexts are a "privileged pragmatic context for novel usages" (Detges/Waltereit 2011:175), they are often not an initial trigger in English – even for attention-getters like *look*. 
Paul Drew (Loughborough University): *Inference and indirectness in interaction*

Paul Drew, with the research background of Conversation Analysis, brought along a number of transcripts of spoken English conversation, in order to examine the association of inference and implicature with indirectness in interaction. He gave insights into the relation of inference and implicature as well as inference and (speaker) identity. Another focus was placed on avoidance practices in interaction, which consist of speakers responding indirectly, leaving it to the co-participant to infer information and thus avoiding saying something explicitly.

The opening example of a husband not recognizing his wife who has called him at work, laid emphasis on the fact that "there's no escaping implicature and inference", as Drew put it. Everything in interaction is open for inference – or: there is an implicature in everything we say (also: inferences affect the relationship between participants). Furthermore, Drew pointed out that the question of how participants understand each other (not necessarily in a cognitive sense), always entails a discussion about inferences and implicatures as well. His understanding of *inference* comes close to the definition given by Gumperz (1982: 153): "Conversational inference, as I use the term, is the situated or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in an exchange assess others' intentions, and on which they base their responses."

For his point on 'Implicature and action', Drew provided examples showing how participants make inferences about actions (e.g. understanding an action as being a complaint), demonstrating very nicely how different inferences from one and the same utterance might be. Going along with Deppermann's statement on methodological problems concerning the proof of inferences, Drew made clear that these insights – derived from participants' reactions – do not provide any evidence of what is happening cognitively.

In the second part on 'Inference', Drew underlined that as inference is so ubiquitous, participants are enacting something special when they mark the inference (by phrases like *(so) in other words*). He highlighted that implicatures and inferences are visible in the moves participants make in interaction and that they engage with and rely on participants' respective identities.

In his last point 'Responding indirectly, leaving the other to make the inference', Drew showed how indirectness in benign cases (participants responding to the inferred agenda of a co-participant) but also in more disaffiliative ones (participants indirectly working against a co-participant's project) is used as a strategy to avoid explicitness or going on record.

3. *Adverbials*

Kerstin Fischer (University of Southern Denmark) & Elizabeth Closs Traugott (Stanford University): *Inferential processes in a clause-final use of already*

Kerstin Fischer presented two hypotheses on the use of *already* that denotes the use of a clause-final *already* deviating from the use as a temporal adverb, e.g., 'Oh, get to the point already!'. According to the hypotheses, *already* (implicating
impatience) can be analyzed either as the temporal adverb being used in new irrealis contexts, or as a new modal particle (MP) in English. 

*Already* as a temporal adverb can be seen as denoting a relation between an expected transition point (ETP) and the real transition point (TP). *Already* then codes that TP has occurred prior to the time of utterance (Tu):

\[ \text{TP} \rightarrow \text{Tu} \rightarrow \text{ETP} \]

Thus, *already* implicates that "things might have been otherwise" (Hansen 2008:143).

The use of the clause-final *already* is not novel and already appears in Shakespeare's plays. However, *alreadyN* being tied to some sort of directive speech act (imperative or modal contexts), mostly blocking the reading 'prior to Tu' is not attested until the 20th century.

Hypothesis I suggests that *alreadyN* is an adverb extended to non-prototypical contexts. This means that in irrealis contexts (like imperatives and modal sentences), the constraint of TP preceding Tu is loosened. In this case, the novel use of *alreadyN* would represent a context-expansion, which has been described as a general mechanism within language change.

According to hypothesis II, *alreadyN* is a modal particle (MP), even though the assumption that a general MP category exists in English is controversial. This analysis gives rise to question what MPs actually are; Fischer pointed out that *alreadyN* as a MP contributes to the interactive negotiation of common ground: In the example 'Oh, get to the point already!', the MP *already* relates the host utterance to an inferable pragmatic context, namely that the addressee could get to the point.

As a conclusion, Fischer made clear that even if both hypotheses are plausible, they presuppose very different inferential processes in interaction. Additionally, she raised questions about cross-linguistic preconceptions that might play a role in analyzing *alreadyN* one way or the other, as well as about English possibly acquiring a new category of MPs.

**Regine Eckardt (University of Konstanz): Texts of Law as model case of conditional reasoning. Why German lost conditional "ob" and found "wenn" instead**

Regine Eckardt examined the question of why during the period of Middle High German (MHG), the standard conditional conjunction in German changed from *ob* (Old High German: *of*) to the former temporal pronoun *wenn* (whereas English kept *if*). Presenting evidence that this development originated in German legal texts after 1200, she pointed out how such a change of function words can give insights about the communicative space at the time.

As her first point, Eckardt gave an overview of German conditionals in the 13th century. Her sources (Gottfried von Straßburg, Nibelungenlied, Chroniken, Berttram von Regensburg) unequivocally show *ob*-conditionals as the standard conditional construction, clearly outnumbering other constructions in all of the texts. However, free relative clauses on basis of *sw*-pronouns (like *(s)wenn(e), s-ber, s-welch*) could entail conditional meanings as well. Furthermore, the *sw*-pronouns were mainly used in contexts that conveyed pragmatics of Free Choice (FC): *'swer ir minne gerte' – 'whoever desired her love'. Nevertheless, testing the pronominal paradigm for [+FC] pragmatics, Eckardt found that the FC presuppositions started
to get lost, predominantly in the case of (s)wenn(e) (viz. (s)wenn(e) started to lose the reading 'whenever' in favour of 'when').

In a second case, Eckardt presented the analysis of conditionals in legal texts, namely in the so-called Sachsenspiegel (the first German law) as well as in other Spiegel texts. The specific legal cases were noted down in form of free relatives and V1 clauses, thus responding to the question 'What happens if …?': 'S)wat so de herde vorluset, dat scal he gelden' – 'Whatever the shepherd loses he must refund'. Ob-constructions, on the other hand, were used for expressing restrictions and elaborations. Eckardt hypothesizes that speakers copied the conditional pattern in legal texts, comprehending sw-constructions as 'good' conditionals. (s)wenn(e) was already commonly used in –FC contexts and thus was semantically and pragmatically most suitable.

Concerning the question of how plausible the transfer of linguistic patterns from the legal language into the common language is, Eckardt in conclusion provided answers from a socio-historical and a language acquisition perspective. In addition, she pointed out that the ob/wenn-case suggests an answer to the frequency paradox.

### 4. Interlude

**Susanne Michaelis & Martin Haspelmath (Leipzig University & Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, Jena): Why independent possessive person-forms are longer: Diverse sources conspiring toward a uniform result**

Susanne Michaelis presented a study on independent possessive person-forms (such as English mine, yours, hers) in a variety of languages. As these are consistently longer than the corresponding adnominal forms (my, your, her), she claimed that this result was guided by the need to highlight the less frequent (independent) forms. Thus, change is determined by a preferred result, rather than a result being determined by preferred changes.

To begin with, Michaelis pointed out that rarer forms in a grammatical opposition generally tend to be longer than their more frequent counterparts (e.g. present tense vs. future tense). This can be explained by a general efficiency principle: the meaning of rarer forms is less predictable and thus needs more coding. The development of independent possessive person-forms shows that different sources and pathways led to an eventual similar result, making it a case of diverse convergent changes or multiconvergence. This means that the change must have been motivated by a preferred result and not, as in other cases, by a constrained pathway (which is the case for nasal vowels, always originating from the combination 'vowel + nasal consonant', for instance).

In a next step, Michaelis compared the use of dependent and independent possessive person-forms in different languages. Only the dependent forms occur in combination with an overt noun; with independent forms, the noun is understood because of an anaphoric relationship or because of predicative use ('Is this bike yours?'). Evidence from corpora data supports the observation that independent possessive person-forms are less frequent. The more frequent use of dependent forms leads to shortness of coding due to articulation reduction.
Subsequently, Michaelis presented types of correspondences between dependent and independent possessive person-forms across languages: the independent form can be longer due to an additional article, for instance (cf. Italian *mia sorella* 'my sister' vs. *la mia* 'the my'). Michaelis provided a list of types of diachronic sources and pathways accounting for the lengthening of the independent forms, e.g. the addition of a dummy noun (cf. Guyanais *mo* 'my' vs. *mo-pa* 'my-part').

In conclusion, the diverse convergent changes support the hypothesis of a functional-adaptive constraint rather than explanations assuming constraints on possible sources or changes.

**Peter Auer (Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg) & Anja Stukenbrock (University of Lausanne):**

*When you means 'I': Personalized uses of German 'generic' *du* ('you')*

Similar to many Romance and to other Germanic languages, the 2nd person singular pronoun in German (*du*) can entail a non-addressee-referential 'generic' function. Based on conversational data, Peter Auer and Anja Stukenbrock demonstrated how the use of *du* varies in its degree of genericity/subjectivity, leading them to claim that by using *du* speakers primarily talk about themselves, and invite the addressee to share the speaker's perspective.

Whereas contrary opinions on the pragmatic meaning of 'generic' *du* exist, Auer & Stukenbrock agree with Kluge (2016) that speakers can use 'generic' *du* to refer to themselves. They reconstructed this inferences by drawing on the next speaker's responses. Inferences can be directly visible, when a next speaker formulates (aspects of) what the previous speaker 'meant', or indirectly visible, through the next speaker's sequentially next action. Auer & Stukenbrock presented 8 instances of 'generic' *du*, which differed with respect to the referent included through the pronoun (speaker (7) vs. addressee (1)) and varied in degree of genericity (*du* being close rather to a generic ('one') or a subjective meaning (‘I’/‘you’)). In terms of genericity, the 7 speaker-inclusive examples could be subcategorized into 'high genericity', 'category-bound generalization' and 'self-reference'. This categorization resulted in an arrangement of the different uses of *du* on a continuum, reaching from an abstract to a very situational denotation. The speaker-including use of *du* here entails a deictic shift, leading the addressee to take the speaker's perspective.

In the second part, Auer & Stukenbrock had a look at the emergence of 'the deictic shift'. After presenting Jacob Grimm's descriptions of non-addressee-deictic *du*-usages (generic/deontic *du* as 'pronoun of teachings and laws' and *du* for speaker-reference in 'thou-monologues'), they then examined the 'generic' *du* in TU/VOS relationships in the 20th and the 21st century in order to assess its emergence and development. The data show a substantial increase of 'generic' *du* during the 20th and 21st century, while the TU/VOS barrier continues being relevant.

In conclusion, Auer & Stukenbrock pointed out that the non-addressee-specific use of *du* does not simply replace generic *man* ('one'), but rather is to be understood as a way of talking about own experiences while performing a deictic shift. Furthermore, this use needs to be distinguished from the (generic) use of *du* referring to the addressee as part of a larger social category.
Ulrich Detges (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich):  
*Te lo tengo dicho muchas veces. Resultative constructions between implicature and coercion*

Ulrich Detges's talk dealt with the question of how and why the change from present resultative to iterative/durative anterior takes place (as it was the case for Germanic and Western Romance HAVE-anteriors). For this purpose, he examined the Spanish *tener* + *past participle* construction, which constitutes a resultative in present-day Spanish but has not turned into an anterior.

At first, Detges presented the anterior cycle (cf. Harris 1982), which includes four stages: resultative, persistence, current relevance, and aoristic function. He then took a closer look at the boundary between resultative and anterior: whereas resultatives denote a certain state (a result) that was caused by an event in the past, "aniters refer to a past action that is relevant to a present situation. [...] Whereas resultatives highlight the state resulting from an event, anteriors highlight the event causing the state" (Rosemeyer 2012:139). Examining the specific verbs being used in the *tener* + *past participle* construction, Detges found that past participles denoting a mental activity/perception (e.g. 'entendido' – 'understood') or performing a speech act (‘dicho’ – ‘said’) are most frequent. The use of these kinds of verbs in the resultative construction leads to an argumentative effect: The previous perception/mental activity/speech act justifies the current state of knowledge ('I know it from having watched it'). This explains how non-telic verbs (like 'decir' – 'tell') can transition to a resultant state: 'I told you so and the effect of speech act is still valid.' The mismatch between the type selected by the verb (non-telic) and the type selected by the construction (resultative) leads to a type coercion effect.

For a resultative turning into an anterior, Detges proposes a process of reanalysis: through reinforcement by iteration ('te lo tengo dicho muchas veces' – 'I have told you many times'), the resultative reading is replaced by an iterative anterior one. The data, however, show a stable frontier between resultative and iterative-anterior: verbs like 'prestar' ('lend'), which imply an iterative-anterior reading when being reinforced by iteration ('I have lent it to you many times' → 'I must have got it back in order to lend it again') do not occur with the *tener* + *past participle* construction. Detges thus concludes that pragmatic overrules conceptual coercion: The conceptual mismatch of the resultative construction being used with atelic verbs is not strong enough to trump its rhetoric efficiency.

Oliver Ehmer (Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg) & Malte Rosemeyer (KU Leuven & University of Freiburg):  
*Contrast and inferences in but-prefaced interrogatives: A synchronic and diachronic analysis of Spanish*

Oliver Ehmer and Malte Rosemeyer examined *but*-prefaced interrogatives in spoken and written Spanish (e.g. 'pero qué dices'), analyzing the inference processes involved in the functional variation of the interrogatives. Taking, on the one hand, a qualitative, interactional approach (regarding the synchronic data) and, on the other hand, drawing on quantitative, statistical methods (for the diachronic data), they determined sequential patterns and significant context variables for the use and function of *but*-prefaced interrogatives.
After presenting their research questions (Functional contribution of *pero*-prefaces in *qué*-interrogatives? Diachronic dimension in the alternation of *qué* X vs. *pero qué X*?), Ehmer & Rosemeyer studied previous research: *interrogatives perform social actions, they are not always questions* (Stivers/Enfield 2010:2623); *prefaces can consist of different kinds of elements (e.g. breathing, discourse markers) and indexically frame the upcoming turn; but as preface can mark concession and disagreement, but can also constitute a challenge of a proposition, marking it as inappropriate*. Oliver Ehmer then presented three cases of *pero qué X* showing a *(specifying) second request, a challenge, and a challenge in reported speech*. Even though there is no 1:1 equal relationship between form and function (the *pero qué X*-challenge still requires an inferential process), we can see indicators for the sedimentation of this construction.

In the second part, Malte Rosemeyer presented an analysis of *(pero) qué* + DECIR conducted on the basis of classification and regression trees (CART). Corpora of spoken and written Spanish were tested for the dependent variable *use of pero* (yes/no) in relation to several predictors (e.g., person, tense, text genre), leading to the following results: Whereas the use of first person (*pero qué digo*) indicates a self-challenge, second person use (*pero qué dices*) occurs in the context of interactional (interpersonal) challenges. These functions constitute entrenched patterns that are used in conversation (2nd person, direct and reported speech) and written texts (2nd person, in constructed dialogues; 1st person, in monologues).

In conclusion, Ehmer & Rosemeyer pointed out that even though differing in form, these patterns derive from the same inference process.

**Richard Waltereit (Newcastle University): Reanalysis at speech community and at discourse level: The French *est-ce que* question**

Richard Waltereit's talk covered language change in the light of reanalysis. Arguing for a conflation of what he subsumes under the concepts of 'discourse-level' and 'speech-community-level reanalysis', Waltereit discussed the emergence of the French interrogative particle *est-ce que*.

Initially, Waltereit distinguished two broad approaches to language change: the structuralist approach, emphasizing the linguistic innovation (novel form-function matching) by individuals, and the variationist approach, focusing on the spread of shifting form-function matching within the speech community. Whereas recurring pathways of assumed inferential change (e.g. space > time; result > past tense) imply a speaker-centered (structuralist) model of language change, the concept of hearer-driven change (assigning a non-literal meaning to an utterance) represents an alternative to this idea.

Waltereit examined reanalysis from two perspectives: On a discourse level, reanalysis (the "change in the structure of an expression […] that does not involve immediate […] modification of its surface structure" (Langacker 1977:58)) can be seen as a type of hearer-driven change. Waltereit presented structural contexts of reanalysis (e.g. concerning NP determination: French 'napperon' (‘cloth’) > English ‘an apron’) and onomasiological ones (cf. Chafe’s (1977) *codability* model, concerning the categorization of referents, among other things). On a speech-
At the community level, reanalysis is conceptually necessary, as the hearer needs to record a new use before spreading it further.

Addressing the French *est-ce que* question, Waltereit first gave an overview of the kinds of interrogatives in Modern French (inversion, rising intonation, *est-ce que*), including the semantics of *y/n* and *wh*-questions. He then demonstrated that, in Middle French, *est-ce que* *wh*-questions (‘qu'est-ce que’) were employed to focalize constituents in an utterance, similar to cleft-constructions. The separation of focal (cleft) and topical (*que*-clause) information represented a construction that finally resulted in 'strong' speech acts: ‘*Qu'est-ce que* tu as ici dit?’ – ‘What is this that you have here said?’ This implicature subsequently became conventionalized. Furthermore, the 'unsmooth' question (caused by deictic/anaphoric use of the pronoun *ce* in Old French) lost its special discourse requirements, resulting in its grammaticalization as interrogative particle.

**John Heritage (University of California Los Angeles):**

**Reading history backwards: Clues in contemporary conversational usage to past processes of subjectivization**

John Heritage's talk dealt with the emergence of the turn-initial particle *oh* in its function as a change-of-state token. Heritage examined the use of *oh* in three primary sequential contexts and suggested a conjectural grammaticalization and subjectivization pathway that explains how the original vocative particle gained its contemporary change-of-state semantics.

At the outset, Heritage stated that *oh* is one of the most common turn-initial particles in English; as other turn-initial objects (e.g., conjunctions and address terms), it doesn't play a direct role in the syntax of an utterance but in the positioning of what follows as an action. In its function as a (subjective) change-of-state token, indexing that the speaker has undergone a change of knowledge or awareness, *oh* can occur in a variety of fundamental sequential positions, namely in first, second, and third position. Whereas in the first position of a sequence, *oh* indexes a change of state that is autochthonous to the speaker (e.g., a realization), *oh* in the third position occurs massively in question-answer sequences (question – answer – *oh*), indicating that the questioner shifted from not having knowledge (K-) to having knowledge (K+). Even though often presumed, *oh* thus doesn't function as a 'surprise' token here. *Oh* in second position, prefacing the response to a question, indexes a change of state triggered by the question itself (the question being understood as inappropriate or redundant). By *oh*-prefacing responses to assessments (also second position), speakers index a judgment outside the present moment, often in order to signal an independent point of view.

In the next part, Heritage presented a conjectural pathway for the subjectivization of the original vocative particle *oh*. In classical Latin and Greek, *O* was used as a vocative clitic/particle that preceded address terms (like names) in first position and more abstract items (like Gods and sentiments) in second position. Over time, the address terms and subjective sentiments were not overtly mentioned anymore but had to be inferred from the (sequential) context. In a next step, turn-initial *ohs* concentrated on oppositional/resistive actions and also occurred in combination with comments/recollections. Heritage suggested that this finally led to the
use of *oh*-prefacing responses to questions and assessments (second position), which in turn consolidated the change-of-state semantics of the contemporary *oh*.

**Uwe Küttner (University of Potsdam): The joint production of an inference? Sequential and linguistic aspects of *Oh that's right* as a practice for claiming 'just-now recollection'**

Uwe Küttner examined how 'just now' recollection via *Oh that's right* (OTR) works, analyzing the construction from both a sequential and a linguistic/pragmatic perspective. Furthermore, he checked for participants' inferences involved in the production of OTR-sequences.

Generally following the definition by Gumperz (1982:339), Küttner understands conversational inference as a process of interpretation by means of which participants assess each others' actions, and on which they base their responses. By using *Oh that's right*, speakers of English can implicitly claim "'just now' recollection of something known but not previously taken into account as relevant" (Heritage 1984:339). In order to understand how speakers make use of OTR, Küttner examined its sequential aspects (drawing on OTR-instances taken from English telephone conversations): A first action of speaker A (e.g., a flawed candidate understanding) is followed by a response of speaker B that rejects some of the presumptions conveyed by that first action and which positions the co-participant as 'actually knowing better'. By uttering *Oh that's right*, A accepts this attribution. In this way, both participants jointly produce an inferable 'cognitive' account for the occurrence of the inapposite first action (e.g. the flawed candidate understanding). Thus, OTR is part of a sequentially organized procedure for dealing with interactional problematic actions.

Concerning the inferential work required, both the OTR-speaker (A) and the respondent (B) are involved: For example, whereas B needs to infer that A's first turn is unintendedly incompatible with what should be in the common ground, A needs to hear B's response as issuing a socio-epistemic challenge.

Finally, Küttner addressed the question of how the tokens *oh* and *that's right* contribute to OTR functioning as a pragmatic marker for 'just now' recollection. While *oh* indexes a change of state, *that's right* endorses a prior turn and embodies a tacit claim to independent (i.e. prior) epistemic access. Using *Oh that's right* as a practice for implicitly claiming 'just now' recollection can thus be shown to rest on an inference that has a compositional basis.

**Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen (University of Manchester): Cyclic phenomena in the evolution of pragmatic markers**

Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen's talk covered cyclic developments on the level of semantics and pragmatics. Hansen investigated both semasiological and onomasiological cyclicity, presenting as case studies the emergence of French *déjà* ('already') and *maintenant* ('now').

To begin with, Hansen pointed out that the grammatical cycles that have been identified across languages, strictly speaking are more like spirals, as the initial and final stages of the development resemble each other but are not identical.
The evolution of French *déjà* is a case of semasiological cyclicity: Latin IAM (‘as of now’/‘already’) > Old French (OldFr) *ja* > Modern French (ModFr) *déjà* (< *dès* + *ja*; ‘already’). Presenting the different uses of IAM and its descendants *ja* and *déjà* respectively, Hansen demonstrated that there are areas of semantic/pragmatic overlap between the three particles. However, this does not signify that one and the same meaning simply changed its phonological form over time. Hansen claimed that the etymologically closely related forms IAM, *ja* and *déjà* have repeatedly developed similar pragmatic functions, leading to a similar, but not identical, range of uses.

In contrast, onomasiological cyclicity pertains to the renewal of a similar pragmatic function by etymological *unrelated* forms that, however, have similar meanings. As an example, Hansen presented the case of Latin (NUM >) NUNC > OldFr or > ModFr *maintenant*, again comparing the different functions of each of the particles. NUNC was not only used in the sense of ‘now’ (in contrast to past) but also as a marker for topic shift in certain cases. In Old French, *or* (< Lat. HAI(C) HORA; ‘at this hour’) replaced NUNC, functioning amongst other things as quasi-modal particle and non-temporal discourse connective. The bridging context between these uses and the temporal one can be found in sentences where *or* can have both a temporal (‘now’) and a contrastive (‘however’) reading. Similar to *or*, OldFr/ModFr *maintenant* (present participle of *maintenir*; ‘maintain’) can also have the function of a quasi-modal particle marking a shift in common ground. However, *maintenant* differs from *nunc* and *or* in that it can be used as a hedge as well. Looking at bridging contexts for the different functions of *maintenant*, Hansen presented a case where both a temporal and a shifting meaning are evoked by the particle. As in the case of *déjà*, NUM, NUNC, *or* and *maintenant* also show areas of semantic/pragmatic overlap.

Hansen concluded that there do seem to be cycles/spirals of pragmatisation (either semasiological or onomasiological in nature) analogous to the well-established cycles of grammaticalization. She raised questions concerning the crosslinguistic frequency and importance of such cycles, as well as about possible subtypes and the typical form (push chain vs. drag chain) of semantic/pragmatic cycles.

### 5. References


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Veröffentlicht am 25.7.2017
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